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C::HAPTER I 
Introduction and Purpose 
On the evening of May first, 1945, Dr. Paul Joseph Goebbels 
climbed the steps leading out of the Fuehrer Bunker and walked a 
short way into the Chancellery garden in the heart of Berlin. There 
he paused a moment to survey the shell-pocked landscape, raised a gun 
to his head and shot himself. It was a last act of propaganda, a 
fitting climax to the carefully contrived pageant he had labored for 
over twenty years to create. It was intended to seal the covenant he 
had made with legend, in his own mind and hopefully in the mmnds of 
the German people. 
A few hours later a contingent of Russian troops found his 
staff still at their desks in the Ministry of Public Enlightment and 
~ 
Propaganda, attending to the ongoing neeqs of the German mind amidst 
the flames and bursting she~ls. They had received no orders to stop 
their work. 
The end of the man and his Ministry indicate the amount of 
dedication Goebbels possessed. Whether he can be considered a 
failure is a question one must ask when one considers his fate. 
Goebbels died believing he and his Fuehrer had been betrayed by 
others in the·Nazi hierarchy. Throughout his career he believed 
that his efforts to implement effective propaganda programs were 
being undermined by Nazi officials without expertise and under-
standing of the requirements of such programs. 
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While his Ministry had extraordinary influence over the .. Gennan 
public at large, Goebbels .neve.r·.really enjoyed coll\Plete control of 
the German media. He did not absolutely control the:·press, and was 
constantly at odds with those·,who did. He lamented for years the 
authority of the Wehramacht over military news releases, an 
authority which caused much trouble in efforts for unified and 
effective propaganda. 
His protests to Hitler brought fil:eeti_ng mollification, promises 
and sometimes rebuke. While he lost faith in Hitler towards the end 
of the war, he never lost his impassioned loyalty to the image he 
helped to create. • 1 Hitler, however held Goebbels at armslength 
almost to the end. The Fuehrer maneuvered Goebbels, contended with 
him and guided the little Doktor along the paths he saw fit. He 
never lost sight of the fact that Goebbels was an extremely complex 
and forceful person. Hitler saw to it that Goebbels remained in a 
constant state of conflict with those around him to insure that he 
represented no threat to his own political security. 
If Hitler had accol!)2dated the Minister of Propaganda, reduced 
the conflict, and granted the desired authority at the right times, 
the result of the pr_ograms in the Ministry might well have been 
different. Had Goebbels been able to rally support for his projects 
and gather about himself the cadre he sought, he might have placed 
himself in a position to be much more effectively heared by both 
Hitler and the German.people. 
_Again, if Goebbels himself had .been able to contravene the 
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effects of his passionate affection for the person of the Fuehrer he 
might have acted more reasonably towards the end of the war, As it 
was, his work and his efforts were markedly impeded by circumstances 
out of his control, politically, and personally. According to such 
an argument, it might be said he failed in his endeavor. But one 
should consider his accomplishments and philosophy before assuming 
failure on the part of Joseph Goebbels. 
Before his death he created a system of evaluati.ng and 
disseminating information to a state, and later, to a continent 
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which, in theory, might have worked had it not been for the inability 
of those around him to appreciate it. In his early career he 
mastered the art of political activism on a scale that has yet to be 
effectively equaled. He first grasped the true value of radio as a 
means of warfare and exploitation.· While he publically professed an 
acute contempt for the German masses, he successfully manipulated the 
thinking of some six_ty million people for many years. His philosophy 
and policy has been studied as a supreme example, alb£!:t Machiavellian, 
of the art of psychological manipulation of a mass using the most 
modern techniques of his day. His procedures in the exploitation of 
subdued cultures through mass media w~ effective in the case of 
France and Holland, and for a time even E.ngland under siege. 
It is the aim of this thesis to explore the structure of the 
propaganda organization in Nazi Germany under Goebbels, illustrate 
his technique, specifically in radio, relate both to his philosophy, 
and in doing so to ascertain the nature of his efforts in relation 
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to the efforts of others with whom he had to contend, and with whom he 
came into conflict. Finally, as an adjunct, to illustrate whether he 
actually succeded or failed in his calling. 
In the light of these aims, the following questions will be answered 
in the course of this thesis: 
1. What characterized the organizational structure of the 
Propaganda Ministry? 
2. What characterized Goebbels' technique? 
3. What was Goebbels' philosophy of propaganda and was it 
consistent with his techniques? 
4. What is the measure of Goebbels' success and- failure? 
Some rather extensive efforts were made in the course of 
research on this thesis. The author, for instance,·checked the 
Library of Congress in Washington, D.C. for a comprehensive 
listing of English and German information on Geobbels. In some 
cases there was a wait of up to five months in obtaining certain 
materials. 
It is perhaps in order to remark that some biographical 
information is included not as romantic generalization, but rather 
to provide an insight into some of the early experiences and 
influences that played a large and significant part in Goebbels' 
development. Such information is essential in understanding the 
unique environment, upbringing and education out of which Goebbels 
arose. This information may serve to provide some basis for 
examining the psychological constitution of Goebbels. 
CHAPTER II 
Procedure and Criteria 
The sources utilized in this thesis are primarily the surviving 
texts of Goebbels ' own diaries, the minutes of his secret conferences, 
and the diaries of ~udolph Semmler , his press chief of many years . 
Goebbels believed himself to be the curator of the official Nazi 
history and wrote copious accounts of his day-to-day activities and 
impressions throughout his career. He would dictate these accounts 
to a stenographer for hours at the end of each day and they would be 
transcribed and bound. He did so with the intention of utilizing 
them after retirement in the composition of historic memoirs which 
he believed would be the standard work on the founding and development 
of the Thi rd Reich. They are at once candid and embellished and 
obviously written with public and scholarly consumption in mind. 
Actually , most of his c reative work was written in the diary 
format , i . e . Michael, a semi-autobiographical novel . His earlier 
diaries, which he began as a student , are much more candid, not 
having been written necessarily for public consumption, and are very 
poetic. He fancied himse lf an activist, revolutionary and a martyr . 
The official diaries, however, have come down to us only in 
part . They were found in rubble and preserved, having been translated 
by Louis Lochner, a wire service correspondent in Germany during the 
war . These diaries run for about seventeen months , with gaps of up 
to a month at points . It is believed that the diaries survived in 
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toto and were found by the advancing Russian armies who neither 
deny nor confirm possession. 
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Those that remain are sufficient, however, to provide a clear 
insight into the method, technique and philosophy of the propagandist. 
They depict a callous, but sometimes remorseful, attitude toward the 
aberant form of journalism that the Nazis developed. They also 
indicate clearly that Dr. Goebbels worked in an atmosphere of 
continuous conflict with the other strongmen in the Nazi upper 
echelons. Goebbels pulled no punches in his descriptions of his 
confederates and, as an educated man, showed great contempt for some 
of his less enlightened collegues. -
A German peasant, working in the Chancell.!::Y area happened upon 
a stack of carbon copy minutes among piles of waste paper he was 
intending to gather and sell as fuel shortly after the surrender. 
He glanced at the top sheets and realized what he had found and took 
the stack to the allied headquarters in Berlin. A translator was 
hastily summoned and the papers were found to be duplicates of the 
minutes of Goebbels' daily staff meetings for about five and one half 
years. Goebbels met daily with the chiefs of all departments in the 
Propaganda Ministry to discuss tactics, the day's news, cultural 
activities in the arts, cinema, and song, along with specific 
propaganda programs. Minutes were kept of these meetings by an aide. 
They are often rather cryptic and presented a far more difficult task 
in translation, as much jargon and quirks of phra::5:logy were used at 
the meetings as a matter of course. These minutes were definitely 
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not meant for public consumption and are c learly a very vivid 
picture of how the inner corp of propagandists functioned and inter-
acted in the disposition of the dail y requirements of the Ministry . 
Nazi policy and technique are described here in such a manner that 
much of what is found in a similar vein in the diaries , is con£irmed . 
These minutes also fill in many gaps found in the diaries and run 
from nineteen thirty-nine to nineteen forty-four . There is less 
critism of Goebbels ' collegues to be found in the minutes and far -
more of the callous, cavalier treatment of the journalistic field . 
This cavalier treatment of journalism, as well as other ploys 
utilized by the Third Reich were not lost on one Rudolph Semmler , who 
acted as Goebbels' press aide for many years . This document comes 
down to us through his widow who received the document shortly before 
the fall of Berlin. Whether Semmler wanted to publish these diaries 
before or as he wrote them is not certain , but they do provide a 
valuable insight into the mannerisms , presence , and countinance of 
Goebbels as a man, and a forceful evaluation of Goebbels the 
propagandist. Semmler remained an a ide to Goebbels throughout many 
of Goebbels ' significant quarrels and caustically acknowledged the 
breakdown of the Ministry ' s credibility toward the end of the war. 
It is through these sources and many historical works on the 
Ministry and Goebbel s that the questi ons of success or failure will 
be approached. Unlike most of the Nazi leaders, Goebbels unwavering 
devotion to his diaries serves to provide an on- the-spot l ook at the 
issues surrounding the question . The minutes serve to confirm the 
assertions made in the diaries and Semmler's records provide an 
excellent alternative viewpoint from which to assess the foregoing . 
This study will be augmented by other resources which will p rovide a 
p i cture of the overall composition of the propaganda machine in ✓ 
additi on to providing a personal perspective on Dr . Goebbels life . 
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It is impossible to prove that what Goebbels did was a lways 
effective since evidence is overwhelming that in many cases he fai led 
dismally, but the failures were in specific instances, as will be 
shown . While it may indeed be true that Dr . Goebbels lost some 
battles, the issue of whether he lost the war remains to be seen . 
The principal concern of any determination of success or failure 
is the propaganda itself . This thesis attends to a specific man in 
a specific system at a particular point in history. Even so, in 
order to make any judgement about the mission and the execution of the 
mission , the term, the idea, that is "propaganda", must be c l arified 
at the onset. The word "clarified" is used because , although volumes 
of work have been done on the idea, the term "propaganda" has not 
adquately been defined and there is no consensus on what the term 
encompasses actual l y and totally. 
The terms necessarily utilized in attempting to c l arify the idea 
of propaganda are as cumbersome in any general sense as the term 
propaganda itself. One must speak of the "ideals" i n a given 
"society", which a r e represented in the discernable actions of its 
citizenry , or its "public ". The reader may explore t housands of 
sources where attempt ed definitions of terms are much more ably set 
out than could possibly be done here. Let it suffice to say that 
the reader can locate discussion on these terms anywhere from Plato 
to Webster as best sui ts his or her needs in eval uating the 
description of propaganda furnished here . 
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Rather, it is more to the descriptive needs of any discussion on 
propaganda to deal with specific questions that are commonly found 
on the subject . For example , one inevitablely finds some attempt to 
place the term in the general category of an art or a science . No 
argument exists that irrefutabl y places it excl usivel y in either 
categor y . This is because propaganda apparently shares the qualities 
of both . 
Whil e propaganda, more and more , in utilizing the scientific 
methods found in demography, polli ng and a host of social sciences it 
is also , according to some of its prominent practit ioners , as we shal l 
see l ater , a largely intuitive and subjective activity . It includes 
the evaluation of fact and construct in its psychol ogical 
applications and in that vein is becoming infinitely more 
sophisticated in the results it brings . But the ver y nature of the 
pursui t and the e l ements involved , ~e ., society, the determination of 
ideals , mores , legend, folklore, opinion and others , must involve an 
intuitive judgement that , often as not , comes straight from the hip 
of even the most scientific practitioner . 
It is necessary to view propaganda and the propagandist in the 
context of the kind of state that spawns either. The parameters 
within which a propagandist operates will differ , say , between a 
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totalitarian or police state and a democracy. The totalitarian 
propagandist enjoys greater freedom from restraint of the demands of 
the individual's right to know, from the inherent viability of his 
government's official position, in the eyes of the governed, and even 
from the access the people have to alternative positions as permitted 
by the government. 
In a democracy, hopefully, there is more substance to the 
potential enlightrnent in the p~ople. The government is in a position 
to influence the tliinki_ng of the people, but ideally from the stand-
point of the popular welfare of the people rather than the government. 
It is incumbent upon a democratic government to factually represent 
its position to its constituents and therefore the propagandists 
must, to a greater degree than in a totalitarian environment, work 
with the facts as they are given to him. As Huxley states, 
"In a Democratic state the propagandist will 
have rivals competing with him for the support 
of the public. In totalitarian states there 
is no liberty of expression for writers and 
no liberty of choice for their readers. There 
is only one propagandist-- the state."l 
Propaganda involves the pass_age of ideas from a source to a 
repeptor. As such, the process includes several elements. An 
originator or communicator, must have an idea to pass on and must do 
it through some kind of medium or means of communication. Such a 
li Huxley, Aldous, "Notes on Propaganda 11 , Harpers Magazine, 
Vol. 174, December, 1936, pp.31-42. 
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medium can be the printed word, or electronic media. The medium must, 
of course, reach some kind of audience. And finally, there must exist 
some kind of effect on the audience. While these elements are grossly 
oversimplified they provide a basic framework within which the 
prop.aganda process can be discerned. 
Who is the propagandist? What qualities must one possess to be 
considered a propagandist? Again, it is a matter of inconclusive 
debate as to what one must be. It is best to :try and broach this 
line of inquiry by attempting to describe the aims of the 
propagandist. As mentioned above the propagandist tiries to reach an 
audience. It is a matter of dispute whether propaganda is an 
exclusively deliberative process. Arguments exist that propaganda 
can be accidental. It may be possible for even the most avidly self-
proclaimed objectivists to propagandize without realizing it. 
It is safe to assume, however, that most propaganda occurs as a 
result of some design. An aim must be pres's'nt. As we shall see 
later, many scholars and practitioners assert that in order for 
prop.aganda to truly exist there must be some predd,lected result. 
This necessarily implies a consciously desired goal on the part of 
the propagandist. He must have previously discerned a problem, 
condition, or state of affairs which he desires changed or 
re-affirmed. There must be a will or desire to effect a compulsion 
of some kind. As he designs his polemic approach he must be 
sensitive to the constitution of his intended.audience or he will 
not reach them. 
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Dispute arises in discussion on the subject of whether the 
propagandist tries to reach a specific public or a mass. A specific 
public is a group which shares a discernable common interest while a 
mass is simply a group of unrelated individuals . To reach either 
requires a different approach. 
The propagandist may be an educator as the educator may be a 
propagandi st. It is not reasonable t o presume that they are mutual ly 
exclusive, as both share the qualities of the other , incidently or by 
design. 
Jacques Ellul wiJ.'i provides an adequate summary of what 
propaganda may incl ude and attends to. First he indicates that 
modern propaganda must include research and scientific analysis in a 
sociological and psychological manner. Second , propaganda must 
intend to establish a set of rules that are possibl e to test . Third, 
W propaganda must i nclude a study of the man and his environment. 
Finally that the propagandist must try to measure and define the 
2 effects of propaganda in order to effectively contr ol its use. 
So far the reader has been introduced to some of the basic 
questi ons i nvolved in the ongoing discussion on propaganda . There is 
a bibliography furnished to provide resources for further 
investigation of this illusive and fascinating subject. 
2 Ellul , Jacques , Propaganda , The Formation of Men's Attitudes 
(Vintage Books , New York) 1973 , pp.4- 5 . 
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The Nazi experience is included as an element in this general 
discussion in many works and appears as a specific stage in the 
development of the art or science of propaganda. For the purposes 
of this paper it would be insufficient to simply examine the general 
nature of arguments and theory in propaganda. The Nazi ' s basic 
approach was formulated at a time when technology advanced to the 
point of world wide extension of the human communicator to a popular 
mass . World communications had been in the process of development 
for some time but only a limited f ew who possessed the technological 
know- how could actually participate i n it. With the advent of radi o 
as more than a seri es of dot- dash means of communicating , the public 
found that they could sit at home and bear witness to events that 
occurred on another contient at the t ime t hey occurred . This was 
not lost on the Nazis. 
In a late r chapt er the policy toward radio broadcasting, 
manufacture and use will be described in detail . Their visions 
concerning radio were rather singular in nature . 
Propaganda in the Third Reich will be presented here in a 
summary manner only t o qualify it in light of the ge neral references 
made above. Hitler wrote extensivel y on the subject and in his earl y 
career compiled his thinking in Mein Kampf . 
Hitler stressed psycho logy not as a scientist but as an 
activist. He did not concern himself with psychology as an 
instrument by which one could gain knowledge of the human mind for 
its own sake . He desired whatever axiomatic precepts he could glean 
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that produced effects favorable to the advancement of his aims . He 
uses the term "psychological" often in his discourse on the subject 
of propaganda but only in the context of differentiating a thoughtful 
evaluation of man from simple unthoughtful guesswork, or outmoded 
European reliance on social archetypes. 
His evaluation was largely instinctive, predicated upon his own 
observation of human behavior and constitution . He held adamantly, 
for instance, that the German mass was capable of only elemental 
education through propaganda . Their capacities did not extend 
beyond rote memory, and that, only at great effort and stimulation 
on the part of the informing agent . They were most susceptable to 
basic primitive sentiment and most access~le through emotions. 
As he believed this, his propagandistic principles were 
accordingly formulated. He held that effective propaganda must be 
first and formost , extremely simple. No compound or complex ideas 
must be asserted in any attempt to propagandize . Only simple ideas 
could attract and hold the attention of the mass. As such , the 
purpose of propaganda was to simply attract attention. As he 
believed that the masses were slow to learn he also asserted that 
they were easy to forget. Given this low retention capability on 
the part of his audience, Hitler proposed that effective propaganda 
must be repetitive . 
He cited the need for carefully contrived and sus tained 
continuity in propaganda of a simple , emotional and ongoing nature 
as a cardinal must in any formula. To break the continuity the 
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propagandist sacrificed all efforts to implant'ideas in so 
unreceptive an audience. If the continuity breaks, the attention is 
wost and the propaganda fails. 
Hitler also lamented the German failure in their propaganda 
efforts duri_ng the first World War. He mentioned the caricatures 
of ~llied troops found in German funny papers during that time, 
depicting the allied troops as fools and incompetent morons. When 
the German soldier\ conf~onted the real foe on the field of battle he 
was, acco:ildi_ng to Hitler, disscl>lutioned by the lack of his government's 
awareness of the real foe and the cavalier manner in which they 
prepared their soldiers to meet him. IJ Hitler also landed the American 
efforts, as well as the British, for the manner in which they prepared 
their boops to meet the German Soldruer. The Allies depicted the 
German soldier as the "Hun" and the "Barbarian 11 , imbued with hostile 
charactaristics and brutality. This was very successful according 
to Hitler as this kind of propaganda served the Allies very well. 
He indicated that they did not bandy about with possibilities, but 
saw to it that their interests were well served. 
He goes on to assert that propaganda must serve the interests 
of those it attends to, first. It is folly to present objective and 
impartial accounts to the people at your expense. Propaganda must 
support only your side. 
He saw propaganda as essentially a means rather than an end. 
He differentiated, in the context of political organization, between 
supporters who simply accepted the particular doctrine advocated, 
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and members who participated in the furtherance of the doctrine, 
actively. A supporter was passive, simply accepting. Propaganda 
attends to the acquisition of supporters while the organization draws 
members from the host of supporters. The members, then, precipitated 
further propaganda. Propaganda, in this context, did not necessarily 
need to concern itself with each and every individual in the mass, 
but rather to the mass itself, from which grew support. 
Hitler, for reasons which have been disputed by most, if not all, 
biographers, seemed to possess an aversion for academics and 
intellectuals. Whether this was due to his own lack of recognized 
f, 
education, or some personal insecurity, it not of major importance 
here, except to illustrate the following precept in his propaganda 
philosophy. He completely discounted the necessity for trying to 
sway the intellectual through propaganda. He continually desried 
attempts to generate propaganda aimed at the intellectual and the 
aesthete. Whether he simply discounted their political value or 
realized that they were, at that time, simply not susceptible to the 
kind of psychological approach utilized in Nazi propaganda is not 
known. 
To grasp some of the general precepts of the Hitlerian philosophy 
in propaganda is to understand Nazi propaganda and the foundation of 
Joseph Goebbels' approach. As will be seen later, Goebbels, on the 
event on his first encounter with Hitler, believed he had discovered 
a genius at the endeavor. Most of his own formulations in the area 
were well educated, sophisticated, extrapolations of the Hitlerian 
\ 
concept. 
It remains then to tell·of.the.~an before we can.really grasp 
the aubtitles of his phi.losophy·. -
17 
CHAPTER III 
Goebbels the Man 
The town of Rheydt, in the Ruhr Valley, has best been described 
as dismal. It is a smallish industrial town which, at the time of 
Goebbels' early childhood was dominated by manufacturing and textiles. 
It was in a small but respectable house on Odenkirchener Strasse that 
Joseph Goebbels was born on October 29, 1897. 
The street was narrow and the houses cramped. The back view, 
with which young Joseph was to become very familiar in his childhood, 
overlooked a barren lot. The little room, which he would call his 
refuge, commanded this view and he was to come to hate and love the 
grim solace offered here. 
His father, Friedrich Goebbels was the son of a manual laborer. 
He longed for middle class respectability and projected his fierce 
longing into his son for whom he had great hopes. Friedrich spent 
his life worki_ng for W.H. Lemartz of Rheydt, a manufacturer of gas 
lamp mantles. In later years he rose from a clerk position to that 
of a minor director. In doing this he cast off the bare vestiges 
of the lower classes. It was a small victory but very significant 
to Friedrich. The Goebbels family lived 6n a salary of about six 
hundred dollars per year. 
Friedrich married Katherina Maria Oldenhausen, of Dutch origin 
who later became a naturalized German citizen. She was the daughter 
of a blacksmith, a simple woman who has been characterized~ by many 
18 
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biographical accounts as a person o~ great faith and exceedingly 
strong character . Her stalwart, Catholic approach of life was to 
figure meaningfully in her son's later conception of the German mass . 
Goebbels recal led to his close colleagues on several occasions 
that she was like a rock in the face of calamity and that her faith 
seemed pull her through many trials . He would speak of a specific 
experience when his father was overcome by some affliction and she 
gathered all her children about her and told them to pray for their 
father ' s safe recovery , which seemed to be very unlikely. Her faith, 
said Goebbels, was the reasons for Friedrich ' s recovery and was a 
lesson not lost on the youth . 
Joseph was brought into the world at a time when class 
distinctions counted for a very great deal in central Europe and 
h is father and mother hoped to see their young son c l imb to great 
heights . His brothers and sisters seemed not to have any particular 
gifts and they were bound to follow their parents roles in the 
culture . Joseph, however , demonstrated an early penchant for 
academics . 
Hi s first experience in the public schools was a happy one and 
he appeared to be a bright, well- liked and well-ba l anced young boy . 
At the age of five he encountered his first bout with a tough 
reality in life. The true meaning of being different. As Manville 
and Fraenkel describe the scene , 
"One day •.• he was sitting on the sofa in the gute 
Strube, the parlor on the first floor of the 
house. Suddenly he began to cry so inconsolably 
that the doctor was eventually brought to examine 
him. He immediately ordered an operation. Joseph 
had infantile paralysis."1 
The exact nature of the affliction was called Osteomelytis. 
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This is an affliction of the bone marrow that apparently retards the 
growth of isolated areas of the body. Claims that Goebbels had a 
genetic abnormality are erroneous. Authority claims were a pppular 
mode of attack and the term "clubfoot" was inacurate. -
The effect of the disorder was accute. The operation was 
completely unsuccessful and Joseph returned home with his left leg 
some four inches shorter than his right. If the effect was accute 
upon his return home, his return to school was shattering. It is not 
generally the nature of five-year-old children to be syrnpathetic 1 and 
the abnormality was made very clear to tqe child. Ebermayer and 
Meissner aptly describe the environment he had to contend with, 
"The upbringing of his former sbhool friends 
had hardly fitted them to deal with such a 
situation. Joseph's crippled body and large 
intelligent head ernbarrased them so they took 
refuge in ridicule. From that day forward he 
was teased unmercifully. His clumsy attempts 
to walk were met with derisive laughter. They 
wrote 'Joe Club-foot' and 'Old Limping Louse' 
on the blackboard and yelled these and other 
equally descriptive nicknames after him as he 
limped down the street."2 
1 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His 
Life and Death (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.2. 
2 Eberrnayer, Erfch, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, Evil Genius, The 
Story of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wi.ngate, London) 1953, p.11. 
It is not the purpose of so graphic a description to be morbid 
but rather to impress the reader with a circumstance that was to 
affect the man throughout his life. He was, at five years old, in 
a position to deal with these taunts only as five-year-old children 
might. 
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His whole psychological constitution was wrenched by this on-
going experience from the earliest periods of his formulative years. 
He was "different". As Manville and Fraenkel point out, 
"So Joseph's earliest recollections were of 
unhappiness and abnormality. It was obvious 
to him that his condition pained his parents 
and from his early childhood self doubt was 
i_ngrained in his nature. 113 
The self-doubt was a destructive and prohibitive element in his 
personality. It was. destructive in that he was never in his life 
capable of really accepting love from the women he encountered, his 
wife, and even himself. It was prohibitive in that he never had the 
capacity to rely on his own worth in the measure of his accomplish-
ments. He was always an element in someone else's plans and in some 
greater scheme. This, it seems is why Hitler filled such a void in 
him, as we shall see later. 
Young Goebbels was not popular and became more and more 
reclusive. This is not suppising in light of th~ social environment 
he had to contend with in school. He began to withdraw and concentrate 
on his internal drives for satisfaction. 
3 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His 
Life and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.3. 
During his elementary education he discovered that he 
possessed an exceedingly quick mind and an able memory. His early 
academic success bro,ught him a measure of sorely needed acceptance 
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and rec,ognition, not necessarily from his peers, but from his 
instructors. He came to thrive on this and began to devour literature. 
His parents had a copy of an out-dated edition of Meyer's 
Konversationslexikon, an encyclopedia. He used this to extend his 
horizons and found that his knowle.dge surpassed his peers, 
imeasurably. He would leave the jeers that came through his bedroom -
window and read voraciously. He read Virgil, Caesar, Goethe and 
many other authors at a very young age. 
The development of his mind was not lost on his parents. They 
began to re-evaluate their opinion of Joseph and decided to commit 
their meager funds to send him to the German equivalent of high 
school, the Gymnaisum. Such a commitment on the part of a minor 
director's family was major indeed. High School at that time, was 
not under the public school system and was available to those who had 
excelled and who's family had the means to enroll promising young. 
It should be pointed out that Joseph's academic experienee was 
only an element in his development. His intellectual prowess was 
sometimes given to a snobbishness and he tended to flaunt his know-
ledge in school. He was over enthusiastic in his school work and he 
often created resentment when he corrected his fellow students and 
even his teachers. Ebermayer and Meissner assert, 
"The fact that he was invariably right added 
to his unpopularity. His school fellows called 
him "Mr. Knowall" and the teachers were 
infuriated by what they chose to call his 
intellectual snobbery. Had they known it, 
the boy would more often than not remained 
silent when he could have answered some 
questions correctly because, despise his 
companions as he might for their ignorance, 
deep down in his heart he longed for their 
admiration and respect."4 
He was given the nickname of "Ulex@'; which meant the sly one. He 
actually rather liked the name, and would recall it later in life 
with fondness. 
Goebbels passed through the Gymnasium at the top of his class. 
The school provided a classical education which culminated in the 
administration of a college entrance exam called the "arbiturium" 
or "matura<iii; taken at the age of eighteen. 
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The young man desired to continue his education and sought funds 
for fees from the Catholic church. His vague ambition was to be a 
priestpbut upon being interviewed by a member of the Albertus 
Magnus Society, a scholarship foundation, he was told that while he 
would receive funds, he was not to study theology. 
He was given a scholarship for two years and matriculated to 
Bonn University. From there he studied at Heidelburg, Freiburg, 
WUerzburg, Cologne, Frankfurt, Berlin, Munich and back to Hiedelburg 
where he took his Ph.D. in 1921. It was not unsual for a college 
4 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, Evil Genius, The 
Story of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wingate, London) 1953, p.12. 
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student to study at many universities but Goebbels was largely 
unclear about what he wanted to take his degree in and studied 
Philosophy, History, Literature, Art, Latin and Greek. He 
specialized in Goethe and later wrote a dissertation entitled, 
Wilhelm von Schultz, A Contribution to the History of Romantic Drama. 
His degree, while most intellectually elevating, prepared him to do 
absolutely nothing. It had no practical value and Goebbels found 
himself faced with the prospect of unemployment. Things were none 
too good for post-war Germany as a whole and lean years awaited the 
yo~ng Doktor. He applied for positions at several newspapers, 
having submitted numerous articles, none of which were published. 
The aspiring writer produced an autobiographical novel entitled, 
Michael which was not published until his rise to power. He then 
wrote two plays, The Wanderer, a lyric work on the life of Jesus and 
another entitled, The Lonesome Guest, also a lyric piece. Neither 
qs 
were produced until his rise to power and nei~her had a very long run 
when they were produced. Like Hitler, Goebbels underwent the 
experience of the frustrated artist. His lot was not happy,and he 
often returned home in desperation for food and shelter. His 
parents, none too happy about the dead-end their son faced after all 
their sacrifices, took him in a circumstance which Goebbels detested. 
At a political meeting on June 22, 1922, Hitler spoke in Munich's 
Circus Crone before an audience of eight thousand. Goebbels 
attended, although he was undergoing a deep period of depression. 
His political and social sentiments were bordering upon Nihilism. 
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At this point he was absolutely ready to embrace something, 
some idea, that would fill the void in him. Every where he turned 
he had met with dissilusionment and rejection. Bursting with mental 
energy, all that was needed was a spark to set everything inside him 
in motion. 
Standing in the crowd, he waited for the meeting to proceed . 
Riess cites Goebbels' recollection of what happened next , 
"I hardly realized that suddenly someone was 
standing up there and had begun to talk, 
hesitantly and shyly at first, as though 
groping for words adequate enough to express 
thoughts whose greatness would not fit into 
the narrow confines of ordinary language . Then 
suddenly, the speech gathered momentum. I was 
caught , I was listening ... I didn 't know what 
was happening . .. I was beside myself. I was 
shouting hurrah! The man up there looked at 
me for a moment. His blue eyes met my glance 
like a flame. This was a command ! At that 
moment I was reborn. Now I knew which road to 
take. 115 
For the next year he would begin to follow politics voraciously. 
While he continued to idolize Hitler , some tennants of the Nazi 
manifesto were not to his liking and he vascillated from party to 
party in the right- wing segment of the German politi cal spectrum . 
Goebbels found meager work at one hundred marks per month with 
the right-wing pat:ty the Voelkische Freiheitspartei, under Franz von 
Wiergershaus, a Reichstag Deputy . Through the meeting held by this 
party he came into contact with some of the members of the Nazi party 
5 Riess, Curt , Joseph Goebbel s , (Ballantine Books, New York, 
New York) 1948, p . 12 . 
who espoused similar views. He met Karl Kaufmann, Gauleiter of the 
Rhine-Ruhr district. Kaufmann introduced Goebbels to Gregor and 
Otto Strasser, strong men in the northern sections of the party and 
he secured a position as an editorial assistant under them in the 
'publication of the Geistiges Fuehrungsorgan, the organ of spiritual 
leadership. He replaced .a young poultry farmer by the name of 
Heinrich Himmler, who had just vacated '!!he job. This was lin 1924. 
The Strassers noted that Goebbels had an excellent voice. In 
addition to his editorial duties he was given the position of 
business manager of the Rhineland-Nord Gau. Actually this included 
Al--
the principle duty of maki_ng speeches and organizing meetings. He 
became proficient at the small audience address. Riess says, 
11He became a forceful agitator; necessity 
de~eloped him. He was able to step onto 
the platform and deliver a speech to a 
public loudly proclaiming it's distrust ... 
He soon realized ..• that the very same words 
said over and over again had the effect of a 
sledge hammer (a truth which Hitler also 
discovered) . 6 
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It was in this early days that his technique and style were honed to 
a fine edge. He spoke everywhere in his district. Goebbels' 
talents became more in demand and, as his experience grew, the 
crowds grew. Ultimately he would have to develop a very complex 
technique to accomodate both a live and radio audience. Manvell. 
and Fraenkel point out, 
6 Riess, Curt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York, 
New York) 1948, p.20. 
"He •.. had to master the most difficult of 
techniques, the art of addressing a large 
audience from a platform while ·at the ·same 
time using a microphone for transmission of 
the speech over the radio. For the skilled 
orator, direct address to an assembled audience 
is a matter ofestablishing the correct level 
of vocal projection that will give him complete 
mastery over his hearer's attention. Goebbels 
was, of course, thoroughly experienced in this 
largely instinctive technique. But to effect 
the right degree of projection to suit a 
microphone only two feet from one's face while 
at the same time endeavoring to reach out with 
his voice to the boundries of a packed hall is 
a matter of highly skilled technical 
compromise. 117 
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Meanwhile, the Strassers were preparing to publish the National 
Socialist Brief which Goebbels worked on. In these weekly 
publications he espoused socialist theories and spoke of an alliance 
with the Soviet Union. This was the main line of the northern Nazis. 
Such a line was not consistant with the line the southern party 
elements were holding under Hitler. Hitler had just been released 
from prison and was back at the helm of the party with the reluctant 
acquiesce of the Strassers. He was courting the nobility for some 
funds and was against the idea of state appropriation of royal land 
holdi_ngs. The northern segments were in favor of the idea as it was 
consistant with the more pure socialist line they followed. Goebbels, 
eager to please his employers, spoke ardently _against Hitler at a 
meeti_ng of conciliation called at the height of the internal party 
7 
Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His 
Life and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.117. 
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strife on the issue. Hitler was not present at the meeti.ng and it is 
doubtful that he heard exactly what Goebbels said about him. He had, 
however, heard that Dr. Goebbels was exceedingly effective in 
motivating the mobs. He had also heard that Strasser had remarked 
that Goebbels was easy to bribe. Hitler, after the meeting, invited 
Goebbels to Munich for the purpose of making a speech. 
He was received royally and acco~dated in fine hotels. Hitler 
lent his party his personal car. For Goebbels, who was earning some 
two hundred marks per month, this was undreamed of luxury. He was 
used to the grim, spartan, worker-oriented attitude of the Strassers 
in the north. Hitler, in Munich, was a public figure of notoriety 
and substance and courted the rich for funding. 
Hitler spoke at length with the bedazzled young Doktor and so 
impressed him that he returned to sing Hitler's praises in the north. 
He abandoned the Strassers and accepted Hitler's inference that he 
might make Goebbels his propaganda chief. He was to be dissappointed, 
however, as Hitler made Strasser his propaganda chief. Hitler had 
other things in mind for Goebbels. 
On October 26, 1926, slightly less than four years after he had 
first heard Hitler speak, he received a letter appointing him 
Gauleiter of Berlin. There were two major drawbacks to the new 
assignment. One was intennal strife in the party there, with tough 
rowdy factions at odds with one another. The other was that the Nazis 
were a minute organization in Berlin where the communists held a great 
majority and what they didn't hold, the Social Democrats did. 
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Upon his arrival he was even less impressed with the conditions 
of Nazi operations . The office where the "work'' was done was a filthy 
basement on the Potsdamerstrasse. The bookkeeping was done by one 
man who did so largely from memory . The party was in debt and most 
of the one thousand members were out of work. Goebbels went through 
the lists of membership and proceeded to weed out the dissident and 
unhelpful. He expelled over four hundred members , keeping with Hitlers 
precept that while propaganda may attract followers , organization must 
attract members who are willing to work rather than simply advocate . 
The party was almost anonymous in the huge city and to establish 
some public awareness Goebbels rented a Communist meeting hall on 
February 11, 1926. He had large red posters printed and distributed 
throughout the city . They looked like the 0:>rnmunist posters. To 
create further incitrnent he staged a parade through the ~ommunist 
section of the city on the way to the hall . 
Upon their arrival thousands of Communists and Socialists were 
waiting and the meeting started with a hugh brawl. This was 
precisely what Goebbels had planned. When the poli ce arrived he had 
the i ngured storm tmoppers placed on the platform i n front of him and 
spoke to the audience as they moaned beneath him. It was the 
beginning of the Nazi pageant and it was effective. The press 
covered the event , albeit unfavorably , but in three days the little 
office in the basement called the ' opium den ' received twenty six 
hundred applications for membership and five hundred for the S.A . 
The party continued to incite riots and disrupt meetings of 
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other parties . Goebbels was ruthless and demonstrated great personal 
courage in some of the battles . The Berlin government cracked down 
on the Nazis, forbidd~ng them to operate or hold meetings . He then 
began to create subversive organizations and went underground. After 
a period of time the restrictions proved ineffective and were 
rescinted . 
Goebbels established a small newspaper called Der Angriff , 
through which he could voice his opinions without r estriction . While 
the paper had a long run it never really amassed a notable circulation. 
Goebbels continued to play upon the insecurity of the people and 
the unstable conditions of the government in Germany. Any instability 
in the established government was a boon to the Nazis . Membership 
grew and it became appearant that Hitler had made a wise choice in 
the appointment of Goebbels in Berlin. He had overcome great 
obsticles in establishing the M.S . D.A . P. city and when Hitler came -
to power Dr . Goebbels was made the Minister of Propaganda. 
On March 14 , 1933 Goebbels was created Minister for National 
Enlightment and Propaganda . He assumed the post after a period of 
fright and great worry that he would be left out of the distribution 
of spoil s that his collegues were participating in since the 
8 
appointment of Hitler as Chancellor. Hitler had at first been vague 
8 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto , Evil Genius , The 
Story of Joseph Goebbels , (Allan Wingate, London) 1953 , pp . 94-95 . 
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about Goebbels' future role and had left the little Doktor wondering 
if his time as a valuable member of the inner circle of the new 
regieme had not come to an end. 
It had not, however, and the New Ministry placed him solidly in 
the cabinet of the new Reich. He did not have the kind of power over 
the active elements of the government that the other, already 
established Ministerial posts did. He had a unique kind of influence 
or dominance, rather, over the minds of the people; over what they 
read, what they heard and over what they tho.ught. We will delve into 
the structure of the Ministry in a later chapter when we illustrate 
the inherent conflict that the structure caused. 
At this point it will be interesti.ng to note the kind of 
beaurocrat that Goebbels became. Even at the onset of the ---
establishment of the Ministry, Goebbels had problems with his peers 
in the other Ministries and he found that they had become very 
ambitious and ruthless amongst each other in their lust for power. 
Rudolph Semmler, in his diary entry for April 22, 1941, aptly 
illustrates Goebbels' frame of mind, 
Goebbels is full of distrust of the men around him, 
even of those closely connected with him. He 
maintains that this puts him in good company with 
Frederick the Great, Bismark and Hitler himself, 
all classic examples of the suspicious nature of 
great menn .•. Goebbels himself watches the scene 
around him like a watchman on a tower with a 
telescope, always suspecting that somewhere 
intrigues are going on that may threaten his position. 9 
9 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.29. 
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This kind of attitude was to contribute to his downfall. The 
attitude, itself, was not entirely a beast of Goebbels' imagination 
or even totally the result of his own actions in relation to others. 
By the start of the war there was an active movement underway to 
unseat him and to destroy the credibility of the Ministry. Being 
aware of this he came to lose some of his faith in the staff of the 
Ministry. As Semmler points out, 
"Goebbels secretly distrusts all his staffi He 
sees the worst side of every human being and 
admits freely that he has become an uncompromising 
misanthropist. Moreover, he always believes that 
important matters are concealed from him, or that 
people are trying to cut him off from the outside 
world, If he is left undisturbed for more than an 
hour - that is to say if an hour passes with~ut him 
seeing a press message from abroad, or having made 
some rapid decision or being called from his room 
for some urgent telephone conversation."10 
The effect on the Ministry that this kind of attitude had was 
damagi_ng as it precluded much valuable input from his subordinates. 
As we saw in.the introduction, the fact in the Ministry when Berlin 
was captured, indicates that Goebbels' attitude was not wholly 
founded on reality. Indeed, Goebbels had closed his mind off to 
much in the way of help and true human value by the very philosophy 
he had toward politics in general. Semmler quotes Goebbels on 
April 26, 1941, 
10 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.29. 
:.~ .. -:_.! 
"Politics ruin the. character; they develop the 
worst and .mean_est·.quc1lities _by forc;j,ng into the 
front of men's minds.their ambition, their vanity, 
their competitive spirit,and their passion for 
influence and cheap popularity. The cause they 
are serving is pushed into. the bac_kground. Too 
many of their politics are only a means to 
eliminate competitors, to conduct vulgar intrigues 
and to attain personal power."11 
Goebbels' image of those who worked around him might have been 
low, however highly he thought of himself. It is apparent that his 
aides and subordinates had to sit in conference every now and again 
and listen to the Doktor luad his accomplishments as Semmler points --
out, 
"This evening Goebbels told us what he reckoned 
to have been his chief services to the National 
Socialist Party. In four decisive ways he had 
vitually strengthened the movement; 1) Brought 
National Socialism from middle class to the 
workers. 2) Winning Berlin and preparing the 
way for seizing power in the Reich. 3) He 
worked out the continuity and choreography of 
ritual in mass meeting and Party public 
ceremonies. 4) His fourth contribution had been 
the creation of the Hitler myth. Hitler had been 
_(given) the halo of infallability, with the result 
that many people looked askance at the Party after 
1933 had complete confidence in Hitler. That was 
why even now millions of Germans drew a distinction 
between the Fuehrer and the Party, refusing to 
support the latter while believing in Hitler."12 
In the ten years since he had taken over the Ministry, 
Goebbels had established himself as a competent worker in the cause 
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11 Semmler, Rudolf; Goebbels~The Man·Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947 1 p,31, 
12 Ibid., p,56 0 
of the Third Reich . He had demonstrated a great prowess for both 
peacetime and wartime propaganda insofar as he understood the 
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German people . His position was still influencial rather than 
powerful and his entry in the Diaries for March 13 , 1943 seems almost 
an attempt to justify to himself that his work was as important as 
those Ministers who enjoyed true power, 
"At midnight Funk suddenly rose to extend his 
congratulations upon the tenth anniversary of 
my taking over the Propaganda Ministry . Yes 
indeed , t en years have passed since I created the 
Propaganda Mini stry as a new instrument for 
leading the German people . I believe I needn ' t 
be ashamed of my ten years of labor . A Ministry 
that seemed like a blank calling card has meanwhile 
become one of which have been written very legible 
and clear letters , easily readable both at home and 
abroad . I believe nobody in the world would deny 
the tremendous importance of the Propaganda 
Ministry to the German state in the shaping of 
policy during the last ten years . 1113 
Semmler seems to confirm the idea that the Mini stry was of only 
negligable value in the eyes of the Minister and the eyes of those 
whom took exception to Goebbels' influence over the German mind. 
Goebbels took great pains to protect himself from becoming over-
shadowed or engulfed in the aura and deeds of those directl y connected 
with the mechanics of running the state and the war effort . He had 
great fear of becoming somewhat of a has- been in they eyes of the 
publi c he sought to influence. 
13 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P ., The Goebbel s Diari es , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc . , Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner , 1948 , p . 297-8 . 
His efforts in response to his a.)?prehensions are discussed by 
' ' 
Semmler in a Diary ent):"y of·March:13, 1943, 
"If Goebbels did not 90::out of his way to find extra 
work, his routine·tasks at.the Ministry would only 
fill four or five hours a·day. Hence the· idea of 
fillinglhis day by writing weekly leading articles 
. I • • 
in the Reich, (they were read verbatum on radio as 
among the most important policy statements} and so 
bringing himself more prominently before the public. 
Nothing ·is worse for a man in public life than to be 
forgotten, said Goebbels a few days ago. This is why 
Goebbels is always careful to conduct skillfully-
throught-out personal publicity. In cautious doses his 
name is_ given to the public several times a week 
through 
1
the newspapers. Every Friday evening he has 
a regular date on the wireless. Press notices that 
look quite short and harmless, mentioni.ng some quite 
unimportant reception, have for him the function of 
keeping the public's imagination busy and giving the 
impressi?n that he is nearly snowed under with work."14 
Even his public appearances, which are carefully orchestrated 
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and preplanned in ~very detail, are to create the effect of a man on 
the go and full of: purpose. By the time the middle of nineteen forty -
three rolled around there was a curious absence of public statements 
being made by the hierarchy of the now foundering Third Reich and 
Goebbels took full advantage of this set of circumstances. Semmler 
points out, 
"His frequent speeches in Berlin and other towns there-
fore have three purposes: to satisfy his own urge for 
work, to•help the war, and to recall himself to the 
people's memories in new and interesting ways, to make 
himself a center of conversation, and to command the 
headlines in the newspapers ..• They have the impression 
that he is rising fast, in short that he is the coming 
man.vl5 . 
14 Semmler•, Rudolf; ·Goebbels"The ·Man ·Next 'To •Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London} 1947, p.74 
15 Ibid., p.74, 
36 
Goebbels was , during this curcial time in the war , to become 
sort of a gadfly to Hi tler . He would be the one who pointed out the 
weaknesses of Party positions in the face of the people . He created 
the concept of "Total Warn which Hitl er came to advocate. To t a l war 
was the idea of mobilizing all human and material resources to turn 
the tide for the Nazi cause . While Hitler bought the idea, he 
appointed , much to Goebbels chagrin , some of Goebbels adversaries in 
the government to administer the new campaign under the guidelines 
of the i deas . Goebbel s was £urious and it took much of Hi tler ' s part 
to mollify him . As he began to ful fill his appointed role in the 
picture he began to realize that his Ministry was losing touch with 
the public at large. Two significant entries in h i s Diaries indicate 
his l oss of insight. On May 12 , 1943 he writes , 
"Total war i s giving me a lot of work to do , but 
matters are progressing accordi ng to rul e and 
program. I have reviewed a gr eat number of 
letters - more than 1 5, 000 in but a few weeks . 
All of these letters testify to the unqual ified 
agreement of public opinion with my views , as 
well as to the great confidence of the letter 
writers in me - a thing about which I am very 
happy . I must try to j ustify this confidence; 
in ot her words , in case errors are committed in 
the realm of total war, I simply cannot fade out 
of the picture . The people identi fy the idea and 
conception of total war with my person . I am 
therefore i n a certain sense publiclt responsible 
for the continuation of total war . 11 1 
16 Goebbels , Dr. Joseph P ., The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Gar den City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P . Dochner, 1948 , p . 373. 
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It is very evident that Goebbels is quit'e satisfied that he has 
the public exactly where he wants them and is ready to continue his 
efforts in their good faith. However, just three days later he 
writes, 
11A lot of criticism is contained in the letters 
reaching us. Morale among the masses is so low 
as to be rather serious. Even people of good will 
are now worried about the further developments. 
The man in the street no longer sees any way out of 
!:he military dilemma. As a result there is 
critisism of the leaders, in some cases even of the 
Fuehrer himself."17 
It is important to note that Goebbels does not single himself 
out as an object of the peoples dissolutionment. And it may be that 
he was not their object. The leaders, orchestrating the total war 
campaign were so incompetent that they received all the blame. 
Goebbels made sure that he was publically visable. He went to the 
bombed areas and walked the streets with the victims. The people 
responded to this with great enthusiasm and focused well on the 
person of Goebbels. As the German military situation grew worse and 
worse, Goebbels made more efforts to reach the people. Again, he 
was adopting this policy while the other leaders were becoming 
strangely reclusive. While the people were watching their meat 
rations gnaw smaller and smaller, men like Goering were feeding the 
animals of his private zoo with fresh meat killed especially for that 
purpose. Goebbels, on the other hand made it publically known that 
h±s rations were coincedent with the masses. 
17 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.380. 
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Such tactics were not lost on the public and were also noticed 
by the allied propagandists. They.even showed some grudging respect 
for the little Doktor, as Semmler points out in July of 1943, 
"The enemy, as well as the Neutral countries, have 
been following very closely the internal political 
develOpments in Germany. They note certaiil changes, 
and record above all how the reputations of the 
leading personalities stand. At the time of 
Stalingrad the Swiss paper Weltworke first began 
to single out Goebbels as the man who kept his head 
in a crisis and to compare him to those who in 
favorable times excite themselves with parades and 
outward show. Goebbels, on the contrary, is said to 
show his capacity as a leader only in times of 
difficulty and danger. Comments of this kind, to the 
effect that Goebbels is at the moment the most 
important- but not the most powerful - man in the 
Germany leadership, are quite common now a days. 
Peterson on the B~±tish wireless at six o'clock 
this morning in the German Workers Programme, says, 
'Goebbels, is the present situation, is the only 
leader in the regieme who has the courage, will and 
ability to speak to the people about it. He is the 
only one who really tries to answer the questions 
the nation is aski_ng, the only one who seriously 
tries to defend the regieme and fights for it's 
existance' 11 • 18 
Why should the foreign press single out Goebbels, a man without real 
power as the most effective member of the German hierarchy? What 
was his special quality? Perhaps his commitment to the German state 
had a depth that was not to be found in his contemporaries. Goebbels 
was the one leader who could have left Berlin in the closing hours 
and yet choose to stay and die with his Fuehrer. His conviction ran 
so deep that he took the lives of his children and his wife wit:h his 
own. In order to understand the measure and mettle of his convictions 
we must examine his philosophy. 
18 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
Ilondon) 1947, p. 
CHAPTER IV 
Goebbel 1s Philosophy 
Goebbels' own testimony on the philosophical precepts he 
embraced serves as a sound description of his position on the field 
of journalism. He provides us with a brief, cogent, and 
uncompromising statement that seems to provide a basis for all 
further assertions, 
"News policy is a weapon of war. It's purpose is 
to wage war and not to give out information. nl 
He made this statement during the period when Germany had begun 
to falter in the face of Allied advances. It was at this time that 
the news for the German people was becoming less and less glorious. 
Until the first winter in Russian the Germans had been treated to a 
barrage of military successes and the facts were positive on the 
international front. Domestic news co~erage had, for some time, been 
carefully orchestrated and controlled. Often in the morning 
conferences, issues that arose for Goebbels' consideration were 
treated within the framworlc of "polemics", the act of taking a single 
position in a conflict or controversy. 
The war situation changed a great deal in the attitude toward 
what the German people should know about what the government was 
1 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.210. 
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doing. Necessary polemics were established so that all.news would 
benefit the Reich in some way •. This policy was official and Goebbels 
justified the policy in his Diary.entry of March 14,. 1943, 
"During a war news.should.be given out mainly for 
instruction and not for info.rmation. Not every 
item of news should be published; rather must 
those who control news policies endeavor to make 
every item of news serve a certain purpose. 
Unfortunately we do not always keep this in mind. n 2 
That the policy mentioned above was not kept in mind was the 
source of great trouble for the little Doktor, as we shall see later. 
Goebbels' infusion of political utility into the presentation of news 
was founded upon his idea of the relationship of news and government. 
This relationship superseded even the relationship news might have to 
the Party and was a natural part of the state. He so states: 
''I consider it absolutely essential that the news 
bureaus be owned by the Reich. New policy is a 
soverign function of the state, which the state can 
never renounce. News policy is a cardinal political 
affair, and political matters of this character must 
be in the hands of the Reich, and not the Party. 
The Party is in no position to establish a real news 
service. In a news service ninety nine point nine 
percent of the items deal with news about state 
leadership and oniy the remaining small percentage 
deals with the work of the Party."3 
Goebbels influence over the state news was always precarious, as 
will be shown. He was in constant conflict with the Wehrmacht, the 
Foreign Office, the state news organ, and many other elements of the 
2 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P,, The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Coil\J?any, Inc,, Garden Ci,ty 1 New :<o;i:kl Edited and Translated by Loui.s 
P. Lochner, 1948, p,299, 
3 Ibid. , p. 73 • 
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government, This is not to say that his influence was not 
substantial. He would operate on the basis that he, as Minister for 
Public Enlightment and Propaganda, was the curator of the collective = 
German mind and asserted this as a basis for what control he had,J .• 
In specific instances he could shift the whole emphasis, _direction, 
and even content of the news. For example he writes in his Diary 
in May of 1943, 
"I issued instructions to the press to pay more 
attention to domestic than foreign questions 
during the comi_ng weeks. The Foreign Office is 
always eager for questions of foreign policy to 
take precedence. The present period, however, 
is so critical that it seems more important to 
me that we concern ourselves with the worries of 
the man in the street rather than with foreign 
policy. The Foreign Office cannot see the point 
but I regard myself as responsible for the morale 
of the German people. From that fact I derive 
the right to keep out of the German press every-
useful. ,,4 thing that is harmful or even fails to·be 
While Goebbels might have felt some personal satisfaction from 
such a justification, he found the members of the press quite 
difficult to keep under control. In domestic news coverage the press 
corps had to be constantly monitored and guided by the Ministry. It 
was next to impossible to maintain absolute control because Goebbels 
could not be everywhere at once. He could not, in many cases, 
prevent publication and found himself having to react to publications 
after the fact. It was in this manner that much of the policy 
concerning news coverage was formulated. 
4 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York} Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.392. 
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News had to reflect the best interests of the society as 
Goebbels perci~ved them. Not to do so was failure and could not be 
tolerated . It was especially difficult to convey the best interests 
of Nazi society where their system of justice was concerned . Goebbels 
lamented the fact in May of 1942 : 
"Embarrasing consequences have resulted from the 
irresponsible and unpsychological publications of 
various court decisions. Hereafter I am having all 
court verdicts of any national importance released 
jointly by the Ministry of Justice and ourselves. 
Our courthouse reporters don ' t have the necessary 
feel for selecting and publishing verdicts according 
to psychological considerations. The publication 
of court decisions is not a question of mere 
publicity but of public education . In connection 
with every verdict we must ask ourselves whether 
publication at this moment will have a favorable or 
unfavorable effect. This is a matter which only 
our Ministry can decide in the end. 11 5 
Not only did the public have to live with the fact that it would 
not receive unrestricted news of the decisions of the courts but the 
idea of public trial was absolutely lost. The treatment in the 
coverage of the courts was not exclusively suppressi ve . As will be 
elaborated upon later , the publication of certain verdicts was made 
to convey fear and to stop undesired practices . The issue of 
listening in on forbidden foreign radio broadcasts was countered, to 
a certain extent, by enforced publication of heavy criminal sentences 
made for such violations . 
5 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company , Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948 , p .122 . 
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Goebbels' domestic policies concerning news cover.age were 
bitterly contested by many others in the Reich hierarchy as were his 
military and foreign policies were. At the onset of the war the need 
for consistant coverage of military activities was.readily apparent. 
The Propaganda Ministry established a precarious liason to coordinate 
coverage in the form of the Prop_aganda Company or "P . K. " • The P. K. 1 s 
had three tasks; first, home propaganda, second, front line 
propaganda, and third, propaganda directed against the enemy. 
The first consisted of the regular work of the war correspondent, 
the second, with a stiffening of morale and "ideological attitude" 
of the fighting men, and the third involved leaflets, trench loud-
speakers and, as the war progressed, the operation of army trans-
mitters broadcasting to enemy troops. 
In 1939 a P.K. consisted of two "light platoons" (each of six 
press correspondents and four photographers), one "heavy platoon" 
(comprlsed of correspondents, photographers, a radio section and a 
film section) one platoon composed of a leaflet staff, a loudspeaker 
section, a film projection section and the editorial staff of the 
army newsheet. There was a fifth platoqn which was responsible fort 
the preparation and evaluation of the materials produced by the 
company as a whole. 
As it was, the P.K.'s functioned primarily according to the 
directives of the Wehrmacht. As the war progressed the conflicts 
between the Wehrmacht and the Prop_aganda Ministry increased. The· 
nature of those conflicts will be explored later for the purposes of 
describi_ng the treatment of journalism by Goebbels and his staff the 
followi.ng example .is appropriate. In December of 1939 Goebbels told 
his staff in conference, 
"Letters from the front and conversation with 
soldiers suggest that there is a widespread 
belief at the front that the fighting at the 
Western front is tho.ught in the home country 
to be relatively easy for the troops. The 
propaganda companies in the army are instructed 
to depict the fighting on the Western front from 
a more serious ·angle. 116 
Goebbels was never satisfied with the coverage of the actual 
fighti.ng. He did not trust the acumen of the General staff in dealing 
with what he continuously terms as "psychological" considerations. 
He was constantly making complaints to the Wehrmacht about the 
handli.ng of this story or that. He received a steady stream of 
reports and evaluations on the propaganda and news coverage in the 
field and by the end of 1942 he was disheartened enough to write in 
his Diary, 
"The latest reports of the SD and the Reich 
Propaganda Office were presented to me. In 
both of these, as well as the reports of the 
Gauleiters, there is sharp criticism of our 
news policy regarding the situation at the 
front. I feel absolutely not guilty of this 
obvious fizzle. I have always urged greater 
frankness in news. 117 
Whether he believed that last statement is impossible to prove. 
It is a suprising statement for one who had expounded the policies 
6 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.10. 
7 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.239. 
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previously mentioned and will appear more surprising as the theme of 
his philosophy is developed further. 
As the war progressed and the situation for the Nazis worsened, 
the task of ful filling the public ' s need for real news deteriorated 
for Doktor Goebbels. Unable to effectively coordinate his input of 
news and disseminate it for the already wary populace, he lamented in 
his Diary in May of 1943, 
"It is quite natural that the people look for a 
scapegoat since the facts themselves can ' t be 
changed . The scapegoat , as has always happened 
in the past, is the press and the radio. The 
smallest tactical mistake that we chance to make 
in press and radio are chalked up against us . 
~tis high time that one of my articles be 
devoted to this theme . 11 8 
If there were problems with the coverage of the front, there 
were problems of home coverage as well. Goebbels had much difficulty 
with the maintanance of competent staffs at each of the papers and 
radio stations . The war was taking a terrible toll on the home front 
and the morale of the people was reflected in the kind of coverage 
the reporters and editors were abl e to general . 
Goebbels dealt with editors in a very formal and sometimes 
belittling manner. He did not really have to contend with the 
regulations he imposed and therefore lacked the insight into the 
problems editors had when faced with a seemingly unending flow of bad 
news or no news at all. 
8 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P., The Goebbels Di aries , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.389. 
In November of 1943 Goebbels wrote: 
"OUr German Press is,. generally speaki.ng, not in top 
form. Our editors have somewhat lost cou~age or 
have gone stale writing about the problems of the 
war so much in recent years. Perhaps some editors 
ought to be recalled from the front and others sent 
out in their place. In other words, a change of 
personnel should be brought about to inject fresh 
blood into German Journalism."9 
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What was "German Journalism"? What kind of men did it attract? 
To be a German journalist was to receive information from the 
government on how to handle information received from the government. 
Major news events were screened as a matter of course. If any 
semblance of objectivity existed in the Weimar government it was lost 
when Hitler came to power. It had to have been exceedingly 
disheartening for journalists to see their work reworked to meet the 
arbitrary specifications of the Propaganda Ministry, year after year, 
and be powerless to do anything about it. 
As a result, those who could, left the field. Rudolph Senrrnler 
reflected on the matter in March of 1941, after a conversation with 
Goebbels, 
He is interested in .•• what types of journalist 
Germany should be provided with in the future. 
I mentioned ... I had noticed a .considerable 
movement of men out of journalism into political 
and administrative posts. He personally would 
find it intolerable and for any person with 
intellectural powers undignified, to attend daily 
the official press conference to have the ten 
Commandments, all beginning, 'thou shalt not', 
handed out by Hans Fritzsche.nlO 
9 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.500. 
lO Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.22. 
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Goebbels apparently was not insensitive to the needs of the true 
journalistic ethos and, it seems, hoped for a change in the future, 
perhaps after the war. Semmler continues, 
" •.• Goebbels went on to say that the work of the 
daily journalist had become quite unsatisfyi_ng. 
He had to find his way through a mass of 
instructions, bans, and political considerations 
and the results were boring, flat phrases. Real 
journalistic talent could not be stimulated by 
the daily journalist's round. Through the search 
for the sensation of the hour, men's views of the 
broad shape of events and the ultimate objective 
were distorted. The great art of journalism was 
to point to the objective and make clear the way 
to it. ull 
It is here that the remorse felt about the field of journalism 
is evident. He did not fail to see that the course the field was 
taking was debilitating to the effective passage of information to 
the public. Two years saw no real improvement in the lot of the 
daily journalist. Personal changes, for reasons mentioned in 
Goebbels' November 1943 Diary entry, had to have taken their toll in 
the continuity of first level management of the press and radio. 
The editors were not able to effectively justify all the 
restrictions to the staff they had to immediately preside over and 
found themselves in a quandry. Some just continued, disgruntled 
and ineffective, while others were vocal as Goebbels states in 
April of 1943 ; · 
11 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next ~o Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.22. 
"The chief editor of the Deutsche Allgemeine 
Zeitung , Silex, has written a report on the way 
the press conference is run. While the tone of 
this memorandum is very impudent, he hit the nail 
right on the head. Any decent journalist with any 
feeling of honor in his bones simply cannot stand 
for the way he is handled by the press department 
of the Reich Government. Journalists are sat on 
as though they were still in grade school. Naturally 
this will have very serious consequences for the 
future of j ournalism. Any man who has a residue of 
honor will be very careful not to become a 
journalist. 1112 
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I f any remorse is evident , it was not made manifest in any 
policy to contravene the serious consequences Goebbels foresa w. No 
real effort was made to upgrade the caliber of news because news was 
a government function and the government was not in a position to let 
the host of journali sts run free with information that might damage 
the government's position . This was increasingly true as the war 
worsened. 
As mentioned in previous chapters , Goebbels, f or reasons of 
wanting to fill his own time and to assert his opinion or counteract 
negative propaganda, wrote extensive articles. He could not, it 
seems , demand publication in all papers. 
H~s topics were concerned with both internal and international 
themes. The tone of his articles were often exceedingly biting and 
sarcastic and he became renowned for those qualities . He also had 
staff writers in the Ministry who would write on assigned topics to 
12 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc . , Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p . 327. 
counteract adverse Allied publications. When his or his staff's work 
wasn't used at a time he felt it should have been, Goebbels became 
enraged 
"I am havi.ng some trouble with the press because it 
doesn't take my s.uggestions as I should like •.• 
Why, the press should howl for joy at be¢ng given 
such excellent material for commentary.· •• I therefore 
consider it my duty to keep exhorting and goading 
them on. If you don't constantly build a fire under 
the people responsible for informing the public, and 
if you don't constantly push them on, they gradually 
become dull and t±red. nl3 · 
Commentary in the radio sector was even more frustrating for 
Goebbels. Most commentary had two purposes; either to address the 
domestic audience or to address the enemy, The techniques used were 
satisfactory to Goebbels at first but a year into the war it became 
apparent that little imagination was bei.ng used in the style and 
delivery of the commentary or "talks" aimed at the foreign 
populations in Europe. These talks appeared in the regular newscasts 
and during entertainment shows. Goebbels saw that response to the 
talks was marginal and compared the Nazi efforts to the allied efforts 
in his conference of April 11, 1940 
"At a time when the enemy is flooding the world with 
rumors, it is pointless for the press and radio to 
to in for commentaries and talks. What matters is 
news. If due to a lack of communications we have no 
news of our own then such news must be written up from 
reports from other countries - which is what Britain 
and France are doing. nl4 
13 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The·Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.91. 
14 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.31. 
50 
The use of for~ign news sources, even enemy sources, was to 
become more and more of a factor in the role of the journalist in 
later years as will be shown. The commentaries and talks became less 
and less effective and by 1943 were almost without impact according 
to the Prop.aganda Ministry. Goebbels was sure that the British and 
American news efforts were far superior to the German system because 
of the volume and accuragy of the reports. He felt that at a time 
when the Axis powers were in serious trouble, the people had to start 
listening to what they said and not their enemies. He wrote in his 
Diary in May of 1943, 
I discussed with Fritzsche and Winkelnkemper the 
question of commentaries in the foreign broadcasts 
of the .German radio. These talks are, if possible, 
to be eliminated altogether. I shall, however, 
permit very brief comments. In the main our 
broadcasts are to consist exclusively of-news. It 
is much more difficult to invent argument-provolking 
news whose bias is not noticeable; it takes more 
brains to do this then to read tedious commentary. 
By forbidding talks I shall compel! the collaborators 
in our foreign radio service to increase our stock 
of news. 1115 
It is reasonable to assume that by the time the war started 
Goebbels had a hearty respect, personally, for the allied news and 
propaganda resources. As mentioned in the introduction, Hitler had 
lauded the Allied efforts in thse areas in World War One 
implementation. Foreign public opinion was more difficult to affect 
15 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.390. 
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than domestic opinion, For this.reason Hitler directed.Goebbels to 
insure that the German foreign·language·papers abroad.be examined 
carefully at the end of 1939", At.the·December-9, 1939 meeting of the 
Proi;,aganda Ministry staff Goebbels issued the followi_ng directives: 
"The Minister reports the Fuehrer•s attitude to the 
treatment of the foreign press. The followi.ng have 
to be applied in the following order of importance: 
a) safeguarding our strength at home bl safeguardi_ng 
the strength of the Reich abroad. For this reason 
there must be a ban on all German-language papers 
16 which might undermine the countries strength at home." 
If the Reich Government was wary about what the German press was 
saying about Germany, it was more worried about what the foreign press 
was saying about Germany. Foreign correspondents in the Re±ch were 
subjected to surveillance on an intensive scale and their personal 
lives, friends, and behavior were carefully scrutinized. By the 
first quarter of 1940 plans were formulated to expell certain foreign 
journalists who were reporting in a manner deemed harmful to the 
interests of the German government and people. such operations were, 
if possible, to have no ill effects on the Propaganda Ministry and 
on March 14th the following directives were given by Goebbels: 
"The Minister gives his approval to the tactics 
proposed by Herr Bomer whereby unwelcome foreign 
journalists are to be pushed across the frontier 
by police as undesirable aliens; in this way the 
Foreign Press Department can be kept out of such 
affairs as much as possible. ••17 
16 Boelcke, Willi A, 1 'The.Secret Conferences of·Dr; Goebbels, 
(E,P. Dutton & Co,, Inc., New· Yorkl 1970 1 p.9. 
17 Ibid,, p,23,· 
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By 1942 Goering's Lu~twaffe had begun to lose e~fectiveness over 
Western and Central Europe due to the unreasonable commitments in 
Russia . Germany had begun to feel the bite of air raids in the way 
Britain had done in the earlier part of the war. The Allies had much 
greater accuracy in the reporting of bomb totals and the measure of 
destruction wrought in Germany while the Germans had great difficulty 
in assessing the damage they had done in Britain. For this reason 
the following policy was adopted by Goebbels and stated in his Diary 
on May 2 , 1942 : 
" I have ordered official censorship to be exc:.@!cised 
on foreign correspondents reports on the air s tuation . 
The English are naturally making frantic efforts to 
obtain information about the results of their air 
raids. We cannot be expected to support their 
efforts . nl8 
The rai ds continued throughout the duration of the war and by 
1943 Goebbels was still unabl e to stop the f l ow of bomb result 
information from reaching the Allies , only this time the problem was 
reporting from the domestic , state controlled press . On March 13 he 
gave the following directive, found also in his Diary: 
"I gave instructions for greater restraint in reporti ng 
air rai ds . We reveal too much and thereby encourage the 
English to continue their attacks from t he air. The 
English are very reserved about their own air warfare . 
We have to date not been able to make a halfway accurate 
estimate of the effect of our raids on England, whereas 
the English know almost everything about the results 
of their 1 s on Germany . 1119 
18 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P. , The Goebbels Diari es , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc . , Garden Ci ty, New York) Edi ted and Transl ated by Louis 
P. Lochner , 1948, p . 200 . 
19 I bid . , p. 296. 
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The foreign journalists that remained in Germany were interned 
shortly before 1942. They were kept in a ramshackle hotel under guard 
and permitted to venture out only occasionally with an armed escort. 
Their food was plain and scanty and the atmosphere was one of 
imprisonment rather than the way th~ Americans handled the situation 
at home. Fore.ign journalists in the U.S. were inte,med in a resort 
and played golf and ate well. Their biggest complaint was not being 
able to obtain more than two or three periodicals per day. In May 
of 1942 the Allies and the Axis powers agreed to return their 
respective journalists to their homes. The transfer was made and 
Goebbels wrote this rather amusing account of the operation and world 
coverage of it: 
" ... the American diplomats and journalists returning 
from Germany have also issued statements that make 
exactly claims about the Axis countries that our 
diplomats make about America. On the whole, therefore, 
there isn't much to be expected of these interviews 
from both sides. I was especially on the lookout 
that all sentimental remarks be taken out of the 
interviews given by our representatives. It wouldn't 
make much of an impression on the German people, 
for instance, to have our spokesmen deplore the fact 
that they were allowed only one newspaper per day 
duri.ng their internment. You have to report something 
:~r: ;:~!~~sw~a~a~a:0!: :~~~g~ot:::: ;:a!:P~:s:!~~ .. 20 
It is ironic that Goebbels had to manuver his returning heroes 
in such a manner that their remarks had to be withheld from the 
20 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.219. 
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German people for their own protection, .Even more amusing was.the 
;r-eaction Goebbels has to the:.i;eleases of those who. had ·just returned 
from internment in Germany, . 
''The ·American journalists·:who were transported from 
Germany and Italy to Lisbon have issued the·funniest 
reports about internal.conditions in the Axis 
countries, They are completely harmless for the 
simple reason that of oourse all promptly disagree 
with each other."21 
Goebbels' conception of the style with which English and 
American journalism was presented was a curious mixture of respect 
and patronization. While he lamented the lack of hard news in German 
reporting as shown before, he assumed a very pompous and righteous 
position concerning the Allied use of details and color in their 
reports. It is apparent that while he lamented the lack of vitality 
and objectivity in German reporting and envied it in the Allied news 
cove~age, he took every oppottunity to demean the Allies in his own 
eyes and in the eyes of his staff. In April of 1942 he wrote, 
"I sent a couple of robust journalists into occupied 
France with an assignment to give proper journalistic 
treatment to undertaki.ngs similar to that of Boulogne. 
our reporters hitherto have been too dry and therefore 
could not compete with the flowery reports of Reuters. 
To impress the English you must represent events like 
that more like a sports event. You must not limit 
yourself to a mere rehersal of acts but must 
compliment the data by details to which the English 
and especially the Americans are known to be very 
susceptible. n22 
21 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P,, The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Coll\Pany, Inc,, Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948 1 p,222,. 
22 Ibid., p.186, 
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An interesting reflection on the manner in which the Allies and 
Germany handled the reporting of the Teheran conference in December of 
1943 is provided by the Doktor. The Teheran conference was the first 
meeting of Roosevelt , Churchill and Stalin . There the three leaders 
agreed to jointly defeat, disarm and control Germany and also discussed 
a world organization possible after the conclusion of the war. 
Press coverage in the Allied countries was spectacular and the 
conference was said to signal the end of the Axis powers. Goebbels 
was , at this time , starting to become a bit worried about the 
possibility of defeat. It was also at this time that the concept of 
total war was being falteringly implemented in Germany. Goebbels ' 
reaction to the press coverage, of the conference appears in his 
Diary , 
"The enemy press naturally accompanies t he conference 
of Teheran and the communique with the obligatory 
anthems of jubilation . . . When Reuter declares that 
the communique is tantamount to a military death 
sentence for the Axis, the obvious reply is that 
military verdicts of death are written not in the 
conferences but on the field of battle . .. The German 
press and radio go after the Teheran conference in 
a big way. Our reply is biting and insolent; we 
e empty buckets of irony and derision over the 
conference . Our sarcasm is superior and I must say 
German propaganda has reached the very heights of 
what can be achieved in publicity. 11 23 
It was at this period of the war that the acquisition of real 
news was not only sparse at home, it was nearly impossible to get in 
the various theatres of combat. Policy was established as early as 
23 
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc . , Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
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1939 dealing with the use of foreign news services as sources of home 
news. In July of that year the members of the propaganda staff 
decided not to jam British signals and radio pr.ograrns as sometimes 
they were the only source of news available to the Ministry. 24 
By the end of 1944 the situation in Germany was generally 
deteriorating and the ability to conduct an effective news gathering 
operation was completely gone. The German papers were publishing 
drivel which was proclaimed by Goebbels himself to be such. Semmler 
recalls in his diary, entry of September 29, 1944: 
"Nowadays our newspapers are fed on the news mat.era.al 
which the British and American press and wireless 
provide. We have to be content with accounts of what 
is happening on the enemy side because the German 
government is no longer able to provide facts which 
speak for themselves. Nothing impressive ever 
happens· on our side, that is why the editors fill 
their pages with stupid diatribes of a kind which 
the reading public long ago grew tired of 
Surprisingly enough, Goebbels agrees with tais point 
of view but can see no remedy yet."25 
What news that came in was very dismal indeed in 1944. The 
German position was one of extreme weakness and there was no real 
concealment of the fact from the people of either side. Policy had 
been formulated as early as 1940 to insure that proper handling 
of difficult or harmful news was planned for and carried out. This 
policy was one of denial, ld!es and later, "poetic truth". 
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The policy of denial was instituted in May of 1940 by Goebbels 
in conference with the Propaganda Ministry staff. The German press 
and radio had previously been given instructions to the effect that 
there must be absolutely no discussion of German war aims . This is 
probably because there has never really been articulated a German war 
aim. It was mostely a muddled appearl for more land and the 
supremacy of the aryan stock. Without such discussion the Allied 
press and radio could only speculate on the aims of the Nazis, and 
German retorts could state as much. The German press all egedl y acted 
accordingly to the policy of denial which ran thus: 
"The Minister formulates the principle for the 
immediate future that in enemy reports that are 
not correct or even anything that coul d be dangerous 
to us must be immediately denied . There is no need 
at all to examine whether a report is factually 
correct or not - the decisive point is merely 
whether the enemy ' s assertions could in any way be 
damaging to us. For this reason care must be taken 
for denials to be issued promptly. In drafting 
such denials the wording 'does not correspond to 
the facts ' will probably prove too weak in a tense 
period; it will be nedessary to make ' sweeping ' or 
' wholesale ' denials or whenever enemy assertions 
touch upon our honor , to retort in the sharpest 
terms . 11 26 
This "principl e " was utilized throughout the r est of the war 
rather and just immediately after it ' s proclaimation . As the war 
situation worsened and the truth became more than simple denials 
could cope with from a polemic point of view, a policy of outright 
26 Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels , 
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc ., New York) 1970 , p .40. 
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lying was instituted based on certain formulations created in 
directives of April 1940. The policy is first articulated here and 
elaborated upon later in a most interesting manner. The first part 
however is ve~ specific on just who may direct lies to be published 
or broadcast. This was called the Directive for the Drafting of 
Tendentious and Disruptive Information and was dated July 1942. 
Some of the elements a£ this formal directive appear in the verbal 
directives of April 1940 as found in the minutes of the conferences, 
"From the lies launched by the Allies during the past 
few days the Minister draws the conclusion that, a) 
lies must be used only as a defensive measure and not 
for making a false show of successes; b) no official 
apparatus, news agency etc., must ever be used for the 
launching of lies; the source of the latter must as a 
matter of principle, be camouflaged at once; c) radio 
and press in Germany must never be saddled with such 
lies at all; these must only go through channels 
ab:voad. "27 · 
The final directive is almost ludicrous in its scope and aim. 
It is not the directive of a man who is in control of his Ministry, 
the field of journalism or even propaganda for it is given in 
November of 1944, a few months before the end of the war. Semmler, 
who at this time was about to take his leave of the Ministry and 
join a fighting outfit for the final defence of Berlin, wrote this 
cryptic and contemptous recollection of Goebbels' new policy on 
lying: 
27 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.32. 
"Goebbels has introduced a new expression into the 
vocabulary of propaganda, It is for internal use 
only! He is now using the phrase 'poetic truth' 
in contrast to-or rather in amplification of- the 
•concrete truth'. Whenever we know only a little 
about some event or plan or operation of enemy 
then - so Goebbels says - we shall not be violating 
the truth if we add something to the story to fill 
in the gaps. We should describe things as they 
might have happened or as they probably did happen. 
To put it in Goebbels own words, •we are only 
helping the public when we call imagination to our 
aid in certain cases when the record of the facts 
is for some reason incomplete!' Many events in 
international politics, he said, could not be 
understood unless we embroidered them a little with 
the 'poetic truth' and so made them understandable 
to the German people. n 28 
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It must have been an extraordinary experience to have been a member 
of Goebbels' staff and to have sat in the room and watched the faces 
of those present while the little Doktor expounded the values and 
utilities of his new concept of 'poetic truth'. At that juncture, 
in that room, the fields of propaganda and journalism were, indeed, 
indisoluable and indivisible as fields of human activity. Goebbels' 
synthesis of the two had taken twelve years and most of a continent 
but in the last months of the war, the kind of atmosphere that 
prevailed in the German government must have been conducive to the 
ready acceptance of such ideas as the 'poetic truth'. 
It is at that juncture that the mind of the propagandist and the 
administrator of national journalism must be examined as a composite 
28 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.163. 
thing. we have looked at the journalist in Doktor Joseph Goebbels. 
Now let us look at the propagandist. 
If there was any remorse concerning the inability to perform 
truthfully in the journalistic sense, Goebbels insured that it did 
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not insinuate itself into the realm of propaganda. He scorned any 
attempt to objectify it's aims and means. He was completely and 
unreservedly opposed to the notion that propaganda must express 
certain qualities of dignity, honor or national integrity. It was a 
dirty business and he was a genius at it. 
His was the discipline of asserting the position of a party that 
actually had no other aim but the acquisition of power. The Nazis 
never really formulated any aims, as mentioned before, and pursued 
their objectives thro.ugh the media in vague and circumlocuitous forms. 
They considered their direction in the short term, for the most part, 
and became adept at meeting immediate situations through their 
propaganda machine. They were reactionary in their approach and 
embraced, basically, the axiom that the end justifies the means. 
Manvell and Fraenkel state in their biography, 
" •.. certain prin~iples underlie Goebbels presentation 
of the Nazi case in their relentless pursuit of power. 
Goebbels says significantly that it is always necessary 
to be, 'strict in prin~iple' but, 'elastic in application'. 
'tactics•, he explains elsewhere, 'are more a matter of 
intelligence and instinct than of character. One 
sometimes has to go a roundabout way to attain a great 
goal ... Most people', he goes on, 'do not understand the 
difference between strategy and tactics.' What he seems 
to mean by this is that you must as a tactician use any 
means you can devise to gain your ultimate objective as 
a strategist." 1129 · 
29 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Henrich, Dr. Goebbels; 'His·Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.107. 
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Goebbels embraced the propaganda philosophy of Adolf Hitler to 
the letter. He owned , as did Hitler, that the best medium for 
propaganda was the spoken word and pursued the development of a corps 
of speakers through rigorous training a nd the establishment of high 
standards of technical proficiency . Goebbels had a personal stake in 
this concept because of his own talents. Again, to quote Manvell and 
Fraenkel , 
"Goebbels s till realized that speaking , not writing , 
was the ess ence of effective propaganda. Hitler had 
said so in Mein Kampf , as we have seen, and it was 
indeed fortunate for Goebbe l s that hi s personal 
ambitions were equally devided between recognition 
as a great orator and a great writer . The Nazis 
were never t o succeed with the printed word to the 
extent that they succeeded with the spoken word , 
whe:i:e the situation was totally different . .. 1130 
It naturally f ollowed that the extend the r ange of the voice was 
t o eM!tend the r ange of effective propaganda . Loudspeakers were a 
popular means to that end but were cumbersome and didn ' t recreate 
the subtleties of the human voice to the extent necessary to establish 
the nuances needed . 
The instrument that would be the deciding factor in the 
pr omulgation of the Nazi message was the radio. Upon his assumption 
of Ministerial status, Goebbel s made the following statement to hi s 
staff, 
30 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel , Heinrich , Dr. Goebbels , His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960 , p.105 . 
"As an instrument for prop_aganda on a la,rge. scale the 
efficacy of·radio has not.yet been sufficiently 
appreciated, In, any-· case, :·our adversaries have. not 
recognized its:value. All'.the·.better; we shall have 
to ·explore its.possibilities'. •• 31 
Indeed the radio wa:s explored.and exploited to its.;f;ullest 
extent and on a scale that has.been.utilized as a model for the 
popular dissemination of propaganda in.many studies of the field. 
But the use of radio will be explored later in greater detail. 
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Goebbels' philosophy was not definitive in the context of 
propaganda per se. He did not call one thi_ng prop_aganda and exclude 
another thi_ng. That which worked was propaganda and that which 
didn't, wasn't. It i 9 best to allude to his own manner of description·, 
"There is no theoretical way of determining what kind 
of propaganda is more effective and what kind is less 
effective. The prop_aganda which produces the desired, 
results is good and all other propaganda is bad, no 
matter how entertaining it may be, because it is not. 
the task of propaganda to entertain but to produce 
results •.• The,:efore it is beside the point to say 
your propaganda is too crude, too mean, too brutal or 
too unfair, for all this does not matter ... The moment 
I have recognized some truth or other and begin to 
speak in the streetcar, I am making propaganda. This 
is the moment when I begin to reach for others, who, 
like myself, have recognized the same truth. Thus 
propaganda is nothing more than the predecessor of an 
organization. Once there is an organization, it 
becomes the predecessor of the state. Propaganda is 
always a means to an end •.. You either are a propagandist 
or you are not. Propaganda is an art which can be taught 
to the average person, like playing the violin. But 
then there comes a point when you say, 'This is where you 
stop. What remains to be learned can only be achieved by 
~ genius. '11 32 
.... ) 1 .. Manville, Roger,and Fraenkel, He;inrich; ·or, ·Goebbels; ·H;is ·Life 
·and ·oeath, · (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.100. 
32 Ibid., p.80-1. 
It is not difficult to discern the hauteur in the statement 
above . Goebbels was not without great pride in his achievements. 
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As mentioned in the i ntroduction , his precepts were basicall y from 
ideas expounded by Hitler in Mein Kampf . His effectiveness was in the 
implementation of the precepts and the extraordinary skill in which he 
judged the tide and substance of the people ' s convictions on any given 
issue . In doing this he abided by the idea that the mass was not 
really able to digest anything very compl ex . Goebbel s was an 
exceptionally well educated man and a very well educat ed Nazi as Nazis 
went . 
It would seem that he had great trouble relating to his audience 
with the development he had undergone . Such was not the case , however . 
The axioms he operated under were , as hi story indicates, very effective 
for his time and in the soci ety in which he operated. They can be 
found ably set out in Mein Kampf , 
"The art of propaganda consists precisely in being 
able to awaken the imagination of the publ±c through 
an appeal to their feelings , in finding the appropriate 
psychological form that will arrest the att ention and 
appeal t o the hearts of the national masses . The 
r eceptive powers of the masses are very restricted , and 
their understanding i s feebl e. On the other hand, they 
quickly forget . All effecti ve propaganda mus t be 
confined to a few bare essentials and must be expressed 
as far as possible i n stereotyped formulas. These 
slogans shoul d be persistantly repeated until the very 
last individual has come to grasp the idea t hat has been 
put forward . If this principle be forgott en and if an 
attempt be made to be abstract, and general , the 
pr opaganda will turn out to be ineffective; for the 
publi c will not be able to digest or retain what is 
offered to them in this way . Therefore , the greater 
the scope of the message t hat has to be presented, the 
more necessary it is for the propaganda to discover the 
plan of action which is psychologically most 
effective. u33 · 
Hitler had an aversion to the academic classes and it seems 
that, while the aversion did not ~ffect Goebbels, the Doktor did 
_agree that propaganda was wasted on them. He sought to transform the 
common man, the man who could be easily led and moffided and who would 
permit his children to be molded. This policy was followed in both 
Germany and abroad, The political techniques of the mass meeting and 
beer hall brawl would have been lost on the learned anyway so the time ' . 
and energy were spent where they would produce the most desired 
effects. Goebbels told his Ministry staff in October of 1942, 
" •.. National Socialist propaganda has always 
addressed itself to the common people and has 
never attempted to convert the intellectual. 
The popular language of National Socialist 
propaganda appealed to the man in the street 
and brought him closer to the National Socialist 
idea. It is thus a mistake to conduct propaganda 
in such a way that it will stand up to the 
critical examination of the intellectual. ,.34 
It has never been exactly proven just how Goebbels and Hitler 
were able to maintain such an acute grasp of the way in which the 
people would respond to a given stimuli, especially when such acuity 
is in the realm of politics. The unnerving ability of both men to 
react with procedures in spur-of-the-moment circumstances, with little 
planning, and be effective, has puzzled scholars for three decades. 
33 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p,69. 
34 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of'Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.293. 
Goebbels often spoke of the masses like children. He was outwardly 
and inwardly contemptuous of their behavior. Yet he assumed the 
role of a protector and guardian of their soul s and thoughts with a 
passi on that did not falter even at the end. 
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As menti oned in the brief biographical sketch preceeding this 
chapter , Goebbels has an immense l ove and respect for his mother. 
They would speak often on the telephone and he visited her regularly . 
He permitted himself to trust her and he held her views to be highly 
illustrative of the manner in which t he masses would r eact . He 
menti oned in his Di ary in January of 1942 that which illustrates this 
fact , 
"In the evening I had a long talk with my mother who, 
to me, represents the voi ce of the people . She knows 
the sentiments of the peopl e better than most experts 
who judge from the ivory tower of scientific inquiry , 
as in her case the voi ce of the peopl e itself speaks . 
Again I learned a lot; especial ly that the rank and 
file are usually more primitive than we imagine. 
Propaganda must therefore always be essentially simple 
and repetitive. 1n the long run only he will achieve 
basic results in influencing public opinion who is 
able to reduce probl ems to the simplest terms and who 
has the courage to keep forever repeati ng them in 
this simplified form despite the objections of the 
intellectuals . "35 
As policy, the idea of concentra ting on the masses became quite 
clearl y articul ated. The radio wa s not to be used as a tool to try 
and convince the intellectual leaders of foreign countries. Abroad , 
35 Goebbels , Dr . J oseph P ., The Goebbels Diari es, (Doubleday & 
Compan¥ , Inc ., Garden City , New ~ork) Edited and Transla t ed by Louis 
P. Lochner , 1948 , p.56 . 
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as in Germany the Prop_aganda Ministry adhered to the .. cqncevt-. t.ha,t. the 
power lay in the masses and . the:, S!lPJ?Ort · of . the common. peoi?le or the 
fear of the common people was. the·.,aesired goal, We shll,11 see the· 
means in which fear was caused· later. in this chapter·. The· policy was 
set forth in the daily confierence in March of 1940, 
"Herr Brauweiler is to see to it that the Cradi.oJ talks 
presuppose less on the i?art of the listener, t.ha,t the· 
main points are more clearly emphasized, and thll.t they· 
address themselves more to the mass and class instincts. 
In this form - i.e. not as talks fior the intellectuals, 
as practiced by Britain - the talks may be continued."36 
This directive was elaborated upon and clarified a week later in 
the conference of March 26, 
"We must always avoid the danger of the foreign language 
service getting too intellectual. The broadcasts ·mus·t 
unleash auger, and not just touch the intellect of the 
few. n37 
Another point in support of the above policy is that.it was far 
easier to fool the less educated and less intellectually gifted. As 
we have seen the lie was not a tool that the Nazis abhorred. The lie 
was used cautiously in the field of journalism. It was used flagrantly 
in the field of propaganda. Truth was to be used only when the truth 
served the needs ·of the state. Otherwise the state suffered in the 
use of truth in a manner that was non-supportive of its aims, no 
matter how nebulous they may be. If the propagandist presented truth 
36 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Gcebbels, 
[E.P, Dutton & Co,, Inc., New 1opkl 1970, p.24, 
37 Ibid., p.24. 
in a way that depicted justice of any kind in the enemy camp, the 
justice of the propagandist's side·may well be held to account and 
that was counter-productive as propaganda goes. 
,Goebbels .again took his cue from Hitler in the o.ngoing 
implementation of that concept. In his chapter on war propaganda 
Hitler states, 
"The function of propaganda is, for example, not to 
we.igh and ponder the rights of different people, but 
exclusively to emphasize the one right which it has 
set out to argue for. Its task is not to make an 
objective study of the truth insofar as it favors 
the enemy, and then to set it before the masses with 
academic fairness; its task is to serve our own 
right, always and unflinchingly.n38 
This the Nazis did. The propaganda campaigns waged internally 
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and abroad, before and after the Nazis came to power and for and 
against what they believed or disbelieved were harsh and uncompromising. 
Often they had no particular solution to the problems they were 
inciting the masses about. More often than not, they were simply 
g~ad that the problems existed so that their propaganda could be 
focused on something that would either hurt their opponents or help 
them through publicity. 
Goebbels took Hitler's precept and extended it in conference in 
August of 1942, 
3B. ·Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston) 
Translated by Ralph Manheiiµ, 1971, p.182. 
"We do not want to make an objective judgement when 
our existence is at stake or when questions of 
national life are in the.blanace; then we are all 
party, all prejudice, all blind and stubborn bras. 
Let no one object that this is not Gennan. Maybe 
the opposite is Gennan - but if so, it is a bad 
and dangerous side of our character, and one which 
we must fight." 39 
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In 1943 the situation for the Gennan military forces was such 
that the public Goebbels had to control through his Ministry no 
longer seemed to accept what he and his staff were telling them. The 
bias and the prejudice no longer effectively masked the facts of 
defeat. The problem of foreign radio attracting large numbers of 
German listeners for real facts was an impediment that Goebbels never 
overcame. As we shall see later, the people, by the end of the war, 
almost completely discounted anything the Nazi government put out as 
official news. Goebbels was very aware of this and indicated his 
worsening position to Hitler, 
"I developed my ideas concerning the nature of 
propaganda to the Fuehrer. I believe that when 
a propaganda ministry is created, all matters 
affecting propaganda, news and culture within 
the Reich and within the occupied areas must be 
subordinated to it •.. I emphasized that I insist 
upon totalitariansim in carrying out the 
propaganda and news policies of the Reich. He 
agreed with me absolutely and unreaservedly."40 
Goebbels was also referring to the growing conflicts with other 
elements of the government on the subject of propaganda control. 
39 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.273. 
40 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.476. 
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Ideally he would have desired that the Reich and the occupied areas 
be encapulized somehow and be completely shut off from the influences 
of undersirable foreign news and prop.aganda systems. The people, he 
asserted, could be conditioned in time to respond. to almost anything 
the government felt warranted. 
Early in his career he had espoused a kinship with the Soviet 
ideology which was quelled by the influence of Hitler and his policies. 
Although Goebbels later denounced the Soviet political system, he felt 
some grudging ~espect for the ability of the Russian government to cut 
off their populations from undesirable foreign or non-Soviet news and 
propaganda. In an article on the subject he lauds the domestic 
propaganda of the U.S.S.R. but, as will be shown shortly, he was 
contemptuous of their foreign directed techniques. He states, 
"It is a matter of taste to admire the accomplishment 
of a propaganda which, by sealing them off hermetically 
from the outside world and by reiterating its empty 
phrases about salvation, universal happiness and so on, 
has succeeded in bamboozling the peasants and workers 
into believing that this state of affairs constitutes 
paradise on earth. One can arrive at independant 
judegment only by means of comparison. Here such. 
possibilities are totally lacking. The peasant or 
worker resembles a man who has been imprisoned in a dark 
cellar; after many years of captivity he can easily be 
convinced that a burning kerosine lamp is the sun ..• A 
national intellegence which might fight against this 
system no longer exists. The system itself possesses 
every means to smother such intelligence - from its 
inception. 1141 
4l Rli!ess, CUrt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York, 
New York) 1948, p.93. 
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Goebbels 1 conception of. the prop_aganda motives of other nations 
was relatively uninformed. He held a number of mistaken ideas about 
the nature of British and American governments and the nature of the 
relationship of their_ governments to the populations. For years he 
refused to believe, like Hitler and other top Nazis, that the 
American production capacity was as effrucient as reported in the world 
press. Both he and Hitler never understood why the British continued 
to hold out against the air onslaught and the continued German public 
position that Germany never wanted war with England and always desired 
to make peace. 
If Goebbels' conception of the British and American governments 
was wro_ng, it follows that his propaganda directed toward these 
countries was based on a sound foundation and was clearly misdirected. 
As such, it was ineffective. 
His misconceptions were articulated in that daily conference as 
a basis for the handling of propaganda directed toward foreign 
countries, 
"After all, the speeches of enemy statesmen are made 
not to conduct any factual argument but merely to 
make propaganda for their policies."42 
Goebbels' disbelief concerning the American production capacity 
was not as harmful as the errors he found concerning German war 
42 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.277. 
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production . Many times he was informed that some new weapon was in 
the offing and he would publicize it only to find later that he had 
been completely misinformed. It was very difficult to recover from 
such blunders , which were not entirel y his fault . At the end of 1942 
he wrote in his Diary , 
"Donald Nel son has issued a report on American 
production. It exceeds a ll previous American 
exaggerations . We simpl y must do somethi ng t o 
offset this American munitions propaganda . 
Unfortunately our own propaganda about armament 
production has had a serious setback because of 
the unfortunate news item about two German weapons 
that hadn ' t been put into actual use. At present 
all who had anything to do with this press release 
have cold feet and don ' t want to venture on this 
decidely s lippery pavement again . I shall do 
everything , however , to get new impetus t o our 
munitions propaganda, for after a ll we must not 
let the Americans ride roughshod over us merely 
because of propaganda dogmatisms. 1143 
That Goebbels failure to realize that German politics under the 
Nazis were not analogous to the politics of the U. S. and Britain was 
harmful in that he coul d not operate in a society where the government 
answered to the people for it ' s actions or even that i n those 
societies such a fact was an essential part of the national 
consciousness . The manner in which information was transmitted to the 
people was based on a kind of mutual trust and respect that was 
totally absent in the German at that period in German history . His 
government operated on t he basis of constant suppression and watchful -
ness over the people under its influence, both at home and in the 
43 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P . Lochner , 1948, p . 251. 
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occupied territories. It is easy to understand why he was puzzled 
by the lack of fear and animosity.in the British system as illustrated 
in this Diary entry, 
"Appearently the English people don't make their 
government responsible tomonrow for what it said 
today. It is extremely easy to lead the English 
people. The German people are much more sensitive 
about these matters. Even today utterances of 
leading men of the Reich dati_ng back to September 
and October of 1939 are thrown up at us if things 
have not come off as prophesied."44 
What he failed to understand was that most of the prophecy made 
to the German people was emotive, illusive and radical. It was based 
on the whims of a few men who had no'real aims save war.· He-could not 
grasp that the statements made by British statesmen were based for the 
most part on sound.fact and the facts had proven themselves, not the 
r 
statesmen. He missed the point that the British were easy to lead 
because they led themselves. 
If Goebbels failed to understand his enemies, he at least had 
some respect for them, especially the English. Unlike Hitler, who 
had called the British people a nation of shopkeepers, Goebbels 
understood that he was dealing with a state as old as Germany herself 
and that the English state had become organized much earlier than 
Germany. He dealt with the British people in a much different manner 
than even his own people. In evaluati_ng German propaganda directed at 
Britian he made the following observation in a morning conference in 
1941, 
44 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New Y6tk) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.65. 
"One of the biggest mistakes of the German radio is 
its tendancy to ridicule the British reports as a 
matter of principle , instead of dealing with them 
seriously . The British public is entirel y acce~ble 
to reasoned arguments but these must be put forward 
calmly and factually. German propaganda misses its 
purpose and becomes downright counter- p r oductive if 
it claims that all British radio reports are 
invariably lies . 1145 
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Goebbels was to re- affirm this attitude with definite policy 
almost a year later. In reflecti ons on the developments in propaganda 
over the years he had been involved in it as a fiel d he returned to 
the theme that the British public was no longer accesabl e through long 
and val edictory editorials and commentary . They had to be reached 
factual ly, 
"The English pay more attention to news than to 
argument . I conclude from this that al l our 
foreign broadcasting , but especially those beamed 
at England , must be changed fundamental l y . Times 
are no l onger suited to l ong d i scussi ons . Just 
as during the fight of the National Soci alist 
m movement against the Republ ic there was a stage 
when the handbi ll was no longer effecti ve because 
it was outmoded , so there is a stage now when 
argumentation is no longer effective. I slant our 
foreign- language broadcasting services chiefly in the 
direction of news but see to it that the proper 
tendancies are mixed with the news items . 1146 
The above was a Diary entry made in t he mi ddl e of 1942 . The 
concept came too late. I t was prompted by the decl ine of public 
interest in German propaganda and the ineffective methods utilized . 
45 
Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences o f Dr . Goebbels , 
(E . P . Dutton & Co., I nc. , New York) 1970 , p.I51. 
46 Goebbel s , Dr . Joseph P . , The Goebbel s Diari es , (Doubleday & 
Company , Inc. , Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P . Lochner, 1948 , p . 170. 
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The problem seemed to be insufficient effort and thought on the part 
of the Ministry staff responsible for the formulation of public 
information. Near the end of the year, Goebbels commanded his staff 
in conference , 
"The Minister makes more fundamental observations about 
the inadequacies of German propaganda methods. On the 
basis of a number of reports submitted to him, he 
remarks that the publ ic at home , but also abroad, no 
longer accepts German propaganda for the reason that 
it's expressions and style have become so worn and 
shabby that they produce a sense of distrust in the 
listener or reader . The Minister issues a mandi tory 
instruct ion to all propaganda bodies . . . to move away 
from thi s method of cliche- r i dden and unthinking 
repition of propaganda terms and to make an effort 
from now on the prevent any further decline of public 
interest in information, announcements , articles 
lectures , etc. 11 47 
It was not enough . The bottom had fallen out of the war effort 
and there was no news at all , let alone good news, for which t he 
Mini stry s t aff coul d make use . By the middle of the next year the 
Germans were getting their news from the enemy and the home population 
no longer regarded their own gove r nment a viable source of information . 
The enemy populations had long since given any credi bility to the 
German broadcast services or print media . Goebbels was aware of this 
and sorely lamented stories that were appearing in the Times of 
London and other Allied media, In April of 1943 he wrote in his 
Diaries, 
47 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels , 
(E .P. Dut ton & Co. , I nc . , New York) 1970 , p . 280- 1 . 
q "The Times has.suddently discovered that our.)?osition 
is exceedingly weak and,our,proJ?.aganda•e<;(Uc1lly.so, 
As a matter.of fact.in.tecent.weeks we have limited 
ourselves too much.to a.defensive proJ?.aganda, This 
must be changed at once.: I have given suitable orders 
to the pres·s and radio ,',;48 · 
If those orders were carried·out, they were done so in a 
completely ineffective manner. Having admitted that the situation 
was hopeless in the western sector of the war, Goebbels turned· to the 
Russian front which was in worse shape militarily. The Russians were 
beginning their advance and Hitler had begun to announce the first of 
many "strategic re-alignments of the front". Total war had not 
produced much in the way of results under the direction of those whom 
Hitler had chosen over Goebbels. 
At the end of 1943 Goebbels, without real support from the 
government tried to put the Ministry in order for_the eastern 
campaign. He wrote in his Diary, 
"I have at last reorganized my prop.aganda machinery in 
the occupied areas on the east. Unfortunately the 
decision in this matter came to late, almost too late. 
But I try to save what I can,n49 
There wasn't much left to save. The German policies in the east 
had been brutal and the pppulations who had lived under German rule 
were completely hostile as a result of the atrocities committed 
there. Goebbels faced a public that was totally unresponsive to the 
48 Goebbels, Dr, Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Comp£lI1Yr Inc., Garden City, New ):'orkl Edited and Translated by Louis 
P, ·Locohner, 1948 1 p,339, 
49 Ibid., p.508. 
faltering efforts of the propaganda machine . The Russians were 
advancing and the taste of a possible victory over what once seemed 
like an invimcible military onslaught was starting to permeate the 
area. 
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This part of the chapter has concerned itself with the philosophy 
of Doktor Goebbels. While he failed as a result of many misconceptions 
about the opponents he faced , his success can best be illustrated by a 
description of some of the actual operations of the Propaganda 
Ministry. 
Thus far the picture of Goebbels' philosophical positions on the 
fields of journalism and propaganda has been a gloomy one in that 
most of his recorded observations on the subject were made in times 
of crisis and imminent defeat . The record of his application of the 
philosophy is less so . 
This chapter concentrates mainly on radio propaganda as the most 
advanced form of the pursuit. Audio media was considered the most 
potent form of mass manipulation. As stated before in numerous 
references,the Nazis believed more in the spoken word than in all 
other media. The German technological capacity in the audio field 
was and remains very well developed . 
Programming technique was based upon the function of furthering 
the aims of the government and all other emphasis was subordinated to 
that priority . There are numerous references which describe the 
attitudes of those concerned with radio on what kind of music should 
be played and when. The approaches taken were so taken with the 
effect the music would have on the listening public at any given time 
7Z 
in the source of the war. Public opinion played a great role in the 
formation of music programming and continuity. Taste played a minor 
role. 
The atmosphere in the music department was decidedly conservative. 
New forms of music were originati.ng thro_ughout the world and the 
German people clammored to hear some of the innovations. German 
music, for the most part, was folkish and martial sounding. Some 
jazz was performed at the nightclubs while they were open. There was 
of course the full compliment of classical music that could be heard 
in concerts. The Nazi radio service provided some classical listening 
but on a generally limited scale as the mass appeal was not that 
great. Goebbels, according to his records, never seemed to establish 
what he wanted in the way of music with any great consistancy. He 
chose to drift with the mood of the times. 
He was appearently not one for modern music and even disliked 
jazz. In his conference on January 29, 1940 he instructed his staff, 
"The radio should not allow itself it be used for 
experiments in the musical field; it is no£ a trail-
blazer of new art. New music must be tried out at 
the Philharmonic or at the Bach Hall, but not over 
the radio. Care should be taken to insure that the 
standards of the Request Concert are not lowered. 
The marun purpose of the R~questCConcert should be 
to give the people very fine music. They are not 
to be turned into a family affair, and all talk 
during the Request Concerts should be cut down."50 
SO Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York} 1970, p.17. 
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As can.be seen from the.above the German people did have some 
input into the radio programming of .music but subject to the tastes of 
the radio chiefs and·Doktor Goebbels. He was not always pleased with 
the people he put in charge of the musical selection. As in the case 
of propaganda, he rejected the ivory-tower manner of the experts whom 
he had to rely upon in these matters. By the middle of the war he had 
replaced several of them and never really got a foothold into the 
means of consistant music programming. 
He was to eventually select the music himself and made some 
programming changes in 1941. At that time were three main programs. 
The first was the Reich Program which was broadcast from five a.m. 
' until two a.m .. This contained the news and commentary along with 
feature coverage and interspersed with music. The second was the 
light entertainment pr.ogram which was broadcast from eight fifteen 
p.m. to ten p.m., each night from the Luxemburg and Alpen transmitters. 
Thirdly there was a serious music program which was carried duri.ng the 
evening hours over the Deutschlandersender transmission facilities. 
It consisted of orchestral, operatic and chamber music. Boelke, who 
translated the conferences, tells .his readers that programming was 
envisioned that would further define the facets or elements of 
overall transmissions. He describes the three shows as bei.ng the 
Beethoven, Johann Strauss and the Goethe programs. The first two 
were appearently adopted but Goebbels never really accepted the idea 
of the Goethe program as a'total spoken word format and cancelled 
it's implementation. 
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The decision to change the radio programming was in response to 
the military forces who called for more light entertainment . The 
change was met with some resistance and Goebbels decided that letters 
to that effect would be turned back with an expl anation that light 
programming was needed and the decision was final. 
The change was carried too far and in 1942 he wrote in his 
Diary, 
"Unfortunately our own radio, by its seemingly 
sentimental programs , contributes to the 
depressed state of our morale . I shal l have to 
take a hand. It won 't do for sadness to be placed 
on the program in this the saddest of al l months. 1151 
The overall picture of the German radio program was described by 
Manvell and Freankel as consisting , 
" ... of little but long stretches of music , (mostly of 
high quality) punctuated with news bulletins, talks, 
interviews, eyewitness reports and outside broadcasts 
connected with the war. 11 52 
We have already seen that Goebbels himself was an able broadcaster 
who out-performed Hitler himself. Goebbels appeared on the radio every 
Friday night with commentary. They were completely rehearsed and pre-
wi:itten. Manvell and Freankel continue to say , 
"Goebbels spoke in a relaxed, easy manner of the trained 
professional , his beautiful voice pronouncing with 
assurance every word and phrase of his carefully composed 
script . Fritzsche attracted attention by developing an 
51 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company , Inc., Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner , 1948, p.520 . 
52 Manville , Roger , and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr . Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.180. 
ironic styl e with the heavy, underlined humore 
appreciated by th~ great lower-middle class 
public for which his star broadcasts were 
intended . His prime function was to jab the 
unheard enemy news, views and statements of 
the allied leaders. 11 53 
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Hans Fritzsche was one of Goebbels ' chief aides at the Ministry 
for many years and will be discussed in more depth later. 
The radio personnel were carefully selected and highly trained 
as speaker before being allowed to go on the air . Their manner of 
delivery was supposed to conform to bhe highest standards of the 
German language. Germany had and has , however many clearly 
discernable dialects. The idea of a standard German pronounciation 
was realized and in the conference of April 8 , 1941 , Goebbels made 
the following asserti ons, 
"The Minister states that complaints have been 
coming in from various quarters about the new 
radio announcer , on the grounds that he has too 
strong an Australian accent . The radio , the 
Minister says, must speak the purest , clearest 
and most dialect free German because it speaks to 
the whol e nation. As a matter of principle , there 
must be a standard language just as t here is a 
standard orthography. What Luther's translation 
of the Bibl e has done for written German , we on the 
radio must do for German speech; fix a standard 
language which, even if it does not sweep away the 
dialects, i s val id throughout the Reich . 1154 
It is interesting to note that Adolf Hitler spoke with a thick 
Bavarian accent and was the object of some ridicule on that point and 
53 Manville , Roger, and Fraenkel , Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels , His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p .180 . 
54 Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels , 
(E . P . Dutton & Co., Inc ., New York) 1970 , p .140. 
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the fact that he often used very poor grarnmer . 
The home service was only an element of the scheme of German 
radio . The most important utilization of radio technology was in the 
war. Here we have the use of a new technology in forms that were 
unprecedented in any other war. Radio was viewed by Goebbels as an 
element in the evolution of propaganda . He felt that the radio had a 
clear role in propaganda and described his attitude toward such 
developments , 
"On the subject of l eaflet propaganda , the Minister 
declares that he does not expect much from a leaflet 
campaign in Britain since the effort involved would be 
quite out of proportion with the result. The British 
masses can be reached much more easily by radio . If 
Britain for her part is operating with leaflets in 
Germany , then this is due to the fact that Britain 
cannot reach the German listener by radio to any 
appreciabl e extent . Besides , the spoken word has a 
more magnetic effect than the written word. The 
Minister admists that the leaflets most recently 
dropped by the British are a little more dangerous 
than the early ones . He wishes to be informed at 
once about any new publication and its exact wording . 1155 
Radio was to have a valuable effect in that leaflets , while not only 
considered obsolete, were dangerous to drop as the luftwaffe had to 
keep all planes for combat duties . 
Audio technology in the Reich was advanced enough to permit the 
duplication of speeches in tape or record form . Such capacities were 
55 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels , 
(E.P. Dutton & Co. , Inc. , New York) 1970 , p.73. 
utilized extensively by the Nazis and later the Allies. Goebbels, 
during the fight for power in.Gerinany, challenged Bruening to a debate 
which Brueni_ng refused. Goebbels went ahead and rented a hall and on 
the appointed night walked in the hall with some large cases full of 
apparatus and some smaller cases. Manvell and Fraenkel relate, 
"The cases contained large disc recordings of Brueni_ng 's 
speeches, and from then on Goebbels conducted a debate 
with the absent chancellor by switching the recordings 
on and off. This kind of performance del_ighted the 
audience and scored a propaganda victory as sheer 
entertainment. Incidentally, the BBC was to adopt the 
same device later in its broadcasts to Germany during 
the war, using recordings of Hitler's propaganda 
speeches and broadcasts against him with interpolations 
of the truth. u56 
Germany, under the Nazis also utilized this technique throughout 
the war. In 1940 Goebbels, in anticipating the advance into Belgium, 
gave the following orders to his radio monitoring staff, 
"The radio is to make immediate recordings of the 
announcements by Brussels and Hilversum radios, 
so that the voices of the regular speakers can be 
used if, in some special circumstances
5 
we put 
ourselves on these enemy wavelengths." 7 
Goebbels' greatest victories in the earlier part of the war was 
his ruthless and cunning use of fear over the radio. He established 
a sequential system of intrusion into the minds of foreign adversary 
populations through radio that in the case of France, Belgium, 
Austria, Czechoslovikia and other countries, many people tho_ught the 
56 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon·& Schuster, New York) 1960, p.101. 
57 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.41. 
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situation was hopeless before the first weapon was fired. To examine 
his technique is an intriguing and sobering experience. He was 
possessed of a devious cunni.ng that was virtually unmatched in the 
Nazi heirarchy. His attention to the details of foreign intrusion 
had the Allies very worried for the first few years of the war. His 
staff received great and constant direction from him personnaly on 
most, if not all, fore.ign polemics • 
In addition to the specific campa~gns which sall be covered in 
some detail shortly, there was the ongoing broadcasts to the foreign 
countries which required very careful orchestration and supervision. 
These broadcasts were carried out under the joint supervision of the 
military, diplomatic and propaganda elements of the German Government. 
While they were later hindered by internal squabbli.ng over priority 
and authority, they proved very effective in the first years of the 
war. In 1940 Goebbels established specific policy concerning these 
broadcasts: 
"The Minister hears a report on the question of the 
censorship of foreign language broadcasts by 
foreigners and decides that, contrary to the present 
practice, a script of each planned transmission is to 
be submitted in good time and in triplicate; this 
practice is to take effect immediately. Censorship 
will be exercized by: a) the Wehrmacht, b) the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, c) the Foreign Press Department. 
Attention is to be paid to the person of the speaker 
to make sure a harmless text is not made to produce the 
opposite effect by a mocking delivery. When the censors 
do not agree, the decision will not be made by a majority 
vote, but by the most determined opinion."58 
58 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr; Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.33. 
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As mentioned before the.Minis½ry.adopted Goebbels plan for the 
opening moves . in the intrusion of . German radio in fore_ign countries. 
This sequence took place before an armed advance was to be made. The 
purpose of the sequence was to prepare the enemy population for the 
advance by posing as a benign force, forced to advance by the stupidity 
of the enemy government, to damage moral in the enemy ga_rrison and to 
weaken the government image in the eyes of the general population and 
therefrom a present a benevolent picture of the German government. 
After this_ groundwork was laid, threats of violence would be 
made in response to supposedly unsound positions of the enemy 
government and a call for capitulation onthe part of the people of 
the enemy country. This was followed by the deliberate introduction 
of confusing information before the actual advance and takeover of 
the nation's broadcasti_ng. 
Again, this sequence was established for use prior to the actual 
invasion of German armed forces. After the country was subdued 
through those means, the Doktor had a plan for the takeover of the 
enemy media. Manvell and Fraenkel pelate a story about the takeover 
of the Hilversum transmitter in Holland, which was mentioned earlier, 
as told to one Charles Rollo by a broadcaster who was there, 
"Berlin radio reporters arrived at Hilversum, thirty 
strong, the day after the Dutch army surrendered. 
They came to repair any ~quipment that might have 
been smashed and, if necessary, to install new 
transmitters, With them were transcribed programs, 
in Dutch, to last two weeks and printed program 
schedules ready for distribution. After some 
though, however, they decided to let the Hilversum 
anriouncers carry on as usual, except that all music 
by British, French or Jewish composers was banned, 
and for a few days all newscasts were suspended . 
When the news was resumed, the Dutch announcers 
were told they might say anything they pleased; 
guard with loaded revolvers in their hands sat 
around to discourage untoward cornrnents. 11 59 
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Manvell and Fraenkel conceded that this policy was "Brilliant" 
in that the Dutch population were greatly re-assured when their 
familiar broadcasters were heard once again . Also the Nazis brought 
in the trucks with them a series of programs enough for two months 
intended for use against the English. 
Without a doubt the most effective use of radio as a means of 
propaganda was the secret transmitter. In the first two months of 
1940 the Germans established secret transmitters for use against 
England and France. The French station was called "Humanite ' ". 
The British station was "The New British Broadcasting Station" and 
also known as the "Concordia Services ". Others included Concordia H 
- the "Voice of Free India" and Concordia A, • the Voice of the Free 
Arabs". In addition there were East Transmitter V, "Radio of 
Lennin ' s Old Guard" , and the "Voice of Hellas" or Fatherland radio 
aimed at Greece. Finally there was the "Free American Radio" . There 
were radio stations that transmi tted in short wave frequency to other 
parts of the world but did not figure prominently in the basic radio 
propaganda scheme . 
59 Manville, Roger , and Fraenkel, Heinrich , Dr. Goebbels , Hi s Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960 , p.177- 8. 
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It should be interesting to examine the manner in which the 
secret transmitters were used against various countries in the course 
of the war . Fear a lways played a great role in the treatment any given 
country received over the airwaves . In the case of Greece , which the 
Germans concerned themsel ves with as a r esult of I t aly ' s failures 
there , a specific polemic was established with the of the royal 
appeal s for help . In the conference of April 21 , 1941, Goebbels 
instructed his staff to undermine the credibility of the Greek throne 
throuqh broadcasts : 
"On the subject of Greence , the Minister states that, 
following the Greek appeal put out over the radio, 
the King t oo (but not the royal house) should be 
attacked . over the secret transmitter , f or instance, 
it should be said : Has it anything to do with Greek 
honor that , merely for the sake of offering resistance 
for another 24 hours, we should let all our bridges be 
smashed and all our oil depots be burnt? Patriots, 
we call on youf Has the King any right to speak any 
l onger on behalf of the Gr eek people? This King, who 
has already had the Greek crown jewels shi pped to 
Egypt , whose ministers are on the point of flying of f 
to Istanbul and who , as soon as German troops appear 
within a hundred kilometers of Athens , will board his 
aircraft to escape . 11 60 
Such a polemic , if delivered under the guise of a local radio 
transmission would have t o have had a ha rmful effect on an already 
alarmed population . Such broadcasts were designed to arouse fear by 
pointing out the weaknesses of government under unstable circumstances . 
GO Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels , 
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc., New York) 1970 , p . 148. 
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It was also the fact that the Greek throne had not really done much 
to prepare for the Nazi onslaught·. that it found itself in an already 
weakened position. 
The case of the French was different in some ways. France's 
military leaders had demonstrated their indecisiveness in that 
battles of Belgium and Holland and by the time the Germans turned 
their attention to France, the population had little faith in the~r 
military. French air weakness also played an important factor. The 
Maginot Line, which had been erected as an eternal defense against 
further German aggression after W.W.I had proven to be completely 
worthless in.the face of the new Blitzkrieg technique and the French 
fell in less than two months. The manner in which the French 
population was handled by Goebbels' secret transmitters showed a 
clear grasp of psychological advantages gained after the fall of 
Belgium and Holland. TThe government in France had been none too 
stable in the "Twilight War" and continually demonstrated its 
inability to maintain control of the worsening situation. Hitler saw 
this as did Goebbels and played on it. The prepartions for war in the 
French territory was carefully orchestrated and the directives for the 
use of the secret transmitters were indicative of careful analysis, 
"The secret transmitter must operate in a revolutionary 
and hypernationalistic manner and, by suitable arguments 
about the government's weakness, to oppose one government 
after another to the point of its downfall. The Minister 
desires the widest possible participation in this work."61 
61 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.47. 
Further modifications were made in policy toward the end of 
reaching the backbone of the threatened populations , the peasants 
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and the small businessmen . Goebbel s turned from the cities to the 
countrysides i n his campaigns on t he radio and emphasized the need to 
invoke pessimi sm and a sense of futility in the populace. Hi s staff 
received instructions in this vein in June of 1940, 
"The secret transmitters i s to use all arguments to 
spread the s l ogans, ' Lay down your arms , it is all 
pointless .' The communi st transmitters ... must put 
forward arguments of pure social agitation . (Every-
t hing is being smashed up; who i s going t o foot the 
bill; who guarantees the pensions; the tax burden 
will be c rushing; etc . ) u62 
Goebbels had a cadre in France to ascertain the mood and 
disposition of the common man. He would capitalize on this in such 
a way as to use French mannerisms on the radio and use the latest 
gossip as qui ckl y as i t surfaces in the general popula tion. As t he 
time drew near for the actual invasion, Goebbels set his staff to 
turning the nerves of the French population to a panic edge , 
"The task of the secret transmitter, from now on, is t o 
use ever y means to create a mood of panic in France . 
To that e nd it must work an a wholl y French platform 
and display the greatest indignation and alarm in 
protesting the ommi sions of the French government. 
I n parti cul ar, the rumors buzzing around France are to 
be picked up and developed . The secret transmitter 
must above all take up the rumors of the French 
government i ntending to flee from Paris , and Reynard , 
62 Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels , 
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., Inc . , New York) 1970 , p.53 . 
who denied these rumors, is to be called a liar. It 
must further utter an urgent warning .against the 
dangers of a 'Fifth.Column' which undoubtedly 
includes all German .ref.ugees. Furthermore, the 
rumor is to be circulated that the first action of 
the Germans in occupied territories is invariably 
the confiscation of all deposits of money in the 
banks, so that true French patriots should withdraw 
their money now in the threatened regions. 11 63 
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Not only did the Germans put an onus on the German refugees, who 
would undoubtedly be mistreated, thus giving the Germans fuel for 
their self-righteous fires, but also they orchestrated an igenious 
method of inciting the French people to add to the confusion by 
destroying their own economic system! 
Once the invasion was effected and the Vichy government was 
established the Germans maintained their stations illegally to 
preserve the stations as supposed underground transmitters to further 
confuse the routed population with lies. The population did not take 
well to the stations and Goebbels was hard put to protest his trans-
mitters. An example of this trouble can be found in his Diary entry 
of May 12, 1942, 
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11 In Paris an assault was made on our short wave radio 
station 'Alois'. Unfortunately it was successful. 
Two transmission plants were destroyed. As a result 
very serious repraisals are necessary. The military 
commander asked me whether he.ought to requisition 
all radio sets in the entire occupied area of France. 
I don't regard this as a happy thought, for thereby 
we shall loose our own possibilities for propaganda. 
He accepted my idea to requisition radio sets individually, 
that is, to take them, to begin with, from enemies of the 
state." 64 
Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret·conferences ·of Dr; Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.42. 
64 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
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Overall, the French invasion was well aug11 
transmitters but the radio campaigns that follc 
not all that effective . The Germans were, it~ 
destroying governments than they were at establ 
them . 
The scenario was much the same for the bat __ ~UJ..OS 
were established in occupied areas along the coast and a battery of 
programs were launched against England from the onset. Although the 
GeDllans never set foot on the British Isles , the same tactics were 
used in anticipation of a possible attack . The Germans were, however, 
dealing with an internal situation altogether different than the one 
they faced in France. The British were much more unified in their 
approach to the German problem and the taste of Dunkirk had solidified 
the government ' s attitude toward the German danger . 
Churchill had become a leading figure and proved to be a 
propagandist equal to, if not far superior to Goebbels or Hitler . 
Goebbels, as indicated before, had an unrealistic image of the 
British politically, sociologically and militarily. He also under 
estimated the alliance between the British and the Americans. His 
radio scenario would have doubtless been modified to take these 
factors into account had he realized it. On July 20 , 1940, the word 
went out to his staff concer ning England, 
"The secret transmitters, on much the same l i ne as 
before the opening of the western offensive , should 
make clear what l ies in store for the British once 
the offensive starts. Over the ' Workers ' transmitter 
the first cautious attempts should be made to call for 
the formation of action committees against Churchill . 
As a catchy slogan each single transmission should 
be prefaced by : ' The Empire is ruled by a fool ; 
Churchill i s a fool. ' The ' Voix de Paix' should 
not only demand peace but might clearly emphasize 
its poss i bility . Furthermore , Herr Raski n is to 
get a Frenchman to Broadcast in English explaini ng 
that France might well have been spared if she had 
accepted the Fuehrer's offer in good time ."65 
The network of stations proliferating in the British campaign 
were diversified in their aims and audiences. The "New British 
Broadcasting Stati on " which had been among the first , was broad-
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casting over three shortwave frequencies . Thei r transmissions were 
directed against the government and in support of peace . Trans-
mitters also chanpioned the idea of Scottish independance 
('Caledonia') and for Welsh separatists tendincies , ( ' Concordia W' ) . 
"Concordia S" operated in a mobile unit and broadcast to the working 
class employing social ist revolutionary sentiments. Another trans-
mitter , "Concordia P" , transmitted on a pure pacifist format under 
the supposed auspi ces of the church . 
When on the offensive, Goebbels ', cunning knew few bounds. He 
was absolutely effective in the incitment of a populace against an 
establ ished government . Absolutely effective except , that is , in the 
case of Britain . I t was not that his tactics were not sound and that 
they were not carefully considered . He simply lost the impact of his 
efforts because of h i s misunderstanding of the British people. The 
65 Boelcke , Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr . Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co ., I nc ., New York) 1970, p.68 . 
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opening radio offensive he launched _against the E.nglish was masterly. 
His tricks and ploys were pure artistry but they did not prevail 
because the government simply had to renounce them as Nazi hogwash. 
It is still interesting to examine the campaign against the British 
over the airwaves as an example of the wav panic and distrust can be 
incited. In July of 1940 Goebbels told his staff, 
"The secret transmitters must on no account unrnaSk 
themselves as German. They must, therefore, as far 
as possible, b.egin each broadcast with attacks on the 
National Socialmsts. They must pick up and magnify 
the themes also tackled by our official transmitters; 
in addition, they are to invent political incedents 
on the home front in clubs and nightclubs and protest 
against them on behalf of the British people. In 
particular, they must now spread horror by putting 
out British eye-witness accounts from Warsaw, 
Dunkirk, etc., and they must now use every conceivable 
means to make sure the very first blows against Br±tiin 
fall on psychologically well-prepared ground. n66 
The exact manner in which the fear and horror was to be aroused 
in the British Isles was a matter of timing and circumstance. All 
involved knew that the mamn part of the Battle of Britain was to be 
fought, at first, in the air. This emphasis was made clear to the 
staff of the Ministry shortly before the first air strikes were 
initiated. As usual, Goebbels had been considering the matter and 
had come up with a scenario he hoped would be adequate to meet the 
needs of the moment. Again, in July of 1940 Goebbels instructed 
his staff, 
66 Boelcke, Willi A., The secret Conferences of·Dr. ·Goebbels, 
(E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.70. 
"It is the task of the secret transmitters to arouse 
alarm and fear am~ng the British ~eople, But ~ince 
the Ge;r:man Propaganda behind this campaign must not 
be apparent, they must wrap up their real intentions 
with moral t ales and good advice . Among other things, 
they should not put out expertly prepared A.R,P . (air 
raid precaution) classes of whi ch all details must be 
so accurately described that the civilian population 
is seized with horror from the start . 1167 
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The air raid warnings had their effect and government measure to 
quell the effect was not lost on Goebbels. He went on to instruct 
his staff that follow-up propaganda was needed along these lines . On 
August 5 , he told his staff in conference , 
"Propaganda against Britain must be stepped up over the 
next few days even more than in the past, and the 
secret transmitters in particular must try to achieve 
the maximum effect. In this connexion the Minister 
praises the ARP transmissions to date and suggests 
that gas defence instruction programs should now be 
broadcast , and fear promoted of incidents in connexion 
with ARP classes . For instance, when the manufacture 
of home made molotov cocktails has been presented as 
a national duty, extreme nervousness must be aroused 
for a few days among all owners of such irenades that 
their devi ces might blow up any moment ." 8 
The air raid theme was followed up as a means to blast the 
credi bility of the members of the Bri tish government calling on the 
citi zens to stay calm and continue productivity. This was effective 
against the French but the English people didn 't seem to fall prey 
to such ploys to any appreciable extent. The devices utilized by 
Goebbels are interesting to note however and on September 4, 1940 
67 Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels , 
(E.P . Dutton & Co ., Inc ,, New York) 1970, p . 70. 
68 Ibid . , p . 7 8 . 
he instructed his staff , 
"The Foreign Lan~age Service and the. secret 
transmitters should between them broadcast the 
fact that the British want to abolish air""'1'.'aid 
warnings for their industrial areas. It would 
be explained to the British workers that they 
are now doubly and tre.bly exposed to the risk 
of bombing while the English Lords are s itting 
in air raid shelters, having taken their families 
to places of safety. The Minister of Information, 
i n particular, who has sent his daughter to the 
United St ates, is a fine person to call on the 
workers to stay put in their factories. I n this 
way the British measure should be divested of its 
patriotic measure and given a plutocratic character . 11 69 
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As the preparations were made to open the act and the appoint ed 
time grew near , Goebbels unleashed a real fear campaign on the British 
people that dealt with the effects of actual bombings. This kind of 
propaganda was staunchly re.butted by the British government and 
Goebbels went further to instruct hls staff in the summer of 1940, 
"The important thing now is to intensify as far as 
possible the mood of panic which is undoubtely slowly 
gaining ground i n Br itain. The secret transmitters 
and the Foreign Language Service in parti cular now 
have the task of painting a picture of the magnitude 
and volume of our attacks for that part of the 
British population which has not yet experienced 
the frightful effects of our air raids . The secret 
transmitters, in particular should marshall witness 
who must give horrifyd.ng accounts of the destruction 
they have seen with their own eyes. However the l ast 
stops of panic mongering have not yet been pulled out. 1170 
As the air raids commenced the British government rallied the 
people in the historic manner described by countless accounts and 
69 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbel s , 
(E .P. Dutton & Co. , Inc . , New York) 1970 1 p.85. 
7o Ibid., p , 77 . 
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histories. The efforts of Goebbels and his staff did , however make 
the job much more difficult, alth~ugh it failed to rout the people 
psychologically . The campaign by radio became less and less 
effective as the people grew to understand the source of the secret 
transmissions . Goebbels tried to counteract the loss of credibility 
tb the secret transmitters at they were discovered and ordered his 
staff, 
"The Foreign Language Service is to issue an emphatic 
denial of British allegations that the New British 
Broadcasting Station is a German Transmitter . The 
British government, it should be said, is trying to 
saddl e German propaganda with broadcasts for which, 
in our view , it is itself responsible. Besides it 
is a cheap way of dealing with o~fosition by 
ascribing it simply to Germans." 
It was an ineffective counter effort
1
though. The secret trans-
mitter became less and less a factor in the war of nerves being 
played by the Germans . 
Perhaps one of the most interesting and most notable of the 
propaganda ploys utilized against the British was the work of one 
William Joyce. Joyce was a British dissident who had embraced the 
National Socialist concept in Britain for many years . Shortly before 
the war he went to Germany where he became a naturalized citizen. 
He was won~ to refer to the British government and people with a 
rather heavy humor and deep irony . His famous, "that liar Winston 
Churchill, First Lord of the Sea Bottom , Ha Ha Ha" was to win him 
71 
Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels , 
(E.P . Button & Co., Inc., New York) 1970, p.81. 
some notoriety with the British listening public and even a kind of 
morose affection for they knew where he was broadcasting from. 
It is said that Goebbels liked Joyce and thought well of him . 
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Joyce ' s effectiveness, like so much of the German effort, started out 
high and deteriorated . 
Joyce, Born in New York of British parents and educated at London 
University, had been a member of "Mosely ' s Blacksmiths " , a counterpart 
of the Nazis in Britain. He was violently anti-semetic. Goebbels had 
been looking for someone like him for a long time . His effectiveness 
wore off though when Churchill came to power. This is when the 
London Daily Express christened him "Lord Haw Haw" after his remarks 
about Churchill. But his irony and fun attitude were soon dissipated 
in the face of Churchill ' s ability to rally the English people and 
his presentation hardened. 
Some of his characters portrayed over the airwaves were 
"Orpington and Orpington" , two British lords who sat in an exclusive 
club and lamented the war, "Sir Izzy Ungeheimer," who avoided his 
taxes, "Bumbly Mannering" , a parson who made money out of mµnitions, 
and "Sir Jasper Murgatroid", who gave away British scandals and 
secrets . 
He was captured by the British at the close of the war and 
hanged . 
The work of the secret transmitters and the regular radio broad-
casts became l ess effective as time wore on . By 1942 the work of the 
secret transmitters had come under question as to whether they were 
even needed any longer. In the middle of the year Goebbels required 
this of his staff , 
As for the work of the secret transmitters , the 
Minister requests an accurate exposition of existing 
transmitters and their purpose and method of work . 
He declares that , generally speaking, the secret 
transmitters are no longer topical, just as in 1932 , 
for instance, the l eaflet had become outdated in the 
internal German struggle . The work of the secret 
transmitters should therefore be continued only in 
cases where there are special reasons. 1172 
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Just as the leaflet was described as outmoded at the beginning 
of this chapter, the secret transmitter was also falling by the way-
side. Goebbels realized that the s uccesses of the transmitters were 
principly as me'bhods of disruption and incitement , he also realized 
that he was no match for the British mentality he had fought so hard 
to break. Indeed, if Goebbels thought the secret transmitters were 
absolute, the Allies did not. On May 18, 1943 , Goebbels wrote 
briefl y of a new turn in the worsening developments , 
"To intensify this war of nerves the Allied GHQ in 
North Africa beamed a radio broadcast to the French 
People and kept repeating it, to the effect that 
Frenchmen were to sit at their radio sets until late 
into the night and wait for important news. I think 
this whole matter is a gigantic bluff . The English 
and Americans won ' t stage an invasion at this time . 
They haven 't prepared sufficiently for it and the 
whole matter is still too uncertain. 1173 
This cryptic entry seems to coincide with the surrender of 
Rommel' s forces in Africa in the same period of the month . Whatever 
72 Boelcke, Willi A. , The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels , 
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the.event, the manner in which Goebbels took the ploy was defenseless, 
unable to .. really counteract.its i effects, The invasion was more than 
a year away but the German .mentality was beim,: geared up for it not by 
prop.aganda, but by the facts. 
Goebbels had the acuity and intelligence to launch an effective 
attack .against·hfus adversaries and do it effectively. If his own 
illfounded conceptions were to blame in part, his peers at the 
Ministerial level and 'at the General Staff level in the Wehrmacht 
were also to blame. The impact this discord had on the Propaganda 




The Germans were reputed to be masters of organization and 
effeciency. They systemtized each function of the government with 
the ideal in mind that such functions would work in harmony with other 
elements in the government. This was not exactly the case when Hitler 
assumed power. The Fuehrer realized the utility of conflict as a tool 
for keeping his personal power and position secure against the forma-
tion of internal, adverse power blocs. 
This was particularly evident in the structure of the Propaganda 
Ministry. As its influence and expanse grew, the conflict with other 
elements of government grew proportionately. As will be shown, the 
Ministry came into almost constant conflict with the Reich Press 
office, the Foreign Office and the Wehrmacht-. 
Before describing the conflicts, it will be necessary to under-
stand the structure of the Propaganda Ministry and in particular the 
structure of the Broadcasting Office. The Ministry started out small 
and compact when Goebbels assumed his post. Originally he had hoped 
that the Ministry would have been self-supporting through revenues 
from the licensing and taxation of radio receivers, but this accounted 
for only a small portion of his intake as the Ministry grew. 
At the onset, the Propaganda Ministry had severn divisions. 
First, a division which dealt with legislation and legal problems, 
budget, finance, accounti_ng, personnel administration, the 
ministerial library, the National Chamber of culture, the Council of 
,~9 
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Connnercial Advertizing 1 fairs and exhibitions; second, for coordi~ 
nation of propaganda and public enlightment, regional .agencies of the 
Ministry, the German Academy of Politics, ceremonies· and demonstrations, 
national emblems, racial questions, the Treaty of Versailles, youth 
organizations, business and social politics, public health and 
athletics, eastern and border questions and the national travel 
connnittee. Third, Radio and the National Broadcasting Company; 
Fourth, for the National and Foreign Press, journalism, press archives 
and news; fifth, for cinema, motion picture industry, cinema censo~-
ship, and youth literature censorship; sixth, for theatre, music, art, 
theatre management, stage direction, design, folk art; seventh, for 
1 protection against counter-propaganda at home and abroad. 
As the needs of the Ministry grew the organization changed and 
became more sophisticated. The duties became more clearly delineated 
and the re-organization reflected the specific spheres of activity 
more readily. By 1942 the overall structure looked much larger and 
indeed, it had grown to eleven departments and fifteen sub-departments. 
At the top, there was Goebbels as the Director of Party Propaganda. 
He had a principle Aide-De-Camp and a Chief of Staff. Both answered 
directly to Goebbels and troubleshot as he saw fit. Under Goebbels 
came the eleven departments or offices. The first (not in order of 
importance) was the Reich League for National Socialist Propaganda. 
1 
Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.135-6. 
Th:ls office coordinated the efforts of all party sections. The 
"Deutschland" Reich motor column transported all scenic effects for 
the demonstrations, rallies and mass meetings. Next came the 
Exhibitions and Fairs office which handled exhibits and stands for 
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such activities .. There was a Press Liason.office and a Liason office 
for state and military elements of the government. The head office 
handled staff and budget needs and acted in an administrative capacity 
in a general sense. There was a training office for the speakers and 
orators. 
The last four offices were the largest. The Cultural Office 
handled a) the artistic planning of badges, emblems and banners, 
b) the section of music, and poems for party gatherings, c) the 
planning of rallies, mass meetings, etc., d) architecture, party 
buildings and pavillions, etc. The Mass Propaganda Office dealt with 
the organization, instruction and assignment of trained party speakers, 
posters, and the logistics and orchestration of mass meetings, rallies 
and demonstrations. The Film office concerned itself with; a) 
organization of personnel; bl technical research, c) party 
documentaries, d) publicity for party films, e) funding for films. 
The Office of Broadcasting is the last department. Its function was 
more elaborate as the mission was the most expansive in the Ministry. 2 
2 Sington, Derrick, and Weidenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels 
Experiment (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943, p.147. 
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The Ministry directly controlled the R.R.G. or the Reich 
Broadcasting Company. (Reichsrundfunkgesellschaft) Before going into 
the structure of the R.R.G . it would be useful to briefly describe 
its history. It was established in the early part of the twenties 
and came under the control of the Post Office. In 1933, when Goebbels 
assumed power, he immediately decreed that all shares of the R.R.G. 
were now under the ownership of the Propaganda Ministry. He thus 
acquired a monopoly on broadcasting in Germany. 
At that time he also created the following organizations: The 
League of National Socialists Wireless Listeners, which became the 
administrative organ of the Office of Broadcasting. This organization 
promoted R.R. G. programming and advised it on content. He also 
created the Chamber of Broadcasting which concentrated on the 
technical and professional areas of the field. There was the Overseas 
Broadcasting Service which is exactly what the title suggests. 
In the realm of news there already existed the National German 
Wireless Service and the Drahtloser Dienst A.G., more commonly 
referred to as simply the A.G. which apparently supplemented the 
N.G.W.S. Both came under the control of the Propaganda Ministry when 
Goebbels assumed power . 3 
In March of 1933 Goebbels placed Eugen Hadamowsky in charge of 
the R.R.G. as he established the following organization. At the top 
3 
Reiss, curt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York, 
New York) 1948, p.94-5. 
Hadamowsky had his offices. Directly under hllll came the offices of 
Aclministration, Engineering and the Central Division, The first two 
are self-explanitory. The third, the Central Division played the 
. major role in the broadcasting functions of the Party. Central 
handled incoming and outgoing matters for State and political broad-
casting. This was a direct function. 
Another direct function was the aclministration of news. Ancillary 
to this was the A.G. and the D.N.B •. (formerly the N.G.W.S.). Here the 
news was gathered through dispatch and psychologically adjusted for 
dissemination. The News division also participated in the coordination 
of the activities of the Propaganda·Ministry Home Press Division. 
The next direct function of Central was the Foreign Services 
Division. Here foreign news was gathered and disseminated. Ancillary 
to this was the Propaganda Ministry Foreign Division which coordinated 
its activities with the Home Press Division. 
Besides Central, Eng~neering and Administration, the R.R.G. 
oversaw the activities of the Programs Division. Here the non-
political commentary, music, drama, entertainment and variety were 
programmed and presented. This department also coordinated the 
activities of the Propaganda Ministry Troop Entertainment Division. 
The Troop Entertainment Division was also coordinated with the Home 
Press Division and the Foreign Division. 4 
4 Sington, Derrick, and Weidenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels 
Experiment (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943, p.45. 
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Internally there were a few sn~gs from time to time but nothing 
major as Goebbels tried to keep a t_ight re_ign over his domain. 
Occasionally some young and enthusiastic member would overstep his 
bounds but this was not harshly dealt with. Goebbels had a reputation 
for letting talent actualize itself as long as it was consistant with 
his own interests. 
The real problems arose when systems and interests outside 
Goebbels'.Ministry confronted him with conflicting decisions and 
actions. Derrick Sington and Arthur Weidenfeld, in their book, The 
Goebbels Experiment indicate the exact nature of Goebbels' troubles 
on this account, 
"The Propaganda Minister's Broadcasting Division 
however-- particularly in wartime - has to share its 
influence over the broadcast output with other 
ministries and with the High Command (Wehrmacht). 
Talks, commentaries, and news items on world affairs 
often seem to be inspired by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs, and the High Command has secured a firm grip 
on broadcasts on military topics. All news items about 
military operations, as well as the daily communique 
and the frequent special announcements, are broadcast 
as 'from the High Command of the Armed Forces'". 5 
Goebbels felt that his personal position, in time of war, was. 
· becoming that of a fringe activist. He was not involved in any major 
policy decisions on the affairs of state, but rather, contended with 
those decisions as a propagandist. His role was to receive the 
information from the real sources of action and create a palatable, 
5 Sington, Derrick, and Weidenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels 
Experiment (Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943, p.46. 
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psychol_ogically sound polemic upon which news releases would be based. 
Hitler was relatively unresponsive to his continuous pleas for more 
solidarity in the presentation of news and propaganda from the beginning 
of the war as the Fuehrer didn't really have the time or the interest 
to be bothered with matters that weren't of immediate concern. Hitler 
also had permitted himself to be surrounded by a cadre of intimates 
that were very jealous of their proximity to the Fuehrer. Hence, 
Goebbels' arguments, when not presented in person, would go unnoticed 
by Hitler. Even in 1943 Semmler wrote, 
"Goebbels is no longer satisfied with his present work. 
He is tired of merely finding fine words for what others 
are doing; he wants to intervene in the affairs of the 
nation. I think people credit him with more power and 
influence than he in fact has at the moment. Of course 
he controls public opinion with his powers over the 
radio, films and to a certain extent over the press .•. 
because he has to share half the work with the Reich 
Press Director (a spokesman of the Fuehrer's Head-
quarters), with the Foreign office and the High Command. 
Many of the directives I pass to the press in Goebbels' 
name are useless, because at the .same time the Fuehrer's 
Headquarters (that is to say Dr. Dietrich) is putting 
out the opposite directive on the same theme. And in 
cases of doubt anything that comes from the Fuehrer's 
Headquarters has Hitler's personal authority and takes 
priority however trivial the matter." 6 
Dr. Dietrich was to become more and more of a thorn in Goebbels' 
side as ~he war progressed. Dietrich was well aware of his edge over 
Goebbels in his position at the G.H.Q. possessing the priority in the 
form of Hitler's personal sanction. From the record of Dietrich's 
6 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.74. 
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releases, it is apparent that the man did not have the kind of 
propaganda sense that Goebbels possessed. Dietrich would make 
announcements that were without even the slightest factual basis and 
Goebbels would be expected to contend with them in a productive 
manner. 
In the critical campaign in Russia in 1941, the Germans were 
waiting news of the outcome of the battles and Dietrich made an 
announcement that the war in the east was already won. He did this 
without even consulting Goebbel s who heard about it aft er the fact. 
Semmler recal ls the incident, 
"Goebbels thinks we have seen today the biggest 
propaganda blunder of the war. Dr . Dietrich, at a 
big press conference in the hall of the Propaganda 
Ministry , made a statement to the effect that the 
war in the east was decided , that the Soviet army 
had at last been mastered . It made a tremendous 
sensation; but , says Goebbels, it has been done with 
unbelievable irresponsibility . He is foaming with 
rage. Firstly because Dietrich has got himself quite 
undeserved credit; secondl y because the impression 
will be given at the front and among the people that 
the war is really as good as over. They will say : 
'That ' s the end of the difficulties and efforts . ' 
This is the biggest piece of news that the war has 
produced . What dangerous illusions we are encouraging 
in the peopl e . 117 
Goebbel s realized the true ext ent of the danger in s uch 
illusions . He went to the Fuehrer to protest the announcement and 
try to gain the authority to handle such information exclusively . 
7 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse , 
I.Dndon) 1947, p . 59. 
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Apparently word of his feelings and intentions reached Dietrich, the 
Fuehrer ' s Press Chief paid a visit to the Minister of Propaganda to 
avoid a confrontation with Hitler . Goebbels writes in his Diaries , 
''Before my conversation with the Fuehrer I had a long 
talk with Dr . Dietrich about our propaganda and press 
departments in the occupied countries . He was agree-
able to having his public relations offi ces integrated 
into the propaganda sections . If he were to start a 
new organization for his public relations offices , we 
would have two sets of machinery in the occupied areas 
with resulting confusion . At present Dr . Dietrich and 
I are collaborating splendidly. I su~pose he realizes 
it's no fun to pick a fight with me." 
What ever vain illusions Goebbels may have had about himself with 
respect to the Fuehrer ' s Press Chief, they were soon put to rest . Ten 
days l ater , as the news of Italy ' s surrender surprised the Germans 
and the Allies were preparing to another force on the west coast of 
the country , Jodl , in conjunction with Dietrich, released some 
erroneous information on the state of affairs their, much to Goebbels ' 
dismay . 
The Allies had been over cautious in their estimates of German 
strength in the area of Rome and decised to land troops at Sal erno. 
Goebbels wrote in his Diary on the twenty first of September , 
1943 , 
"I had a very serious clash with Dr . Dietrich and General 
Jodl about the news handouts concerning Salerno . The two 
gentlemen felt very compromised . They would like, under 
all circumstances, to prevent my reporting this matter 
to the Fuehrer . I can refrain from this only, however , 
8 Goebbels , Dr. Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday & 
Company , Ihc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.443 . 
if given binding assurances that incidents of this sort 
won't be repeated, I have no mind to let my good name 
be discredited by.the· journalistic amaturishness of 
inferior officers. 11 9 
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The relationship was to grow worse. Dietrich had the high cards 
and remained virtually ensconced in his G.H.Q •. role. He remained as 
oblivious to the true propaganda needs of the Reich as Goebbels was 
aware of these needs. It seemed the Dietrich almost enjoyed baiting 
Goebbels for some obscure personal reason. Although there is no real 
documentation of the circumstances that might have arisen over personal 
reasons, Semmler points out the atmosphere was not productive and even 
affected the day to day disposition of news discemination, 
The endless quarrel between Goebbels and the Reich 
Press Chief have been dormant for a while only to flare 
up again and rage the fiercer. This struggle to dictate 
the tone of the press has begun again, .• Although 
Dietrich is State Secretary to the Prop_aganda Ministry 
he refuses to take orders or advice from Goebbels. He 
shelters himself safely behind Hitler whose Chief Press 
Officer he is. The press section of the Ministry, which 
took over the functions of the former press department of 
the Reich Government, is formally not under Goebbels at 
all, but under Dietrich as Press Director of the Reich 
Government. The headquarters of this department is in 
the famous Room 24, which is staffed d~y and night. 
From here are issued all political directives to the 
German press; all requests passed down from above, from 
Hitler, from Goebbels, from the Foreign Office and from 
the Chancellery have to go through his office. I myself 
pass to room 24 the press instructions I receive, 
dictated by Goebbels, so that they can be passed from 
there to the newspapers. Now if there is some important 
new material, like a speech by Churchill, it can happen, 
or rather it is the rule - that at least three or four 
pages of policy directives are produced. These are 
supposed to assist our editors in their work. But it is 
9 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. nochner, 1948, p.462. 
obvi ous to me that they deprive the writers of the 
last vest iges of intellectual independqnce , Th.e 
directives often contradict one anothey , ?ometimes 
only on a few points but more often compl etel y and 
utterly, I n such cases . there are only two .courses 
of action open to the wretched official in Room 24 1 
who is a lmsot continually tal king over two t elephones 
at once . Ei ther he can forbi d any ment ion of the 
Churchill speech for 24 hours - in whi ch case the 
Br i tish newspapers say the speech has given the 
Gennans such a shock they don ' t know what to say -
or he will t ake the di recti ve points f r om the 
Hitler- Dietr ich document and ignore the suggestions 
of Goebbels and Ribbentrop . 1110 
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I n the same entry Semml er illustrates one of the most f ascinating 
quirks of the ongoi ng conf lict to be made mani fest i n the overall 
ef fect of German news services , the difference in coverage in 
different media . He continues, 
"Oddly enough , Dietrich ' s authority extends only to the 
press , whil e Goebbels has exclusive contr ol over the 
r adio and over i ts sour ces . So it often happens that 
a speech by Church i l l i s comment ed on quite differ entl y 
by the pr ess and by the radio. Gener ally t he 
differences ar e sli ght but an expert can spot them at 
once. 11 11 
Semmler's observations were astute and timely . Only two days 
passed before Goebbel s decided to make the differences in the t wo 
medi a all the more c l ear as a r esult o f hi s growi ng i neffectuality 
in the printed e l ements of news . Semmler recal ls the conf erence 
meeting , 
lO Semml er , Rudol f , Goebbels- The Man Next To Hitler , lWesthouse , 
London) 1947, p . 111-12. 
ll Ibi d . , p . 112 . 
"One result of the latest quarrel with Pietrich is that 
Goebbels has decided to intensify the political use of 
the radio. He is going to give special attention to the 
development of its news services . The directive of his 
11 o ' clock conference , not pnoperly used for the press , 
are to have all the more influence on the radio. 1112 
llD 
As mentioned in previous chapters, the Propaganda Ministry had 
close ties with the Wehrmacht and the German High Command in the 
acquisi tion and dis semination of news releases . The military had set 
up the P.K. 's or the Propaganda Companies which have also been 
described previously. Things did not r un smoothl y , however, 
especially as the war began to turn for the worse for the Germans . 
It was easy for harmony to prevail between the milit ary and the 
Ministry when the war was full of German victories and the news was 
mostly favorable. When the High Command had to admit some defeat 
and mistakes , the atmosphere changed measurably. 
For reasons not maa e known to the Ministry , the military made the 
deci sion to limit the scope of the P.K.' s and when Goebbels discovered 
the order he became enraged . In April of 1942 he wrote in his Diary, 
"A new and heavy conflict with the OKH has started . The 
successor of Colonel Hesse , LTC Schwadtlo- Gesterding , had 
Lieutenant Mansfeldt, in private life a public relations 
man for I.G. Farben , deliver a speech to the P . K. men which 
is just about the limit . According to that speech, the 
army reporters may report only about the army. If they 
see anything in any theatre of war that has been done or 
carried out by some other element of the Wehrmacht , they 
are shamefully to be silent about it. I shall now become 
12 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels- The Man Next To Hitl er , (Westhouse , 
London) 1947, p . 113 . 
energetic and demand.that the OKH remove the two 
o:f;ficeii; .. at once,~because I have no intentions of 
bothering with. nitwits: ;i,n .. the dif:f;icult ta,sk·of 
collaboration between the:· Prop_aganda Ministry and 
the various.departments:of.the.Wehrmacht,. I shall 
require herea:f;ter ·, only- specially selected·. propagandists 
be placed in key.pos;l,tions · s~nce otherw;i,se. I cannot 
guarantee success for.our coIDlllon endeavor, 1113 
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Such problems were common for.over a year and :f;inally Goebbels 
made another visit to the G.H,Q,, where Hitler had now all but 
virtually cut himself off in seclusion to direct the war, The 
impression Hitler made on Goebbels was, once again, favorable but to 
no real avail. Promises were made and Goebbels appeared mollified. 
Again, he had no great proximity to the Fuehrer and the problems he 
presented Hitler were of no immediate importance beside the pressing 
matters of the conduct of the war. At the meeting Goebbels asked for 
more authority and Hitler agreed in principle, asking his Prop_aganda 
Minister for a written report and further arguments. Goebbels wrote, 
"The Wehrrnacht ••• should concern futself with the military 
questions only. Questions of psychology are exclusively 
the concern of the Propaganda Ministry. The press 
section of the High Command, which has always created 
a lot of trouble for me, is now being transferred to the 
Propaganda Ministry. Keitel and Jodl are opposing this 
with every means at their disposal but the Fuehrer asked 
me to send him a report on this question, whereupon he 
will issue the necessary decree. Propaganda, he said, 
is a function of the Propaganda Ministry and not of the 
Wehrrnacht. "14 
13 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P, Locl,ner, 1948, p,116~7. 
14 • .6 Ibid., p.36 • 
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What Hitler said and what he actually did were two entirely 
different things. Goebbels was to wait for a decision to actualize 
the promise which never came . 
1943 was a year when the Nazis began to feel the reversals of the 
war on all fronts , especially the home front. Bombings had increased 
and the production capacity of the German industry began to fall such 
that the losses were irreparable . The German people were put into a 
constant state of near panic as the Allies embellished the bomb results 
with propaganda similar to that used by Goebbels against England. 
The bombing was also destructive to morale as the much feared 
Luftwaffe had fallen upon hard times in Russia and was led by an 
increasingly befuddled and inept Goering. So the population writhed 
helplessly under growing attacks as the German concept of total war 
came home to roost. 
The panic had not been contained in the civilian population 
exclusively. The German High Command began to leap at any information, 
so poor was the capacity for intelligence and news gathering on the 
part of the Nazis. A clear example of what Goebbels had to contend 
with is i l lustrated in his Diary entry of May 20 , 1943, 
"The Americans have made another day raid on Flensburg 
and Kiel. First reports were to the effect that they 
dropped fountain pens and other articles filled with 
explosives . After a few hours this report , which was 
issued by the Naval Command at Kiel, proved unfounded . . . 
Such events show how nervous the Wehrmacht cormnanders 
have become under pressure of Anglo-American air raids. 1115 
15 Goebbels , Dr . Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc ., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P . Lochner , 1948, p.386 . 
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The High Command , under great pressure to reassure the German 
people that the destruction was only incidental, sought to flood the 
papers with victories at the slimmest possibility. For this Goebbels ' 
credibility was badly damaged when the reports turned out to be bogus. 
The Salerno incident was a case in point , as mentioned earlier, and 
Goebbels wrote of the damaging and debilitating effect such blunders 
had on his machine and his person. He wrote on September 18, 1943 , 
"I realize once again that our military propaganda 
for foreign countries has failed completely . Despite my 
earnest warnings it stressed German victory in Salerno 
quite superfluously. The military news services under 
General Jodl have been wri ting about a Dunkirk and a 
Gallipoli, and the whole pack of enemy propagandists 
attacks me and makes me responsible for this totally 
faulty news policy! I can no longer accept such 
responsibility and am going to take the offensive against 
our discordant news policy . It won ' t do for my good 
name to be dragged in the dirt by the world and, when 
things have gone wrong, for those responsibl e to fade 
away into the background , leaving me to take it on the 
chin .. . I have always held that victories are to be 
announced only after they have actually been achieved 
and that the skin of the bear must not be distributed 
until the bear has been killed. our mili tary public 
relations officers have again sinned greviously 
against this elementary principle of war- news policy . 1116 
Again , Goebbels went to the Fuehrer and articul ated his positions 
pointi ng out the disastrous results of the military handling of the 
news. Hitler again sought to mollify and placate Goebbels . The 
Gernerals , who had constant contact with Hitler, had no arguments in 
support of their poli cies and again Goebbels appeared to have driven 
home his points . He wrote of the meeting a week after the military 
publica tions, 
16 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P ., The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc . , Garden City , New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P . Lochner, 1948 , p.457 . 
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1'I told the Fuehrer in detail a.bout my diHiculti_es with 
the press section of the o , K,W, (Wehrn\a.cht). The fuehrer 
is simply flabb~gasted· that I should be hindered thus in 
the development of TI\Y work. He had always been told by 
the gentlemen of the O. K.W. that the press sections had 
already been dissolved. He is now determined to wipe the 
slate clean •.• The pro~aganda in the occupied areas is also 
to be subordinated to me, not only in those with civilian, 
commisars , but also where military governors are in char ge 
of the administration . 1117 
It never happened. Hitler, who appeared shocked by the discord 
and made promises to wipe the slate clean, didn't really have the 
concern to let the problem bother him once Goebbels left. It is safe 
to assume that the Generals didn ' t go overboard to recall the matter 
to Hitler's attention either. 
By the beginning of November of that year Goebbe ls began to 
realize that Hitler was not going to make a move in his behalf due to 
the pressing matters of running the war that so consumed the Fuehrer's 
time and energy . Calamity followed calamity and Goebbels wrote at 
the end of the year in despair, 
"The propaganda department of the Wehrmacht has failed 
here completely. Oh, if only the Fuehrer would decide 
to subordinate it to me I believe I could master this 
relatively difficult problem in a short time. But 
officers are not suited to propaganda , especially not 
if they judge the situation from Berlin . 1118 
Goebbels never got on top of the discord between the military 
and his Ministry. He had to contend with the Generals to the end of 
the war. His problems with them, just as with the Reich Press Chief, 
17 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company , Inc. , Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p . 475-6, 
18 Ibid. , p . 499 . 
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Dietrich, were only elements in the systematic inharmony that helped 
to ruin his credibility. Another was the.trouble he had with Herr 
van Ribbentrop, the Minister of Foreign Affairs.· Like the state 
offices and the military, the Foreign Office had its own propaganda 
section which caused Goebbels a great deal of trouble. 
Apparently, Goebbels and van Ribbentrop had been at each other's 
throats for some time, since the beginning of the war. Semmler 
provides an insight into the relationship between the men and some of 
the ramifications thereof, 
"Goebbels and Ribbentrop are bitter enemies. They never 
speak to one another, never see one another for cabinet 
meetings with all Ministers present have not been held 
for a long time. From time to time they send each other 
insulting letters •.. Goebbels calls it a tragedy that 
Hitler has such a dilettante as his advisor on foreign 
policy ... Goebbels described his ministerial colleague from 
the other side of the Wilhelmstrasse: 'His name he 
bought (referring to the 'van' in front of it}, his money 
he married, and his job he got by intrigue ... Psychologically 
Ribbentrop is in the category of people who always finish 
your sentence for you --yes man at all costs. He has no 
firm convictions and always swims with the tide."19 
Goebbels did not possess much more admiration for Ribbentrop's 
news and propaganda services than he did for his person. The issues 
between the propaganda and news functions of the two Ministries were 
similar in nature to that which existed between Goebbels and the 
military. In the case ·of the Foreign Office, Goebbels found a foe 
that didn't have much closer-proximity to Hitler, in the wa~ years, 
19 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.18. 
than Goebbels himself did. 
Goebbels wrote in roid-;I-942., 
"The news policy of the Foreign Office also leaves 
much to be desired. You can.'t base news policies 
on diplomatic viewpoints. It is simply unbearable 
that one's own people alone in all the world know 
nothing.about the success of military undertakings 
carried out by their own soldiers.' A drastic example 
of this is the sinking of Norwegian ships in the 
service of the English, which left Sweden and had a 
good number torpedoed in the Skagerrak. The Foreign 
Office sits on this news and won't even condescend 
to publish a perfectly neutral item. Meanwhile 
even the last Bantu Negro knows that really happened. 
The German people alone are not in the know. By that 
sort of policy we are fairly compelling the German 
public to listen to foreign and enemy broadcasts." 20 
The situation, already bad, got worse. The suppression of news 
by the Foreign Office contributed greatly to one of Goebbels' most 
vexing problems. That problem was the intrusion of foreign propaganda 
into the Third Reich through radio. 
On September 1, 1939, the Supreme Defence Council of the Third 
Reich passed a decree that absolutely prohibited the listening in on 
and passing along of'±nformation acquired through foreign and enemy 
broadcasting. It was constructed such that the offence of passing 
information acquired from enemy radio was graver than the simple act 
of listening. By 1942, however, both acts were punishable by death. 
In 1940 this ban also extended itself to the members of the 
Wehrmacht··and all echelons of the government. Special permits were 
20 
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
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issued to.those people who had.to.listen.in for reasons 6£ their work, 
These .permits were specific .about,:what could be listened·. to and when, 
All such permits still prohibited::the:.bearers froll\ d:l.sSell\inating.the 
infomation to others.outside,their line of duty, For instance, a 
top level writer was .permitted· to listen to the B,B,C, Geman la.nguage 
pr.ograll\ to quote .Churchill but only .permitted to pass along those 
quotes that were approved by the Propaganda Min~stry. 
On January 26, 1940 Goebbels issued an all-encoll\Passing order· 
prohibiting all government and 11\ilitary personnel f!l70Il\ listening in 
on foreign broadcasts. In it he made the observation, 
"Any German soldier exposi.ng his soul and his spirit to 
such enemy .. propaganda is committing psychological self-
mutilation. This· is no less despicable than cowardly 
self-mutilation; 021 
The publication of sentences for such infractions were emphasized 
as a means to combat the curiosity of the German radio listener. 
Goebbels instructed his staff in conference in January, 
"The Minister rejects as too lenient the sentences 
passed by the courts for listeni.ng to the dissemination 
of fore.ign broadcasts and dell\ands a few exemplorary 
sentences; Sentences of less than four years penitentary 
are no longer to be published in the German press. "22 
The first years of the war saw many foreign journalists remaining 
in Gemany to report on the home lifestyle. As foreign citizens with 
some diplomatic protection, the Propaganda Ministry could not very well 
.. 21 Boelcke 1 Willi A,; ·The Se."C;i:et ·conferences ·of ·pr; ·Goebbels, 
(E,P, Putton & co,, ;r:nc, 1 New ):orkl 1970 1 . J?.14,. 
22 Ibid. 1 p.15. 
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impose such r_egulations upon. them, - Goebbels provided· W.s sta;f;f with 
the necessary directives:on.the:·inatter· in January of 1940.1 
"Herr Bomer is authorizea·to inform the ;f;oreign 
journalists in Gerinany·that they may listen to ;f;oreign 
broadcasts.' However·, to pass on such news is ;f;orbidden, 
Each foreign journalist·wtll be given a special warrant 
card, made out in his narile,and containing precise 
directives . -1123 · 
A week later the DOktor had some . second tho_ughts, 
"The Minister suggests to Herr Bomer that on a suitable 
occasion ·he might see that a foreign journalist, who.has 
been guilty of particularly damagi,ng and vile lies, is 
arrested and subjected to prolonged _proceedi_ngs. This 
might provide a drastic check on the atrocity propaganda 
of certain foreign journalists,"24 -
Other tactics utilized were the individual terrorism of listeners. -
This was accomplished by the use of volunteer radio wardens in each of 
the subsections of the Gaus. The radio wardens were attached to the 
Party regional offices. Often they were members of the S.A. in the 
early days of the Party and later political hack troops. They 
coordinated net functions and did demographic and ascertainment work. 25 
Through the utilization of the ears of the radio wardens the 
Ministry could effect terrorism on the individual quite effectively. 
Goebbels instructed his staff in February of the same year, 
23 Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, 
(E,P7 Dutton & Co,, Inc., New York) 1970, p,18. 
24 Ibid. r p, 21. 
25 Sington, Derrick 1 and Weidenfeld 1 Arthur, The·Goebbels 
· ·EXpe.riroent (Yale University Press,·New Haven} 1943 1 p,47, 
. "The Minister declares· himself in _agreement- with.- the 
idea that more elaborate. rad;i.o rece;i.ye):':,, .-belong;i.ng 
to ov=t eneinies·:of the·. state are exchanged.· .. ior :small 
receiv=s, even:· if. th_ere: is no more than justified-- -
suspicion that they· listen·to foreign broadcasts,"26 
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The publication of sentences for radio infractions-:was continued 
at r,egular intervals of about tlu;ee .weeks starting ;i.n April of 1940. 
It was not effective, however, and 'by the end of the year it becall\e 
apparent that stiffer measures would be needed, Goebbels tried to 
coordinate with the courts some means of increasi_ng punishment for 
offenders, In October of 1940 he ;i.ssued the followi,ng directives, 
"The Minister instructs Ministerialdirektor Gutterer 
to make.representations with State Secretary Freisler 
on the subject of heavy sentences of penal serviture 
for radio offenders. Gutterer is to point out to hhe 
S,D. and the state police that enemy radio is again 
bei_ng listened to on an increasing scale. The Minister 
demands heavy sentences for radio offenders because, 
at this decisive phase of the war, every German must 
be clear in his mind that listening in to these 
broadcasts represents an act of serious sabotage. •• 27 
The British were also very aware of the danger to the German 
people that listening in to foreign broadcasts constituted. They 
were well prepared to meet the challa,nge in that respect. Their 
programming was directed not only at the civilian populace but the, 
soldier as well. Just as the Germans brought pre-produced prograll\s 
into Holland, France and Belgium when they overran those countries 
and took over their radio systems, pr,ograll\s des_igned for the British 
- - 26 Boelcke, Will;i. A,, The Secret Conferences ·of 'Dr; ·Goebbels, 
(E-.P. Dutton & Co,, Inc,, .New· Yo;,;kl ,1970 1 p,19, 
27 Ibid,, p.108, 
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capabilities.in both radio and·prop_aganda and issued.directives.on the 
issue. in January of 1941, . 
''The Minister points ·:out-: the··great danc,er .' frail\ Gepr\a.n 
troops listening.in to·British transmitters. There are 
indications that British·broadcasts, which·are now 
being put out daily·from.London for the Gerll\an Wehrll\acht, 
are being listened to on an increasi_ng scale -by members 
of the Wehrmacht in the occupied territories. There is 
a real da_nger of contamination by these enemy broadcasts. 
The Minister refers to the example of France, which at 
the moment of decision had already been totally broken 
in her morale by Gerll\an radio transmissions, The 
Minister instructs Major Martin to see to it that a 
categorical order is issued by the Chief of the High 
Command of the Weh=acht, on behalf of the Fuehrer, 
prohibiti_ng once _again as a matter of general princiPle 
the listening to enemy transmitters by members of the 
forces on pain of heavy penalties."28 
At this point in the war, the threat of the foreign intrusion of 
radio propaganda was so great that, in accordance with set rules of 
manufacture, a notice was placed on all radio sets made in the Reich 
which read, 
"Listening in to foreign transmitters is an offense 
_against the National Security of the people. By order 
of the Fuehrer such listening in will be punished by 
long terll\s of penal servitude. Remember this soldier!"29 
The civilian and military listener was considered to be of three 
classes according to observations made in conferences in May of 1941. 
These were the deliberate enemies of the state, the curious and the 
"philistines" which were said to be most easily scared away from such 
28 Boelcke, Willi A,, ·The Secret·conferences of Dr. ·Goebbels, 
(E.F._Dutton & Co,, Inc, 1 New York) 1970, p,116, 
29 Ibid., p.116-, 
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practices by.the publication of sentences, 30 The·problen\ was.never 
was to become a greater and·greater thorn in Goebbels~ side as the 
news services of the Nazis deteriorated toward the end of the war, 
In January of 1942 a Reich Minister quoted a broadcast in the 
presence of Hitler and the E'uehrer·was so shocked that he· issued a 
decree on the fifteenth limiting the number of people authorized to 
listen in to Goeri.ng, Ribbentrop, Keitel, the commanders in chief of 
the military, Goebbels, and some highly placed Prop.agenda Ministry 
officials. 
Goebbels made the decision known more specifically in his 
conference of January 30, 
''The Minister announced the Fuehrer yesterday 
.again·gave·him the task and the full power to decide 
who shall receive foreign news reports of any kind. 
The Fuehrer has expressly named a few Reich Ministers 
and Reichsleiters who may receive these, and he has 
issued instructions that others, even those in the 
highest positions, r.egardless of rank or influence, 
are not to be supplied with them, and that the 
strictest yardstick is to be applied in every respect," 31 
A great clamor arose within the he±rarchy of the government from 
every quarter. The elate were first very jealous of their privileged 
position and second, just as dependent upon foreign sources for the 
truth as any ordinary citizen, Goebbels received a stream of protests 
30 Boelcke, Willi A,, The·sec;ret Conferences of D:r; ·Goebbels, 
(E,F~ .. ~':1tton. & Co,, Inc .. , New Yo:i;k) 1970, p.167. 
I 
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and appeals from officials and.commented upon the fact in his Diary 
in.February of 1942, 
1'It is disgusti.ng. how mci,ny b.ig shots· are riow- try;i,n',f 
to prove to.me that they·can•t continue their work 
unless they.receive.permission to listen to foreign 
broadcasts, In almost·all cases I deny their 
requests. I agree to place at their disposal only· 
such material as is essential for his special work, 
The task and duty of listening to foreign broadcasts 
must devolve on the political offices created for this 
purpose. Administ:rzative offices have nothing whatever 
to do with it,"32 
From the tone of the entries Goebbels' position was well founded 
by orders fnom the Fuehrer and his attitude was one of smug, self 
satisfaction. This must have. grated upon the nerves of his peers and 
they went over his head to Hitler to obtain permission to listen to 
the fore.ign broadcasts. Goebbels recalls with some relish in his 
entry of February 20, 1942 some specific instances, 
"It is really amusing to see how all the Ministers now 
approach the Fuehrer, asking his permission to listen to 
foreign radio stations. The reasons they ass.ign is 
nothi.ng short of grotesque. For example, the Minister 
of Education declared he must. know what our enemies are 
supplying in the way of anti-German news in order that he 
may &ndoctrinate youth .against such reports! The Fuehrer 
rejects such requests brusquely and encourages my efforts 
to keep news distribution as restricted and limited as 
possible ... 33 
The list of persons entitled to; listen to the broadcasts must 
I 
have fluctuated as time wore on and more people got back to Hitler. 
It is interesting to note that the greatest trouble had on the issue 
32. Goebbels, Dr, .Joseph P,, ·The Goebbels •Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Coll\Pany, Inc.,·Garden·city, New York) Edited and'Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.77"'8,· · 
33 . , 
Ibid., p.95.,.6, 
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of fore.ign broadcasts came from the top of the Nazi. government. 
Perhaps the officials knew that the only real news coverage came 
from the Allies and depended upon them for a clearer picture of what 
their own government was saying. 
Semmler recorded that, in 1944, the list was further depreciated 
by Goebbels, 
"Goebbels recently cut down the list of people to whom 
political and military news from abroad is sent. I was 
told to produce a list of the recipients of the 
con~idential DNB service and of the wirless monitoring 
material. He crossed of four fifths of the names, 
Rosenberg, Funk, Ley, many Party Of fices , departments of 
the War office, editors, the Ministry of Justice and a 
whole list of high officials are to see no more foreign 
news material at all, except items which directly affect 
them personally or are relevant to their duties. A 
special editor has been appointed to select what they 
shall receive in the future. There have been many 
complaints about this drastic decision, some of them 
made to Bormann and Hitler. Goebbels has himself 
received many letters imploring him to go on circulating 
at least part of the material. But Goebbels maintains 
that many harmful rumors start with the officials who 
read the stuff. By.:cutting down its circulation he 
hopes to check the flood of rumors. He will not listen 
to any objections and at the moment he is in one of his 
radical moods."34 
The danger lay not so much in the news getting around but how 
the people of power were to interpret it. The Germans had maintained 
several agencies for the evaluation of foreign broadcasting. Among 
them was the Seehaus Service of the Abwehr, under the command of 
34 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, {Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.155. 
Admiral Canaris. Canaris is a mysterious figure in Nazi history and 
as head of the l\bw:ehr· (intell_igence) he played·. a s_ignificant role in 
its £ormation.; It b.as been said that he was a British agent and 
assisted in the attempt of Hitler's life which.cost over a thousand 
lives in rev~ge~ 
Canaris administered the Seehaus and its daily report to the 
Government. As early as 1942 his work came under suspicion by 
Himmler, who was jealous of his intelligence operation and desired it 
under his own control, and Goebbels was made aware of the potentially 
dangerous Seehaus report. The report was very popular in the 
governmentand many valued it's appraisal of the foreign news services 
and information. By 1942, however, it began to assume a somewhat 
cynical, though veiled, and defeatist slant. Goebbels wrote~in his 
Diary in January of that year, 
"To a great degree the defeatist tendencies in the 
O.K.W. and the O.K.H. arise from the altogether too 
irresponsible distribution of the news material 
especially on the part of the Seehaus. I am going to 
not engage in defeatist propaganda. Admiral Canaris 
has given me a number of hair raising examples showing 
the irresponsible handling of confidential material. 
These examples suit me fine. They furnish the basis 
for taking severe and radical measures."3 5 
Two weeks later Hitler would give his decree limiting the 
distribution of foreign broadcasts. From a list of over one hundred 
35 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.43. 
and eighty who received the reports: in the Fore.ign Office, only two 
or three· would continue to.get:. thein;after· theccutbacks, · :only two 
copies would. go to the Wehrmacht:. and . the rest to selected members of 
the Prop.aganda Ministry. ~6·· '·After talks with Canaris and the· staff 
of the service Goebbels concluded.that the Seehaus reports were a 
danger to the security of the.Ministry~ He wrote on January 26, 
''I (have) spent considerable time today looking 
into the so called Seehaus Service, and carefully 
studied one day's output of this subversive office, 
which is being financed by funds of its own. I 
have arrived at the conclusion that this service 
must be limited as much as possible. I hope the 
Fuehrer will confer the necessary powers on me 
to enable me to intervene rigorously. Everybody 
who counts now agrees with me that the dangerous 
manipulation of this service must be curbed to 
prevent a collapse of morale in the leaders of 
the state and the Wehrmacht."37 
Who the persons who counted were in the above pass.age is 
difficult to determine because there arose a great clamor when the 
Service was curtailed. The outcry was eno.ugh to cause the attention 
of Hitler to be turned personally to the distribution. Goebbels took 
the initiative and intervened in the continued operation of the 
Seehaus and succeeded in reduci.ng its distribution to a few people in 
the entire country. This was on the agreement of Hitler. The Foreign 
Office protested to the Fuehrer but on this point, Hitler seemed 
adamant. The Seehaus ceased to become an organ for "defeatist" 
* Canaris was hanged by the Nazis on April 9, 1945 for treason. 
36 Goebbels, Dr •. Joseph P., ·The·Goebbels•niaries, (Doubleday & 
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37 Ibid., p.50. 
tendencies , but not without indicatins to the Ministry just how much 
credibility it had lost, even by 1942 . 38 
Goebbels ' credibi lity was lost for many reasons. They will be 
discussed in the final chc\,Pter. First and finally it should be 
interesting to note that some discord appeared internally in the 
Ministry of such a nature as to ill ustrate how far down things had 
gone s i nce the start of the war . 
Ei ther he was having trouble with an over- enthusiastic underli ng 
or a completely disgruntled one. In the first instance one young man , 
a product of the Hitler Youth Corps , publicly disavowed certain 
departmental decisi ons in the Ministry . Goebbels wrote , 
"I had a sharp conflict wi th Cerff about the present 
program of our broadcasting system . Cerff takes a 
somewhat super- National- Socialistic attitude . If he 
had his way music, for i nstance, would be made only 
on lyres. You can ' t operate a radio service for the 
masses that way. Broadcasts must have diversi fied and 
manifold programs . Cerff just won ' t see this. I 
strictl y forbade him to critisize the broadcast in 
bulletins of the Reich Propaganda Office . I regard 
it as simply impossible that one of my departments 
should attack another publically. We haven ' t sunk 
that low in the National Socialist State! We still 
have enough power to remedy known defects . But under 
no circumstances wi ll I tolerate bringing about changes 
by stirring up the masses . 1139 
Such a restri cti on seems wholly inconsistant with the manner in 
which t he little Doktor managed to assist ih the acquisition of power 
38 Goebbels, Dr . Joseph P . 1 The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company , I nc. , Garden City, New iork} Edited and T~anslated by Louis 
P. Lochner , 1948, p,50. 
3 9 I bid. , p . 390 . 
when.the Nazis were on the rise. The introduction of change through 
mass incitement was the stock in trade of Goebbels for many years of 
his life. 
Perhaps most reveali.ng of the deterioration of the Ministry's 
effectiveness is the public allegation of one Colonel Martin during a 
press conference in May of 1943. Goebbels recalled the inc.ident in 
his Diary, 
"During my absence Colonel Martin made certain statements 
in the (press} conference which I must challenge sharply. 
He declared that the people no longer believed the German 
news reports. He said we. were absolutely dis'credited, no 
matter how .hard we tried; people no longer believed the 
government. Even though I must admit there is a somewhat 
critical news situation at the moment, Colonel Martin 
must not mistake the attitude of the O.K:w. toward our 
news policies for that of the German people. The German 
people, as far as the broad masses are concerned, are 
quite uncontaminated. n4Q 
Actually, the "somewhat·critical• news situation" never repaired 
C . 
itself try as Goebbels might._ And the only people who were left 
"uncontaminated" were selected members of the· Ministry staff and a 
handful of people who were to end up in the Fuehrerbunker beneath the 
Chancellery. 
The German people were quite out of reach and in the closing year 
of the war, there existed no propaganda in the Third Reich, if Goebbels 
own criteria were to apply, 
40 Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & 
Company, Inc., Garden City, New York} Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948, p.387.• 
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" •. ,the propaganda which produces the.desired 
results is. good and all other pro{>aganda is bad •.. ., 4i 
There was no propaganda that is, except the· enemy propaganda. 
41 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.80-1. 
CHAPTER VI 
Summary and Conclusions 
At the beginning of this thesis certain questions were posed, 
the answers to which were to be found in the course of the research. 
It is the place here to report the answers to these questions. 
Goebbels' technique was a manifestation of his philosophy. He 
was utterly ruthless in the pursuit of his aims and established a 
policy for most of the extenuating circumstances that arose in the 
presentation of the actions and policies of the Reich Government. 
Doktor Goebbels utilized secret transmitters to intrude into the 
minds of the populace of enemy and subjugated states. He employed 
fear and lies to achieve some of his ends, often very effectively. 
He imposed a strict policy of domestic censorsnfep over the 
Reich and many people went to concentration camps for violations 
thereof. His philosophy was that the German listeners committed 
treason in the exposure of themselves to enemy contamination. 
His philosophical positions on journalism and pro~aganda were 
Machiavelian and completely discounted the notion that tlie German 
people were capable of determining what was right and wrong, good or 
bad, politically benign or destructive. He accepted complete moral 
responsibility for the formation of public opinion and news 
dissemination. 
The structure of the Propaganda Ministry was such that it was 
exceedingly susceptible to the intrigue and caprice of outside, 
adverse influences in the Reich Government and the Military. Goebbels 
himsel f was susceptibl e to the whims of the various press and 
propaganda sections of the Wehrmacht, the Foreign Office, and the 
Reich Press Office . 
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Those in positions of influence in those particular government 
elements were acti vel y trying to reduce Goebbels ' i mpact with the 
Fuehr er , the peopl e of Gennany , and the world in general as has been 
born out by the research . 
It is not difficult to understand what the conflicts cost 
Goebbel s in the end . They had depri ved him of his credibility with 
the German people. The German people in turn, had turned to the 
Alli ed media for thei r information . 
At the end of 1943 the situation existing between Goebbel s , 
the O.K.W., and the Foreign Office were so muddled down by in-
fighting that effective coordination was absolutel y impossible. I n 
the l ast entry that has come down to us from his personal Diary , 
Goebbel s wrote , 
"Lammers, at my request, reported the situation regardi ng 
the propaganda in Paris to the Fuehrer and told him about 
Ribbentrop ' s attempt to take it out of my control via the 
O. K. W. The Fuehrer was in a rage and turned against 
Ribbentrop , using very harsh and insulting expressions. 
The Fuehrer described the report given me by Ribbentrop 
through Minister Ritler as absolutely untrue and 
mendaci ous ."l 
1 
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P . , The Goebbels Diaries , (Doubleday & 
Compa ny , I nc. , Garden Ci ty, New York) Edited and Translated by Louis 
P. Lochner, 1948 , p.547 , 
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It had.deteriorated into.a morass of pettiness and bitter back-
stabbi_ng which included. the·:Fuehrer·. There. was. no comeraderie or 
sense of mutual purpose. All that.seemed to matter was the individual 
and his particular aspirations or even his vanity. Goebbels, however, 
in his own way, was to have the last laugh - before he died. 
Finally, what is the measure of Goebbels' success or failure~ 
What if the military had accepted Goebbels' propaganda strategy? 
It is conceivable that the events of the latter part of the war would 
have been borne more readily by the public. The people of the 
German Reich might have retained their faith in the reporting of the 
government, which, however embellished, would hot have provided so 
haphazzard a picture of the military efforts. As it was, Goebbels 
( 
was helpless to thwart the effects of the Wehrmacht's poor·and self-
illusory depiction of its plans and efforts. Goebbels cannot be 
blamed for the military picture offered to the people. 
What if the Foreign Office had accepted Goebbels' propaganda 
strategy? Perhaps the people of the subj_ugated territories might 
have been kept a bit more docile, even in the face of the terrorist 
tactics of some of the Nazi-appointed military and civilian governors. 
The Reich could have gone much further with the propaganda technique 
than it did with the strong arm technique. While not a gentle man, 
Goebbels saw that it was far more expedient to control the masses 
through psychological means than thro_ugh purely martial means • 
Goe.bbels cannot be held accountable for the ineptitude of Ribbentrop 
and his staff in the handling of fore_ign proI>aganda. 
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What if Dietrich,.the.~eich Press Chief, had.accepted Goebbels' 
proi,aganda strategy? . Perhaps . the .. populace would have. enjoyed a 
consistant pres~ntation of the political position of the state. There 
might have been greater support for the total war efforts that came 
too late in relation to public response to them. There might also 
have been less to hide from the people had the prop.aganda been 
consistant. 
These suppositions are not offered up as a denense of Goebbels 
and his philosophy. Goebbels was simply a proi,agandist who was 
engaged by the Nazis to present the actions of the Party,,and:.J.ater 
the government in the most positive, constructive and noble light . , 
possible at any given time and in any given circumstances. He was 
ruthless, equivocal, a liar and in the case of the Jewish people, 
merciless. He was all of these thi.ngs but one thi.ng more, he was 
absolutely loyal to Adolf Hitler. 
What if Hitler had given more support to the man who had so 
zealously served him from the earliest years of the Party? All 
sources examined indicate that Goebbels virtually created the Hitler 
myth and the concept of Hitler's infallability. The trouble was 
that Goebbels believed his own handiwork. We shall see the extent 
of that belief shortly. 
The question of Hitler's reciprocal support is <lmportant as 
Goebbels assumed that it was always there. He never doubted that 
the Fuehrer was just consideri.ng his impassioned ;pleas in the clear 
light of day before making a move to his aid. Goebbels firmly 
believed that Hitler, the proi,aganda master who had taught the 
Little Doktor so much, that Hitler had Goebbels' best interests in 
mind and the interests of the Pro~aganda Ministry in mind as well . 
It had occurred to him that his proximity to his Fuehrer was 
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less than other high ranking Nazis , especially the Generals. It even 
occurred to him that the Fuehrer was not quite himself after years 
under the quack treatment of Professor Morell, who had administered 
experimental drugs to Hitler during all that time . Hitler irrationally 
ordered imaginary armies to attack the oncoming Russians then ranted 
and raved when his orders were not carried out. Goebbels saw little 
of this . What he saw were the people who had fawned about the 
Fuehrer for so many years deserting him like flies in a wind. 
Hitler had led him right down to the last yard and Goebbels 
was finally faced with the question of how he and his Fuehrer were 
going to die in the eyes of history . The question had been in 
Goebbels ' mind for over a year as Semmler recalls, 
"Nowadays Goebbels often has fits of deep pessimism. 
He said today that he had always despised his fellow 
human beings, but never more than he did now . From 
many things he has said recently, and especially 
today, one can see his complete contempt for men and 
their behavior. This contempt sometimes rises to the 
point of disgust with life itself. How else can one 
explain what he said today in front of his wife: 'If 
all our efforts, work and struggle should lead nowhere, 
then I would not find it hard to die. For in a world 
where there was no room for my ideals there would be 
no room for me either. ' ' If it ever comes to that, my 
dear,' his wife answered. 112 
2 Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels - The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, 
London) 1947, p.107. 
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First, Goebbels had to insure that, despi te the crushing defeat 
of National Socialism, his efforts had to lead somewhere . Second , 
his contempt of men l eads one to believe that he needed more than a 
man to believe in and honor . Hitler , the wret ched , insane shell of 
the man he helped to power, had to fulfill that need right to the 
end . In the last months of the war , activity in the government 
sector of the German capitol of Berlin centered upon evacuation of 
the last vestiges of the thousand year Reich. After twelve years 
the Nazi Party was being removed from the German scene through t he 
most drastic and radical political means availabl e t o man; 
annihil ati on . The ranks of the mighty, began to thin as the mighty 
sought refuge in other , safer quarter s than their capitol . 
As the Russians drew near in the east and the American closed 
in on the west , the last i nner cadre went undergound, beneath the 
heart of the government , the Chanceller y Building in the Fuehrer-
bunker . It was there that the last act of propaganda was perpetrated 
by the lit tle Doktor f or a history of which he still felt he was the 
curator. 
Semmler recalls that those around Hitler begged him to flee and 
head south , out of the Russi an/American pincer . In Manvell and 
Fraenke l it seems that Goebbels was of a much different mind for he 
had plans of his own for his Fuehrer , 
"Semmler , however, records that Goebbels per suaded the 
Fuehrer to stay in Berlin and remain faithful to the 
oath he had taken on January 30 , 1933 1 when he swore 
he would never l eave the Reich Chancell ery , and that 
no power on earth could force hi m to abandon his 
position . If a legend were to be established as Goebbel s ' 
last.fulfillment of his:duty 1 the Leader must die 
within the · precincts o;f; , the:. building which was . the 
symbol of his .a,utho.i:ityi ,,3 · 
If the war was lost, at the·very least and last, the proper 
polemic treatment of the Goetterdaernerung must prevail. A last act 
of propaganda must insure that the Nazi legend remained intact for 
future generations. This was his end and the manner in which he 
would serve German history. On April 21, 1945 he told an aide, 
"Mark my words, Naumann, what you are seeing here is a 
historical drama.of such magnitude that there has been 
nothing to compare with it this century nor indeed any 
century unless you go back to Golgotha."4 
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The Russians were continuing to she~l the central Berlin area 
and the din of mortar fire was constantly in their ears. Goebbels 
was not sure how the people would react to the iropendi_ng defeat and 
the thought of the welfare of those whose moral fibre he had assumed 
responsibility for bothered him. He tried to justify his anxiety to 
his aide Fritzsbhe without much success, 
"In the final analysis this is what the German people 
wanted. The great majority of the Germans voted in 
favor of our leaving the League of Nations - in other 
words, against a policy of appeasement and for a 
policy of courage and honor. It was the German people 
who chose war. 11 5 
3 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels; •His"Life 
and Death, (Simon·& Schuster, New Xorkl 1960, p.256-7. 
4 Ibid. , p. 263 • 
5 Ibid., p.266. 
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.The aide tried to remind him.that the Nazis had.included.peace 
as a strong plank-in.their platform,during their struggle for 
power, but Goebbels would have none of it. He was satisfied with his 
position and absolved himself of an~ guilt for the destruction of the 
German nation. 
Events moved quickly during the last few days in April. On the 
twentieth of the month Goeri.ng and Ribbentrop informed Hitler that 
they could better serve the Reich elsewhere than Berlin and left. 
Hitler did not try to keep them, feeli.ng beurayed by their departure. 
Himmler followed,. going north to meet an intermediary from Switzer-
land to try and achieve a capitulation. Goering sent Hitler a 
telegram saying that he was going to assume command of the Reich. 
On April 29, 1945, Hitler issued his last orders. They expelled 
Himmler, Goering, and Ribbentrop from the government and made 
Doenitz Reichs President, Bormann Party Minister and Paul Joseph 
Goebbels Chancellor of the Reich. 
Goebbels had only one more'thi_ng to accomplish. Manville and 
Fraenkel assert, 
"He realized all that mattered now was a heroic 
finish, that death should be proud to take him 
and his leader."6 
6 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.256. 
Hitler had issued his orders as a prelude to.his own suicide 
which occurred.only a .. few.hours·later. In the ordex;s.he.commanded 
Goebbels to flee and assume control of the-government. Goebbels 
wrote his famous appendix to the orders and maintained in it, 
"In the delirium of treachery which surrounds the 
Fuehrer in these most critical days of the war, 
there must be someone at least who will stay with 
him unconditionally until death •.. In doi_ng this I 
believe ! am doi_ng the best service I can to the 
future of the German people. In the hard times to 
come, examples will be more important than men. Men 
will always be found to lead the nation forward into 
freedom; but a reconstruction of our national life 
would be impossible unless developed on the basis 
of clear and obvious examples. n7 
13,7 
Hitler had killed himself and was joined in death by his brid~, 
Eva Braun Hitler. Their bodies were carried up the cement steps to 
the Chancellery garden and there burned. In the light of the flames 
Goebbels raised his hand and saluted the pyre. His next task was a 
far more personal one and the grisly responsibility loomed massive 
on his shoulders. There was only the consolation of history as 
Ebermayer and Meissner point out, 
" ..• he must ..• s.ta.nd be:fore the generations to come as· 
the only true successor to the Founder of National 
Socialism. The last day of his life on earth crowned 
his ambition - an ambition so infinite that death 
itself was not too great a price to pay for its 
fulfillment." 8 
7 Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life 
and Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960, p.276. 
8 Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, ·Evil:Genius-; ·The 
·story ·of Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wi_ngate, London) 1953, p.240, 
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His wife gave their six children a sleeping draught and laid 
them i n their beds in the small rooms set aside for them in the 
Fuehrerbunker. When they were asleep she adminis t ered poison to them 
all and they died . Such was the end for them. On the evening of 
May 1, 1945 Goebbels and his wife c limbed the s t eps into the garden 
and died in sight of the flames and bombs, by their own hands. 
I n the end Goebbels was brought l ow by h i s peers , his 
adversari es , h i s Fuehrer and his own hate, blindness and contempt. 
He did not, however, die a sickly r efugee, a hungry prowler in some 
war t orn alley , or an Alli ed prisoner , but r ather , Chancellor of the 
Third Reich and above all, a propagandist . 
APPENDIX I 
I.t cannot be disputed that the· New York Times coverage of World 
War II was arno_ng the most comprehensive, if not the most comprehensive, 
of any newspaper in the Western World. During the war the Times 
managed to put out more than one-hundred twenty-five thousand words 
on Sunday'l. That's more than ten thousand words longer than Gone With 
the Wind. 
Publisher Adolph Ochs died in 1935, two years into the time span 
covered by this paper. He was succeeded by A.H. Sulzberger., who 
remained as publisher through the end of the war. 
The editorial page was headed by Rollo Ogden from 1920 to 1937, 
four years into the time span covered here. He was succeeded, after 
his death, by Dr. John Finley, from 1937 to 1938. Finley retired in 
1938 and was succeeded by Charles Merz, who remained editorial head 
until he became editor of the Times sometime after the war. He was 
replaced by John Oakes, who was given the new title of Editorial 
Editor. 
Generally, Merz and Sulzberger tended to favor a strong stand, 
editorially, on vital issues. This was a departure from Ochs' 
philosophy of shying away from too strong a commitment which might 
affect news coverage. Both Merz and Sulzberger felt that the Times 
had, over its one-hundred year history, established so solid a 
reputation that no fear of news coloration was necessary. 
The stand the Times took in editorial coverage of Joseph Goebbels 
was consistent throughout the series of editors. It was one of 
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contempt, derogation, and criticism, interspersed with some grudging 
admiration of Goebbels' administrative and·organizational prowess. 
The style of the editorials does cha_nge somewhat from editor to 
editor in that, 1. the taste and technique of the editors differed 
and 2, the gravity of the world situation was drastically different. 
Generally, the coverage of Joseph Goebbels by the New York Times 
was very comprehensive. Goebbels appeared on their pages over 900 
times. Of these 900 appearances,30 were editorials consisting of 
about 290 column inches over a period spanning from 1933 to 1948, 
approximately 15 years. 
Between 1933, when Dr. Goebbels first appeared in the "Topics of 
the Time" (first started by F.C. Mortimer, September 8, 1896) and 
1937, the overall tone of the_editorial coverage is exceedingly 
sarcastic. The general posture of the Times' implied position is 
very caustic, self-righteousness in the face of Goebbels' blatant 
disregard for the principles of free press. 
Whether this was an effective approach to a man who succeeded 
in, at least, establishing and perfecting the infrastructure for a 
continental propaganda system, is an open question. Goebbels never 
made the slightest attempt to disguise his role or minimize the fact 
that freedom was what the Nazis said it was. He believed just that 
and never made any bones about it. 
It could be that the serious tone of the later editorials in the 
Times realized the true impact Goebbels had on totalitarian thought 
and recognized his residual affect on the Communist propaganda 
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machine after the war. 
His first appearance on the editorial p_age was on March 20, 1933, 
(14:5}, in a five and one-half inch editorial entitled, "German Unity 
Compulsory". The main theme of this piece deals with the facade 
created by Nazi government concerning national unity, or at least the 
outward display of it. Having won only 52% of the vote, Goebbels 
spoke of the Nazi desire to possess one-hundred percent support and 
alluded to the further "educational" processes necessary to achieve 
that according to the New York Times. This editorial is assertive in 
form. The sarcasm contained in the composition is illustrated by such 
phrases as, 
"Concerning the time schedule for making all Germans 
think and feel as one, the Hitler government would 
seem to have radically changed its mind within 
twenty-four hours. 11 
On January 22, 1934 in a five inch editorial entitled "Goebbels 
Takes Over Sports", (14 :4} , the Times blasts Dr. Goebbels for 
implemen.ting polemic and propaganda scenarios concerning the 1936 
Olympic Games. Goebbels' obvious ploy to place certain political 
values on.a supposedly apolitical activity such as sports drew 
scornful remarks from the editors. The sarcasm still prevalent in 
these early editorials is again amply illustrated by the following 
phrases, 
"From the Nazi standpoint a man can do one hundred 
meters .•. in a manner that is beneficial to the state ... 
jump twenty-four feet so as to affirm the spiritual 
unity of the G~rman tribes ... toss the shot fifty feet 
in protest against the iniquitous peace treaties •. :" 
While this editorial is of relatively little substance there is value 
in a point taken so adroitly and lightly about a very serious 
development ol; al;J;airs. · 
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.Again on February 13 ,· •1934· in a J;ive inch editorial entitled 
"Swastika and Purdah", (20:4), the editors,deplore Goebbels' position 
on the domesticity ol; German women. Purdah, apparently the custom ol; 
keeping women subordinated in harems, is a concept employed by the 
editors to demean Goebbels' assertion that women in the Reich are 
better suited tor child-bearing, kitchen work and an overall domestic 
role. The analogy is rather l;limsy and the Times seemingly is content 
with attacking Dr. Goebbels on a trifling point. 
Goebbels, in his speech on the subject, indicated German men 
would fight "tooth and nail" against female competition. The editors 
of the Times in response stated, "A hero who uses his teeth and nails 
on his womenfolk is a bit hard to visualize." This appears to be 
flimsy rebuttal. It is as though the editors have taken some kind of 
personal position against Goebbels. 
On April 24, 1934 in a five inch editorial entitled, "Goebbels 
Resents Praise" the editors provide an informative/assertive 
conrrnentary about Dr. Goebbels' negative attitude towards the 
apparently all too laudatory posture of the German press towards the 
NSDAP. The Times' conclusion is that Dr. Goebbels feared that many 
German editors were taki~g this tack with a tongue-in-cheek attitude. 
Still the sarcasm pervades the style with passing reterences like, 
"The director of the culture and conscience of the German peoole ... 
turns uoon the editors and calls them cowards and toadies." However 
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the sarcasm is somewhat diminished here and this editorial is probably 
the firs.t of the reallv serious a.rguments presenteff bv the Times about 
Goebbels' propaganda theories. (22:4) 
In an interpretive/assertive editorial of about five and one half 
inches on May 10, 1934, (20:4) ., entitled, "Freedom is Prescribed", 
the Times continues the examination of Dr. Goebbels' policies on 
German journalism. Goebbels' admonishment to the German oress about 
the monotony of their coverage is taken to task by the editors who 
redicule the orincinles of strict discipline found in the German 
culture as applied to the stvle of the press. Sarcasm still exists 
as the editors guip, "Editors will be expected to display a certain 
amount of manhood and judgement, whether they have forgotten how or 
nota" 
On August .29, 1934, (16:4) in a six inch editorial entitled, 
"Goebbels Breaks the News", the Times attack a ploy on Goebbels• • 
part that seeks to prepare the people of Germany for the hard winter 
that is about to come. Citing the difficulty the Reich government has 
had in re-vitalizing the industry and agriculture of Germany, the 
editors call Goebbels' request of the German people to forebear and 
be proud of privation for the State, and excuse for the inability of 
the German .government to cope effectively with the problems. Actually, 
every emerging government in the world has used this very old ploy, 
including our own. As such, the ~rgument of the Times falls on pretty 
shaky ground. If the editors had simply pointed out the ploy as a 
classic one and not taken so pompous a position, the editorial would 
have been far more effective. The sarcasm is still present in remarks 
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like, "Her;r Goebbels is oili.ng up his prop.aganda machinery ..• to prove 
that poverty is more precious than prosperity." 
The Times next attacks Dr. Goebbels in a nine and one-half inch 
editorial, (18 :3r on August 7, 1935, entitled·, "German Catholics"·. 
Here the contention is that the political activities of the Catholic 
Church in Germany were justified, which they were. The method of 
approach and the style render this pie,ce very ineffective because of 
the ridiculous assertion that some high-ranking German officials still 
admire the old pagan gods, possibly. Goebbels and Goering are cited 
as using poster campaigns of which none are quoted. They might 
have been very effectively. The editors pick up on the Pope's charge 
of paganism in the Reich in a very flimsy manner. over-all the 
arguments presented do not adequately support the vital and important 
point of contention they might have. 
In a five and one-half inch editorial published on September 24,. 
1935, (22 :4) entitled, "Bleeds for Minorities", refutes Goebbels' 
position on minority treatment in an assertive manner. The glaring 
inconsistancy in the German assertion that German minorities in the 
Memmel are entitled to humane treatment while Germany brutally 
persecutes the Jewish minority, are picked up effectively in this 
sound and cohesive argument on the Times' part. Goebbels' statement, 
"Fruitful collaboration among nations is possible only if an alien 
people is respected just as is one's own'~,.is used at a point near 
the beginning and not attributed to him until the end of the editorial; 
after the inconsistancy of German policy is deftly pointed out. Here 
is one of the few places in the early editorials where sarcasm is 
used with some utility, 
The editorial of March S, 1936, (20:4) entitled, "Streicher 
Wears'. Tails", is of very little relevance to Goebbeis as he is 
mentioned only in passing. The Times seems to be taking some l_ight 
jabs at Streicher and Goebbels for some statements concerning the 
wearing of tuxedos by Storm Troopers. It is fill, at outward 
appearance, and presents no arguments of any real significance. 
On May 18, 1936, (16:3) the Times takes Dr. Goebbels to task 
14,5 
for the policy he implemented concerning the criticism of plays in 
German newspapers. Here Goebbels is grudgingly given the benefit of 
the doubt as he states that plays will not be criticized until the 
next day in order to allow for contemplation and reflection. Although 
the idea came from Goebbels, it is really not so very bad when one 
considers the frivolous; sometimes yiscious manner in which p;Lays were 
and still are criticized. Sarcasm abounds in this editorial entitled, 
"Critics Will Goose Step". The Times concludes, "Probably the only 
advantage of this change to anybody is that it will help the evening 
papers at the expence of the morning." 
on October 27, 1936, the Times published a six and one-half inch 
editorial entitled, "Just As, So--", (24 :4) which attacked the first 
real public limitation of German writers and publishers. First, that 
is, accordi_ng to the Times. Actually Goebbels had restrict!3d 
publications in the Third Reich for many years but had never really 
been in the position to_ go public with it without some loss of 
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effectiveness. The "just as, so--" kind. of a_rgument utilized by 
Goebbels is very old, dati_ng back to Plato.·. The, editorial is almost 
a rhetorical criticism which gets rather syrupy, albeit with some 
cause, but goes too far, as in this contention,• 11 ••• so the whole 
population must consult the latest official bulletin on when to think, 
when to feel, when to hate, when to weep, and where, and how, and for 
whom, and against whom. 11 
The opening line of the November 29, 1936 editorial (IV, 8:4) 
entitled, "Critics Must Think" is a six inch attack on the currently 
stated policy that German critics must restrict themselves to 
"description and contemplation" when evaluating a play, music, 
literature and the other arts. No real assertion is made save that 
this is very restrictive which is eminently apparent. The piece is 
cryptic, sarcastic and fortunately, brief. It is more a reflection 
than an argument but concludes by asserting that perhaps such 
restriction is not worth paying for. 
The twelve inch editorial entitled, "Ersatz Government"; (18:4) 
published on April 4, 1937 is one of the most significant comparisons 
made by the Times. Here the speech by Goebbels commemorating the 
forty-eighth birthday of Adolph Hitler is reponded to by a comparison 
of democratic and totalitarian governments as they relate to the 
difficulty each has in ruling any given people. Times' citation 
of widespread dissent in Germany is sound. and the examples of .the lack 
of internal cohesion in_ government circles are conveniently situated 
in the a_rgument. Authorities on Hitler's political techniques will 
assert, however, that he permitted, and at times even fostered·, the 
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disharmony in his government to prevent any power blocs from forming 
against him. This should have been·. considered in the editorial. 
It nu.ght be that Hitler had not been in power lo_ng enough for a clear 
picture of the nuances of his methods to be·perceived by his critics. 
The editors also point out that Goebbels might'be misconstrued about 
the positions democratic governments take regardi_ng the difficulty of 
totalitarian rule. Goebbels was.a firm philosophical proponent of 
the totalitarian form, right down to the last day of his life. The 
Times was absolutely correct in drawing attention to the error of his 
perceptions because Goebbels' diaries·revealed later that he was 
pitifully ignorant about societies other than the German Reich. It 
can be said that, to the end, he never really understood,the British, 
for whom he had great respect, nor the Americans, about whom he knew 
very little. It can also be said that inconsistancies exist in the 
democratic form of government which do not arise out of the 
enlightened discourse of the masses as the Times asserts. Watergate 
is a glowing example of this. 
-Goebbels is caught in a very weak position in, "Uniting 
Germany", a fourteen inch condemnation of his position on the growing 
dissent in the German churches, published on May 31, 1937, (14:4). 
It is apparent that the sarcasm is now becoming less desirable to the 
editors of the Times and it is here that Dr. Finley assumes. control 
of the editorial page. The strength of the arguments are devastating. 
as the Times rips Goebbels' attempts at justifyi_ng the on-going 
religious persecution in Germany. The attempts at moral justification 
and appeals to decency are rebutted by reminders about the 1934 purge, 
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the summary executions and the exploits.of Ernst Roehm, the.homo-
sexual. Goebbels would later determine how· the: rulh1gs of the German 
courts would be reported in the.press and by.wham. The close is the 
most effective element in this piece which calls to the attention of 
the reader the gross inconsistancies which are now becoming I().ore. and 
more numerous in Goebbels' propaganda, 
"In the same breath in which he proclaims that 
religious wars divided and weakened Germany, Dr. 
Goebbels warns of a new purge and declares a war 
to the finish. This is a strange but now familiar 
formula by which the Nazis propose to achieve 
national unity." 
The first mention of possible war is made in, "Calling All 
Babies", a short, four and one-half inch comparison of_planned 
population policy simultaneously announced by the Russians and the 
Nazis published on June 9, 1937. The Times states, "If we were sure 
that Herr Goebbels won't start anything before he has his extra 
twenty million and that Moscow won't start anything before she has her 
one hundred and twenty five million ... " It is a brief capitalization 
on similar remarks made by governments of similar qualities and as 
such is a sound vehicle. It is the last time Goebbels will appear in 
the editorial page for a year and a half. 
"Laugh, Clowns, Laugh" was the title of the February 7, 1939 
editorial, which, in six and one-half inches, complained of the lack 
of humor in the Third Reich. It is little more than reflective of a 
qualitative trait of Goebbels and the. government in general when he 
ordered an actor expelled from the profession because of some 
unacceptable comment made before a German audience during a 
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performance. Goebbels is ridiculed for reacti_ng publically by 
proclaimi_ng a humor contest to· offset negative public reaction. It 
is ironic that this editorial is on the humorous side of Germany's 
government because it is the last Goebbels appears in before the out-
break of the Second World War on September 1, 1939. (18:4) 
By the time, "The Spiritual Weapons" was published Charles Merz 
had assumed control of the Times editorial page. In this nine inch 
composition appeared on December 2, 1939, Goebbels is again quoted at 
the beginning of the text and not attributed until the end. He is 
quoted as saying at one point, "Art is one of the sharpest spiritual 
weapons of war." The general theme of the editorial plays on 
Goebbels contention that optimism is an essential ingredient in 
successful wartime operations. The conflict in past and present 
positions is capitalized on very effectively. The close is a sharp 
rebuke to Goebbels' inconsistancy. Asking if he realized what he was 
implying at the time he made the quoted statement, the Times says, 
"And if he did, would it not be the part of .wisdom for him to slip 
quietly over the Swiss frontier?" (16:3) 
Indignation would be the best word to describe the posture found 
in. "Advice From Dr. Goebbels', published:.on March 1, 1940. This 
eight and one-half inch editorial is a searing indictment of Goebbels' 
position on the rights of neutral countries to publically state their 
political positions and reactions. The Times' contention is that 
proclaimed neutrality and freedom of expression are not mutually 
exclusive. They conclude that Goebbels' statements of disapproval 
indicate that the.European neutrals are in jeopardy if criticism of 
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the Reich is not discontinued. The acid open to the editorial is 
illustrative of the great contempt the Times: held for. Goebbels. "That 
oellucid thinker, that good,. gentle, tolerant, easygoi.ng statesman 
Herr Doctor Joseph Goebbels .•. " The close is an indication of the 
Ti10es 1 position of the conduct of the German government as a whole. 
"But the ·truth is we can't· insult them. No one can 
insult a government which is somewhere between 800 
and 25,000 years behind the times in every attribute 
of civilization and human. decency. It is a waste 
of energy to try." (20:1) 
On October 4, 1940 the Times published, "Nazi Golden Age", (22 :1) 
in which it compared the classic, idylic and utopian concept of the 
golden age to Goebbels' concept of one of war and conflict. A simple 
reflection, it served to illustrate the kind of approach Goebbels 
took in indoctrinating the Hitler·Youth at the onset of the war. A 
brief five and one-half inch composition, the. editorial was not 
without it's assertion that, "Liberty's days. of gold may yet come, 
with the unanswerable thunder of guns and the whirring of 
irresistable wings. " Such melodic fare was to become more and more 
prominent in the first days of the war when the allies were suffering 
severe setbacks. It is as though the.Times was indulging in a little 
propaganda of its own. 
In a couplet editorial under the "Topics of the Times" logo, 
The Times published, "Evacuated German Children" and, "Bombs Home to 
Roost", (14:4) on December 28, 1940. Germany, it is explained in this 
nine and one-half inch editorial, is now starting to experience the 
impact of mass aerial bombardment. Goebbels trys to justify the need 
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for such protective measures as the l arge- scale evacuation of 
children and cites the immensity of German military operations . The 
Times compares the scale to world war one and concludes the cost is 
the children. -Artic l e is emotive and rather reflective, almost with-
out real point to be made . I t will be a year and nine months befor e 
Goebbels appears in the edi torial section again and Gennany ' s 
position will have begun t o deteriorate substantially . 
That this occurr ed is evi dent in the l ead to , "The Invisible 
War" , publi shed on September 4 , 1942, (22:1) which read, "Somehow 
the statements of Propaganda Minist er Goebbels no l onger ring with 
the same sel f - confidence. He has begun to plead with the Gennan 
people. " The editorial continues to summarize the conditions in 
Gennany under heavy and growing allied bombardment . Reference is 
made to the increased penetration of British broadcasting with Dr. 
Goebbels never really found himself in a position to effectively 
cont~ol; even though such listening was punishabl e by death at the 
time this editorial went to print . It i s also noteworthy that 
Goebbe l s was restricti ng the infonnation about bomb destriction in 
the German Press and Radio and at the same time relying heavily on 
bomb destruction reports from BBe for use in his own newscasting 
operations. There is a shrewd assumption on the part of the Times 
conta ined here that Goebbels i s starting to become disillusioned with 
Hitler 1 s ability to conduct the war. He does mention many periods 
of doubt i n hi s Diaries at this time but, as events i l l ustrate , he is 
the last to leave lliitler, and then only i n death . 
By the time Goebbel s returned to the editorial page on April 
20 , 1943, (22:2) the New York Times found itself in a position to 
assert , "Things looked well fo:r Hitler two years ago . They don ' t 
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look sp well now." This nine and one-ha l f inch editor ial the editors 
have used to point out that the word of Dr . Goebbels has been ringing 
hollow for some time , " . . . even the official propaganda sounds like 
whistl ing in a cernetary ." While only marginally :r::elevant to Goebbels, 
the piece further asserts that , as an educated man , he must be feeling 
very d i s ill usioned with his Fuehrer . Again , it is as though there 
existed a personal vendetta between Goebbels and the Times editorial 
staff . 
Goebbels probably read the New York Times every day . If such 
was the case , he coul dn ' t have been pleased with the theme of 
September 5 , 1943 ' s editorial , "Goebbel s Does His Best" (I V, 8 :1). 
It is a direct and devastating attack upon his somewhat worn 
argument that Germany never wanted war anyway; to try and make some 
justi fication for the di saster befall ing her at the time. Goebbels ' 
assertions about smal l over- populated nations not sure of Germany ' s 
will to survive are sounded out and refuted . It is also in this 
editorial that we have the first i nkling that the Times is ready to 
specul ate about the end of the war in relation to a definite period 
of time, "But Herr Goebbels is ingenious. We shall look forward to 
his review of five years of war a year hence . In case, that is, that 
he is still able and around at that time . '' If Goebbels read the 
New York Times he would have been hard putcto r ebutt the ~rguments 
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put here. He could not have known that the time-frame in which the 
Times was beginning to think was not that far from the truth. 
The editorial entitled, "Art is Long--", published on December 
26, 1943, (IV, 8:2) is little more than an eight and one half-inch 
scandal shot charging Goebbels with absconding with some famous works 
of art. The problem with this assertion is that graft is not, unfort-
unately, restricted to the German government. The significant 
element in this piece is the re-assertion that, "Time is growing 
short." 
The next two editorials naming Goebbels are of only marginal 
relevance to him personally or politically. The first, "Russia's 
New Victories", published in the middle of March of 1944 and, "Why 
the Generals Failed", published in July of the same year, merely 
use short Goebbels statements to launch attacks on Germany's vastly 
deteriorated position generally. They are principly concerned with 
strategic analysis of the fronts and of the military breakdown of the 
Reich forces, both of which Goebbels had little to do with, actually. 
He appears again on November 13, 1944 in an editorial entitled, 
"The Hitler Mystery", (18:1) in which certain statements made to the 
child's militia, or the 'home guard' is installed in the face of 
martial collapse. Here the substance of his statements are not even 
detailed except to be called almost foolish. The only real quote is 
given toward the end of the composition where he is said to be 
fishing for a possible peace feeler, "Germany, he said, will continue 
to f.ight until her enemies 'are prepared to conclude a decent peace. '" 
He was not actually doing anything of the kind, however, because h~s 
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diaries reveal at this time period a frustrated Goebbels repeatedly 
going to Hitler to ask for further.powers to institute total defence 
measures in Berlin. He had alree\dY res_igned himself to death, as had 
his wife, Magda. 
On December 31, 1945, six months after Goebbels' death, the Times 
published an editorial entitled, "Hitler's Testament" (16:ll. It is 
a last stab at the entire Nazi ideol_ogy and again both Hitler and 
Goebbels are used as spring boards for commentary on the evils of 
totalitarian go~ernment. It concludes that both Hitler and Goebbels 
fell victim to their own lies and that the mark they made on history 
will serve as and example and therefore not be entirely without 
redeeming value. The style is pompous, now, but then, it, in all 
probability, inspired many sincere feelings on the part of the readers. 
It is pointed out, however, that Goebbels was the only one to remain 
with Hitler in the last hours. In fact, although not mentioned in the 
editorial, Goebbels' staff was the only one that did not flee and his 
personal assistant was captured, with other staffers, in the 
Propaganda Ministry, at their desks, by the Russians. 
If any general comment can be made about the coverage of Goebbels 
by the New York Times editorial staff, it is that they were content to 
employ very grandiose language and puff themselves up quite a bit when 
reacting to his arguments. Reacti_ng is an accurate work also for, 
throughout most of the war, the nendency of the editorials was very 
reactionary in around 80%.of the publications. 
The manner in which arguments were presented was to the greatest 
possible advantage to the American interests, which, one could 
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suppose, was probably very naturc1l. In WWII the press of l\merica 
had a grec1t tendency to be most tolerant with government, a posture 
which was to prevail up until the .. b_eginning of the Viet Nam war. 
It could also be asserted that much of the style of the'Times' 
editorial :.,age was very emotive, marginally logical and much given to 
pro:.,agandization. Most papers in the country.were of such a nature at 
that time. 
While it would be a very difficult assumption to prove, the 
supposition that the Times might, at the request of the government, 
have withheld some information, juxtaposed information in the 
interests of national security, and similar practices, is not beyond 
the realm of belief. This is not to say the Times might have 
published any outright lies at government request, but it is not 
unreasonable to assume that the Times might have cooperated with the 
government for the cause of the war. It is exceedingly probable that, 
after the Viet Nam experience, the_ governmental lies, the wi thholdi_ng 
of information to hide mistakes and the rest, the Times would never 
indulge the government again in the fashion of WWII. 
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APPENDIX II 
Comprehensive Listing of Goebbels Appearances in New York Times. 
1930 1933 cont . 1933 cont . 
Sept. 2, 16:5 Apr. 12, 24 : 5 Nov . 18 , 11 : 3 
June 1, 13 : 5 Apr. 16, IV 1:4 Nov . 22 , 10 : 5 
Nov. 29, 10:4 Apr. 25, 9 :1 Nov . 19, 11:2 
Apr . 28 , 9:3 Nov . 24 , 15 : 1 
Apr. 30 , 28 : 2 
1931 Apr. 30, IV 2 : 3 
May 7 , 12 : 5 1934 
Feb. 6 , 9:1 May 7 , 13: 2 
Mar . 22, 2:1 May 10 , 10:1 Jan . 16 , 12 : 3 
Apr. 28 , 56:4 May 14 , IV 4 :7 Jan . 20 , 8:2 
June 23 , 15:8 May 11, 10 : 2 Jan . 22 , 14:4 ed 
Nov. 18, 6 : 2 May 30 , 5 : 4 Jan. 21 , IX 2 : 3 
J une 26 , 14 : 7 Jan. 27 , 7:2 
J une 29, 1:3 Feb . 1 2 , 17 : 3 
1932 July 8 , 10 : 4 Feb . 13, 18:4 ed 
July 9 , 2 : 5 Feb . 18 , IY 2 : 8 
Feb . 24, 10 : 2 Aug. 18, 8 : 3 Feb . 19, 6:2 
Apr . 16, 4:3 Aug . 29 , 4:4 Mar. 1 , 8 : 3 
June 24 , 6 : 2 Sept. 1, 12 : 2 Mar . 7 , 4 : 2 
June 28, 5:4 Sept. 3 I 1:1 Mar . 24, 7:6 
Sept. 25 , II, 5 : 6 Sept . 13 , 10:2 Apr . 14, 8:5 
Oct. 20 , 5 : 1 Sept. 14 , 1:3 Apr . 14 , 8 : 8 
Nov . 7, 1:1 Sept. 17 , IV 3:8 Apr . 1 5 , X 5 : 7 
Sept. 15, 9 :1 Apr . 21 , 9:4 
Sept. 24 , 35 : 2 Apr . 24 , 22:4 ed 
1933 Sept . 25, 1 : 2 Apr. VI p.3 Corr. 5/5 , 15:7 
Sept . 25 , 6 : 5 Apr. 27 , 10:5 
Mar . 1 2 , 20:4 Sept. 26, 14:1 Apr . 29 , IV 2:7 
Mar. 14 , 13 :4 Sept. 26, 1: 3 May 7, 9:3 
Mar . 16, 13 :1 Sept. 27, 13: 2 May 19 , 6:3 
Mar . 19, IV 1:6 Sept. 29 , 10:4 May 9 , 1: 2 
Mar. 20 , 14:5 ed Sept . 30 , 6 : 7 May 1 0 , 20:4 ed 
Mar . 19, 1:2 Oct . 1 , IV 4:7 May 12, 6 : 2 
Mar . 28 , 12 : 5 Oct. 9 , 14:2 May 13, 30 : l 
Apr. 1, 1: 8 Oct . 15, IV 5 : 3 May 1 5 , 11 :5 
Apr . 1, 11:1 Oct. 18 , 3 : 3 May 13, IV 1:6 
Apr. 7 , 10 ; 3 Oct . 21, 9 : 4 May 14 I 16:4 
Apr. 2 , 8:4 Oct . 26 , 8 : 6 May 28 , 8:5 
Apr. 2 , 28 : 6 Oct. 27 , 12:5 May 29 , 10:5 
Apr. 4 , 12:3 Nov. 4, 1 : 3 June 7, 10 : 2 
Apr . 12 - p.16 Nov. 19, IV 3 : 6 June 13, 11 :1 
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1934 cont. 1935 cont. 1936 cont. 
June 13, 11:2 .Ma-r. 31, r..v 4;3 ;Feb . 23 , · I.V 2 : 7 
June 14, 11:2 Apr. 4, 17;5 ;Feb. 23 I I.V 1;2 
June 1 5 , 5:5 Apr. 7, 1: 1 Mar. 1 , I.V 2:4 
June 24 , 3:3 Apr. 7, 35:2 Mar. 29 , VII p . 8 
June 25, 7 : 1 Apr. 14, 1:7 Mar . 1, IV, 6:6 
July 1, IX 3:2 Apr . 15, 12:3 Mar. 5 , 20:4 ed 
July 2 , 2:3 Apr. 28 , 5:1 Mar. 2 , 10:4 
July 6 , 1:8 May 20 , 8 : 8 Mar. 1 1, 14:2 
July 2, 1:8 May 2, 5:1 Mar . 13 , 11:1 
July 12, 1:5 June 2 , 32:7 Mar . 20, 9 : 2 
Aug . 14, 1:2 June 12, 9:1 Mar . 25 , 12:2 
Aug . 14, 10:l June 24 , 12:5 Apr. 2 I 1:2 
Aug . 15, 3:7 June 25, 15:2 Apr . 20 , 8 : 2 
Aug. 19, VIII 2:3 June 26 , 19:2 May 2, 3:1 
Aug . 25, 5:6 June 18 , 8:5 May 24 , 31:2 
Aug . 26, 2 : 5 June 21 , 7:5 May 14 , 1:4 
Aug. 28 , 7 : 1 June 22 , 7:2 May 18, 16:3 ed 
Aug. >29 , 16:4 ed June 23 , 20:1 May 24, IX 1:1 
Sept . 4 , 15:3 June 25, 10 : 2 May 3 , IV 4:3 
Sept. 17, 8:6 June 30, 8:4 May 31 , IV 5:1 
Oct . 3, 10:6 June 30 , IV 4 :7 June 3 , 24:3 
Oct . 9 , 6:1 July 24 , 1:4 June 15 , 9:5 
Oct. 1 3 , 5:1 July 28, IV 1:5 June 20 , 10:4 
Oct. 14, IV 1 : 6 Aug . 5 , 1:8 July 6, 6:2 
Oct. 15, 16:4 Aug. 7, 18:3 ed . July 12, 1:5 
Oct. 26, 14:3 Aug. 6, 16:4 July 13 , 10:2 
Nov. 1, 2:5 Aug. 8 , 8:2 July 31, 13 : 2 
Nov . 6 , 23:7 Aug. 11, IV 4:7 Aug. 3, 14:4 
Nov . 19 , 11: 2 Aug. 25, IV 5 : 3 Aug . 16 , V 2 : 1 
Nov. 24, 7:2 Aug. 17, 2:3 Aug . 30, 1:7 
Nov. 26, 4:6 Aug. 22 , 1:4 Aug. 31, 3:2 
Dec . 3 , 14:4 Aug . 24, 7 : 1 Aug. 30 , 25 : 3 
Dec . 30, IX 4:1 Aug . 25, 1:3 Sept. 1, 13:2 
Dec . 20, IX 4:5 Sept. 1 , 1 : 4 Sept. 11, 12:2 
Dec . 5, 16:3 Sept. 3, 15:1 Sept. 11, 1:2 
Dec . 9, 28:2 Sept. 20, 4 :1 Sept. 12 , 1:1 
Dec. 7, 27:5 Sept . 24, 22:4 ed Sept. 1 2 , 7:1 
Sept . 30 , 11 :4 Sept. 26, 9:4 
Nov. 16, 1 : 5 Sept. 13 , IV 4 : 5 
1935 Dec. 14, 10 : 2 Sept . 20 , 34:5 
Dec. 29, IV 8 : 4 Sept. 21 , 10:3 
Jan 1, 1 : 4 Sept. 25 , 14:6 
Jan. 7 , 14:2 Sept. 29, 9 : 8 
Jan. 26, 13 ;4 1936 Oct . 4, 32:4 
Feb . 24, IV 4:3 Oct . 25 , II 6 : 8 
Mar . 1 , 17:1 Jan. 18, 1:3 Oct. 27 , 24 : 4 ed 
Mar. 19, 2:4 Beb'. 11, 5:3 Oct . 26 , 1:4 
Mar. 23 , 8:4 Feb. 16, IV 5:6 Oct . 27 , 4:2 
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1936 cont. 1937 cont. 1938 cont, 
Oct . 30, 4:2 June 20, 28 : l JulX 30 1 5 ; 5 
Oct . 31, 8 : 2 June 22, 12 ; 2 Aug . 6 , 5 ; 6 
Nov. 4, 29:4 July 18, 3:2 Sept. 2 , 1 : 8 
Nov. 6 , 12:3 July 31, 2:7 Sept . 11, 39 :1 
Nov. 8 , IV 8 : 2 ed A:U<J'. 1, 26:1 Sept. 1 2, 3:2 
Nov . 8 , IV, 7 : 2 Aug . 16, 6:3 Oct. 6 , 17:3 
Nov . 29 , IV 4:3 Sept. 6 , 4 : 4 Oct . 19 , 1:2 
Nov . 16, 25:5 Sept. 8 , 10:4 Oct. 15, 2 : 2 
Nov . 26 , 1 : 8 Sept . 10 , 7 :1 Oct , 22 , 8:5 
Nov . 28 , 1:5 Sept. 12, 38:5 Dec . 1, 10:4 
Nov . 29, 31 : 3 Oct. 1, 5 : 3 Dec. 16, 20:2 
Nov . 29, IV 8:4 ed. Oct. 6 , 7:5 Dec. 4 , 42:2 
Dec . 6 , 42:2 Oct. 7 , 20 : 5 Dec. 18 , IV 1 : 6 
Dec . 1 7 , 17:7 Oct. 30, 3 :5 Dec. 23 , 11:5 
Dec. 22, 13 : 1 Nov. 6, 2 :4 Dec . 31, 5:5 
Nov. 9 , 15 : 5 
Nov. 26 , 2 : 6 
1937 Nov. 27 , 19:1 1939 
Dec. 12 , 53 : 7 
Feb. 14, VIII p . 3 Dec. 14 , 12 : 5 Jan . 1 , 16 :1 
Feb. 20, 19:4 Dec . 24 , 8 : 8 Jan . 1 9 , 7 : 4 
Feb . 26 , 11:5 Jan . 21, 5:1,3 
Mar . 7, IV 1:6 Jan. 26 , 6 : 6 
Mar . 1 2, 27 : 5 1938 Jan . 2 , 14 : 2 
Mar . 20, 1:4 Jan. 14 , 4 : 4 
Mar. 22 , 8:2 Jan. 31 , 1 : 6 Jan. 29 , 23 : 5 
Mar . 26, 9: 1 B'eb . 5 , 1 : 8 Jan. 30, 5:6 
Apr . 17 , 7:5 Feb . 17 , 3 : 2 Feb. 4, 1:3 
Apr. 20 , 9 : 2 Feb. 19, 3:6 Feb . 5 , 33 : 4 
Apr . 21 , 22 : 2 ed. Feb . 22, 19 : 2 Feb . 7 , 18:4 ed. 
Apr . 26, 4:1 Mar. 10 , 15:2 Feb. 19, 32 : 4 
May 2 , 39 : 3 Mar. 23 , 9:9 Mar . 5 , VII p.6 
May 2, VIII p. 9 Mar . 30, 4 : 2 Mar . 6 , 1:6 
May 9 , 3:4 Apr. 5 , 16:3 Mar. 8 , 8:5 
May 19, 11 :1 Apr . 10, 1 : 1 Mar. 9 , 1 2 : 4 
May 29 , 1:3 Apr. 10 , 36 : 1 Mar . 10, 5 : 3 
May 31, 14:2 ed . Apr. 11 , 1 : 8 Mar. 11 , 7 : 3 
May 30 , 1:7 Apr. 20 , 13 :1 Apr. 16, 40 : 2 
May 26 , 6 :B May 15 , V 10:l Apr. 20, 5:1 
May 19 , 25:4 May 28 , 5:1 Apr. 21 , 8 : 6 
June 5 , 8:2 May 30 , 4:4 May 2 , 10:4 
June 6 , 1:3 June 13 , 15 : 4 May 2 , 48:3 
June 22 , 1:2 June 15, 1:3 May 3 , 22 : 4 
June 27 , I V 12:6 June 19, 21 :1 May 4, 22:5 
June 28 , 12:6 June 20, 8 : 4 June 26, 3:2 
June 7 , 4 : 1 June 24 , 22 : 5 July 16 , 20 : 3 
June 9 , 24:4 ed . July 23, 3 : 4 Jul y 29, 3:5 
June 15, 5 : 5 July 24, 20:4 Sept. 22, 4:6 
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1939 cont. 1939 cont, 1941 
Sept . 28, 6:2 June 27 1 19 : 5 , 6 Ja.n, 1, 16 ; 3 
Sept, 22, 6 : 6 July 1 , 6 : 1.-.4 Ja.n. 6: 14:4 
Sept. 28 , 6 : 5 July 19, 7;4 Jan. 31 , 18:6 
Oct. 9, 6 : 6 July 29 , 3 : 5 Feb. 3 , 3:7 
Oct. 10, 4 : 2 Aug. 9, 7: 2 , 4 Feb. 6 , 6 : 4 
Oct . 18, 1:4 Aug. 11, 1:7,8 Feb. 9 , 16:1 
Oct. 19, 22 : 1 ed. Aug . 13, 7:3 , 4,7 Feb. 12 , 16:1 
Oct. 23, 4 :1 Aug . 16, 1:5,8 Feb. 19, 7:6 
Oct. 29, 9 : 3 Mar . 3 , 4:7 
Oct. 29, 4 : 6 Mar. 12, 5:5 
Nov . 2 , 3:4 1940 Mar. 12 , 20 : 2 ed. 
Nov . 6, 3:1 Apr. 6 , 1: 6 , 8 
Nov . 9, 1:5 Jan. 1, 11:1 May 2 , 9 : 1 
Nov . 13, 3 : 8 Jan . 12 , 5 :1 May 18, VII p . l 
Nov . 13, 4:5 Jan . 20 , 5 :1 May 22 , 3:6 
Nov. 28, 3 : 5 Feb. 14, 4:1 June 14, 3:8 
Dec. 2 , 16:3 ed. Feb . 29 , 3:4 June 22, 1:8 
Dec. 7, 29:8 Mar . 1 , 20:1 ed . J une 25, 3:8 
Dec . 13 , 12 : 9 Mar. 4 , 2:2 July 13 , IV 4:6 
Dec . 23 , 9:1 Mar. 5 , 3 : 3 July 18, 7 : 2 
Dec . 23, 5:6 Mar. 27 , 20:4 July 27 , 3 : 2 
Mar. 15, 1:7-8 Apr. 9, 2 : 2 Aug. 1 4 , 1:2 
Mar. 17, 8 :1, 5 Apr. 12, 10: 6 Aug . 17, 6:1 
Mar . 28, 7:1 Apr . 18 , 3:6 Aug. 20 , 18 : 7 
Mar. 29 , 14 : 2 Apr . 20 , 4 :1 Aug. 21 , 6:4 
Mar. 30, 7:1 May 10 , 4:5 Aug. 22 , 3 : 7 
May 19, 34:7 Sept. 1 , 3 : 5 
Germany Fore!i:gn Radio May 31, 3:7 oap . 3 , 2 : 5 
July 19, 7:2 Oct. 28 , 7 : 5 
Feb . 26, 24: 1 July 28 , 17:1 Oct . 29 , 11 : 4 
Mar . 21 , 7:1 July 29 , 2:7 Nov. 7, 1 : 5 
Apr . 1, 23 : 9 Sept . 2 , 9:7 Nov. 10, 3 : 3 
Apr . 7, 5 : 2,6 Sept. 3 , 3:2 Nov . 16, I V 4:8 
Apr . 22 , 7:1,7 Sept. 5 , 3 : 3 Nov. 16, IV 9:3 
Apr . 23 , 34 :1 ,3,6,8 Sept. 30, 5:2 Nov. 21 , 3:8 
May 5, 12:1 , 5 Oct . 1 , 6 : 5 Nov . 10, 8 : 3 
May 13 , 2 : 2 , 5 , 6 , 8 Oct . 4 , 22 : 1 ed. Nov. 14 , 11:2 
May 20 , 5 : 1 , 3 Oct . 12, 1:3 Nov . 28, 6 : 3 
May 21, 14:1 Oct . 27 , 28 : 4 Dec. 7, 39:2 
May 27 , 6 :1 , 5 , 8 , 7:2 Nov . 29 , 5 : 1 Dec. 26, 8:2 
June 9 , 36:1 , 4 Dec . 2 , 2 : 6 Dec . 21, 1:3 
June 15, 1:4 Dec. 11, 5 :1 Dec. 25 , 7 : 1 
June 15, I V 5 :1,3, 6 1 8 Dec. 12, 9 : 6 Dec. 31 , 16:6 
June 18 , 1:2 Dec. 25 , 1: 5 
June 1 9 , 1:7, 4 : 3 Dec, 28, 14: 4 ed . 
June 20 , 10: 3 
June 23 , 12:6 
June 26, 1: 6- 8 
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1942 1942 cont. 1943 cont . 
Jan . 3 I 9:3 Nov, 27 I 4;7 June 3, 20;1 ed. 
Jan. 11, 24:3 Dec. 17, 11 : 1 June 6 , 26 ; 3 
Jan. 23 , 7:2 Dec. 27 , 13 ; 2 June 19, 4:1 
Jan. 11, IV 4 : 7 Dec, 31 , 5:7 June 23 , 7 : 3 
Jan . 23 , 7:1 Dec. 20 , 39 : 3 June 24 , 4 : 3 
Jan . 16, 10 : 9 Dec. 23 , 3 : 5 June 26 , 6:5 
Jan . 18, VII p . 10 June 26 , 6:7 
Feb. 7, 4 : 8 June 27 , 20:4 
Feb. 11, 6:6 1943 June 27, 23 :1 
Mar. 7 , 4 : 1 J uly 2 , 7 : 2 
Mar. 25, 10:5 Jan. 1, 4:5 July 17 , 4:2 
Apr. 1 2, VII 28 : 2 Jan. 3, 7:2 July 24, 2 : 2 
Apr . 17, 4:8 Jan. 7 I 3 : 6 July 14, 12:6 
Apr . 20, 6 : 5 Jan. 19 , 4 : 4 & 5:4 July 10, 3 : 5 
May 28, 3 : 4 Jan . 28 , 7:4 July 18, IV 4:1 
May 30 , 4 : 3 Jan . 17 , IV 4 : 5 Aug. 2 , 1 : 6 
June 13, 7:1 Jan. 21, 4 : 2 Aug . 7 ' 1 : 6 
June 18 , 4 :1 Jan . 31 , 1:6,8 Aug . 8 , IV 3:3 
June 22 , 4:3 Jan . 31 , 39 : 2 Aug . 10 , 4:2 
June 22 , 6 : 5 Feb. 1 , 3:1 Aug . 17, 4:4 
July 1 2 , I V 5 :7 Feb. 1, 4:6 Aug . 30, 4 : 4 
July 26 , IV 9 : 6 Feb. 4, 3 : 3 Aug . 10, 4 : 7 
July 30 , 3:2 Feb. 7' IV 3:3 Aug. 21 , 3 : 8 
Aug . 13, 5:3 Feb. 8 , 6 : 4 Aug . 19 , 5 : 5 
Aug . 19 , 5 : 9 Feb . 13 , 5 : 6 Aug. 1 5 , IV 4:6 
Aug . 20, 7 : 2 Feb. 15, 3 : 6 Aug . 20 , 3:7 
Aug . 24 , 4 : 2 Feb. 19 , 1:5 Aug . 21 , 6 : 1 
Aug. 31 , 5 : 3 Feb . 21 , IV 3 :7 Aug. 27, 2 : 5 
Sept. 3, 4:6 Feb. 25 , 4 : 6 Sept . 3 , 4:6 
Sept . 9 , 22 : 1 ed. Mar . 8, 5 :1 Sept . 3 I 6 : 3 
Sept . 13, 3:3 Mar . 13, 4:7 Sept. 5 , IV 8 :1 ed . 
Sept . 18, 3 : 5 Mar. 14 , 5 :1 Sept. 1 2 , IV 9 : 6 
Sept . 24 , 3:5 Mar. 17 , 5 : 3 Oct. 2 , 5:5 
sepp. 26, 6:1 Mar. 21 , 12 : 2 Oct. 3 ' 39 : 5 
Sept. 22, 6:1 Mar. 29 , 4 : 4 Oct . 4, 4:1 
Sept . 27 , 13 : 1 Mar. 12, 7:2 Oct . 4 ' 16:3 
Oct. 1, 9:3 Apr. 12, 7:2 Oct. 5 , 29 : 2 
Oct . 19 , 18:5 Apr. 20, 10 : l Oct. 10, VI p.9 
Oct . 2, 6:3 Apr . 20, 22 : 2 ed. Oct. 17 , VI 45:3 
Oct. 1 2, 5 : 8 Apr. 22, 10 : 6 Oct . 22 , 7 : 5 
Oct . 22 , 1 : 2 Apr. 23, 3 : 2 Oct . 27 , IV 9:3 
Oct . 25 , VII 35 : 1 Apr. 23 , 7 : 5 Oct . 29 , 5 : 2 
Oct . 30, 4:3 Apr. 30 , 4 : 3 Nov. 1, 2 : 7 
Oct . 27, 2 ; 3 Apr. 16, 2 : 2 Nov . . 7 , IV 4 : 1 
Oct . 30, 21 : 4 May 9 , 34 : 2 Nov . 7 , IV 11 : 4 
Nov. 19, 6:5 May 15 , 5 : 6 Nov. 8 , 7 : 4 
Nov. 22 , 32:3 May 26 , 5:1 Nov. 21, 39:5 
Nov. 26, 1:8 June 2 , 3 :1 Nov . 29 , 9 : 2 
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1945 cont. 1946 
Jun . 19, 4 :3 Feb, 10 , VI 30;4 
Jun. 26, 3:1 Mar, 15, 11;4 
Feb . 3 , 1:7 Apr. 26, 6;7 
Feb . 7, 6 :2 June 9 , 33:2 
Feb. 7 , 6 : 3 June 10, 9 : 3 
Feb . 8, 9 :1 
Feb. 11, VI 8 :1 
Feb. 16 , 7:1 1948 
Mar. 1, 8: 1 
Mar . 6 , IV 8:1 ed . Jan . 25, 43 :3 
Mar. 2 , 2:4 Mar . 14 , 5:1 
Mar. 9 , 3:6 Mar . 14, VI p . 9 
Mar. 11, 29 : 1 Mar . 15 , 1 :2 
Mar. 18 , VI p.9 Mar . 15 , 22 : 2 ed . 
Mar . 31 , 9:2 Mar . 16, 1:2 
Apr. 9, 18:5 Mar . 17, 14 : 3 
Apr . 13, 1 2 : 6 Mar . 18 , 23:1 
Apr . 19, 3:6 Mar. 19 , 1 2 : 2 
Apr . 20 , 5 :1 Mar . 20 , 6:2 
Apr . 21 , 3:1 Mar . 22 , 7:2 
Apr . 22, 1:7 Mar. 23 , 17 : 2 
Apr . 22, VI p.10 Mar . 24 , 20 : 2 
Apr. 23 I 6:6 Mar. 25 , 19:l 
Apr. 23 , 18 :1 Mar . 26 , 15:1 
Apr . 24, 4: 7 Mar. 27 , 4:2 
Apr. 24 , 18:1 Apr. 25, VII p.l 
Apr. 30 , 3:3 
May 2 , 8:1 
May 3 , 1: 5 
May 3, 10:1 
May 4, 1:8 
May 7 , 5:3 
May 11, 1 : 6 
May 14, 3 : 1 
May 16, 9 :1 
May 18 , 7:6 
May 6 , II 5 : 3 
May 13, 8 : 3 
May 20, 8 : 1 
Sept. 29 , 9 :1 
Sept . 30 , II 3 : 5 
0op . 10, 2:7 
Oct. 27, 9 : 2 
Nov . 2 , 1:1 
Nov . 2 , 3:2 
Dec. 30, 6 : 2 
Dec . 31, 6 : 2 ,4 
Dec. 31 , 16:1 ed. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Bezymenski., Lev, The Death of Adolf Hitler, (Hartcourt, Brace & 
World, Inc., New York} 1968. 
Boelcke, Willi A., The Secret Conferences of Dr. Goebbels, (E. P. 
Dutton & Co., Inc., New York} 1970. 
Bullock, Alan, Hitler, A Study in Tyranny, (Harper & Row, New York} 
1962. 
Christianson, Rea, and McWiliiams, Robert, Voice of the People: 
Readings In Public Opinion and Propaganda, (McGraw-Hill, Inc. 
New York} 1967. 
Craig, Gordon A., Europe Since 1914, (The Dryden Press Inc., 
Hinsdale, Illinois} 1972. 
Ebermayer, Erich, and Meissner, Hans-Otto, Evil Genius, The Story of 
Joseph Goebbels, (Allan Wingate, London} 1953. 
Ellul, Jacques, Propaganda, The Formation of Men's Attitudes 
(Vintage Books, New York} 1973. 
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Goebbels Diaries, (Doubleday & Company, 
Inc., Garden City, New York} Edited and Translated by Louis P. 
Lochner, 1948. 
Goebbels, Dr. Joseph P., The Early Goebbels Diaries, (Frederick A 
Praeger, New York} 1963. 
Gordon, George N.; Falk, Irving, and Hodapp, William, The Idea 
Invaders (Hastings House, New York} 1963. 
Grunberger, Richard, The 12-Year Reich, (Ballantine Books, New York} 
1971. 
Hale, Oran J., The Captive Press in the Third Reich, (Princeton 
University Press, Princeton, New York} 1964. 
Hardy, Alexander G., Hitler's Secret Weapon, (Vantage Press, New 
York} 1967. 
Hitler, Adolf, Mein Kampf, (Houghton Mifflin Company, Boston} 
Translated by Ralph Manhein, 1971. 
lS 
Manville, Roger, and Fraenkel, Heinrich, Dr. Goebbels, His Life and 
Death, (Simon & Schuster, New York) 1960. 
Michel, Henri, The Shadow War, (Harper & Row, New York) 1972. 
Qualter, Terence H., Propaganda and Psychological warfare, (Random 
House, New York) 1962. 
Riess, Curt, Joseph Goebbels, (Ballantine Books, New York, New York) 
1948. 
Semmler, Rudolf, Goebbels-The Man Next To Hitler, (Westhouse, London) 
1947. 
Sington, Derrick, and Weindenfeld, Arthur, The Goebbels Experiment 
(Yale University Press, New Haven) 1943. 
Shirer, William L., The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich, (Fawcett 
Publications, Inc., Greenwich, Connecticut) 1959. 
Weiss, John, Nazis and Facists in Europe, 1918-1945, (Quadrangle 
Books Chicago) 1969. 
; 
G0291 
